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Abstract 
 
This dissertation explores intersections between trompe l'oeil painting and photography. 
It began as an interest in contemporary photographers, such as Thomas Demand, whose 
photographs of constructed paper models encourage viewers to discover the nature of his 
interventions. His strategy resonates with a centuries-old strategy in trompe l'oeil 
painting, but now in the terms of photographic, rather than pictorial presence. That is, 
most of Demand's photographs do not compel the viewer's belief in the tangible presence 
of the object represented; instead, they exploit photography's indexical promise of 
delivering the world as it once appeared, in order to temporarily trick viewers about the 
terms of that indexical delivery. Beyond intersections in artistic strategies, I track 
reception accounts of trompe l'oeil painting and photography for their reliance on a 
credulous spectator. Pliny's Zeuxis, who is tricked by Parrhasius's painting of a curtain, 
remains the model for this errant credulity. In their efforts to reveal the manipulation of 
photographs, historians and theorists assume that the natural attitude for viewing 
photographs is wholly credulous and recast postmodern viewers as contemporary 
Zeuxises. Instead of admonishing spectators for such credulity, I argue that trompe l'oeil 
facilitates a pleasurable experience of oscillation between belief and disbelief. I also 
suggest that these trompe l’oeil deployments of oscillation tend to coincide with historical 
moments of perceived change in visual technologies—changes due to digitalization, as 
well as mechanical or other forms of reproduction. Trompe l'oeil artists play upon our 
supposed willingness to accept reproductions for the objects they represent. The inclusion 
of photographs and/or engravings in these trompe l’oeil paintings simultaneously stages 
and reprimands our desire for the aura of the actual object. Finally, I suggest that a 
contemporary renewal of trompe l'oeil in the medium of photography reveals an interest 
in recuperating belief in photographs—a belief not unlike that which Roland Barthes 
narrates in Camera Lucida. Just as Barthes can discover something of photography's 
indexical promise, even after decades of his own scholarly efforts to unveil photography's 
rhetoric of construction, so might we, even while heeding the postmodernist lessons of 
disbelief, recuperate a moment of belief in a skeptical age.  
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Introduction 
 
The apparent contradiction between the photograph as transparent and the 
photograph as representation describes a fundamental duality in theories of the medium. 
In his essay “Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism,” Kendall 
Walton declares, “Photographs are transparent. We see the world through them.”1 He 
compares this kind of ‘seeing through’ to seeing through eyeglasses, mirrors, or 
telescopes.2 The mechanical manner in which a photograph is produced allows us to see 
the referent through the photograph; “viewers of photographs are in perceptual contact 
with the world.”3   
It was also as “the record of a perception” that Ernst Gombrich defined painting.4 
Norman Bryson admonishes Gombrich for this misunderstanding, describing it as 
“fundamentally wrong” insofar as it suppresses, in his estimation, “the social character of 
the image, and its reality as sign.”5 Bryson insists on the social and cultural dimensions of 
the world available to interpretation through a painting, and John Tagg, for one, does this 
for photographs, arguing that they are signs through which class-, race-, or state-based 
power relations are represented, rather than records of reality.  
                                                
1 Kendall L. Walton, “Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism,” Critical Inquiry 11 
(December 1984) 246-77, 251. 
2 André Bazin states the case for photography’s transparency somewhat more emphatically: the photograph 
“shares, by virtue of the very process of its becoming, the being of the model of which it is the 
reproduction; it is the model.” It is not a sign, but rather a contribution to the natural world, in the order of a 
flower or snowflake. (André Bazin, “The Ontology of the Photographic Image,” in What Is Cinema?, ed. 
and trans. Hugh Gray, vol. 1 (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2005) 14.  
3 Walton 273. 
4 Norman Bryson, Vision and Painting: The Logic of the Gaze (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983) 
xii; abbreviated VP hereafter. 
5 Ibid. 
2 
 
For Bryson, Gombrich’s mistake is an error of “The Natural Attitude,” a term 
lifted from the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl to title the first chapter of his book 
Vision and Painting. According to Husserl, the natural attitude is our everyday encounter 
with the world, which presumes that the world is always already present, prior to my 
reflection upon it. In the natural attitude, he writes, “I find ever present and confronting 
me a single spatio-temporal reality of which I myself am a part…. This ‘reality,’ as the 
word already indicates, I find existing out there…. ‘The’ world as reality is always 
there.”6 It is a profoundly naïve, but ordinary way of being in the world, which 
Husserlian phenomenology efforts to correct through its insistence that the subject is 
always implicated in the world and vice versa.  
Insofar as a viewer of a painting might see in it an “image-object as if it were the 
image-subject present to direct perception,” she encounters it in the natural attitude. 
Scholars describe this as the domain of a particular kind of painting: trompe l’oeil. 
Indeed, Bryson’s chapter, “The Natural Attitude,” begins with an analysis of what he 
terms a most “revealing story about painting in the West.”7 Taken from Pliny’s Natural 
History, it is the oft-claimed origin story for trompe l’oeil painting. 
Zeuxis produced a picture of grapes so dexterously represented that birds began to 
fly down to eat from the painted vine. Whereupon Parrhasius designed so lifelike 
a picture of a curtain that Zeuxis, proud of the verdict of the birds, requested that 
the curtain should now be drawn back and the picture displayed. When he realized 
his mistake, with a modesty that did him honor, he yielded up the palm, saying 
that whereas he had managed to deceive only birds, Parrhasius had deceived an 
artist.8 
 
According to Pliny, a painting ought to be so perfect a copy of the world that its status as 
both a painting and a copy can be overlooked. 
                                                
6 Husserl qtd in Ibid., 4-5. 
7 Ibid., 1. 
8 Pliny qtd in Ibid., 1. 
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Zeuxis approaches Parrhasius’s painting in the natural attitude, and Parrhasius’s 
painting facilitates this by concealing its status as representation. For Bryson, 
Parrhasius’s painting is an image in the natural attitude, insofar as it is  
self-effacing in the representation or reduplication of things. The goal towards 
which it moves is the perfect replication of a reality found existing ‘out there’ 
already, and all its effort is consumed in the elimination of those obstacles which 
impede the reproduction of that prior reality: the intransigence of the physical 
medium; inadequacy of manual technique; the inertia of formulae that impede, 
through their rigidity, accuracy of registration.9  
 
Its relationship to the world, or its subject matter, is “essentially optical,” as if a kind of 
passive transcription, and its goal is thus transparency.10 It is not the painter’s effort, but 
the perfectly reproduced world that we should see. It is in trompe l’oeil that this painterly 
effort to conceal its status as a sign through self-effacement is most dramatically realized; 
“an artist aims to create an illusion convincing enough to deceive the eye of the beholder 
by making a flat surface appear three-dimensional when the painting is finished. Thus, in 
a sense, his technical skill is meant to go undetected.”11 
For Bryson, Pliny’s tale establishes the goals of art to be the disavowal of its 
fundamental materiality. Cast as an effort to achieve an “essential copy,” all traces of the 
process of production are purged, including the features of style, which would only 
interfere with this goal. Within this paradigm, style “appears as an inert and functionless 
deposit encrusting the apparatus of communication.”12 The traditional method of art 
historical connoisseurship proceeds as if a forensic analysis of telltale details—drapery, 
hands, hair, ear lobes—through which “style betrays itself, in the manner of a crime.”13 
                                                
9 Ibid., 6. 
10 Ibid., 6. 
11 Célestine Dars, Images of Deception: The Art of Trompe l’Oeil (New York: Phaidon Press, 1979) 7. 
12 Bryson, VP, 7. 
13 Ibid., 7. 
4 
 
According to Pliny, the painter who can best efface himself and his effort is victorious; 
painting’s goal is thus transparency. Its manner ought not to betray itself. While the 
connoisseur, the certain professional, might discover some telltale sign of an artist’s style 
in the detail of the drapery, Zeuxis does not. Instead, Zeuxis believes that the curtain—
the world reproduced in the painting—is actually present, as available to him as the world 
is in the natural attitude.  
But it is in reaching out to touch the painted curtain that Zeuxis discovers the 
mistake of the natural attitude: the curtain, much like the world ‘out there,’ is not (only) 
given to be seen (via perception), rather it is (also) given to be interpreted as a sign with 
social and historical dimensions. To understand trompe l’oeil as painting in the natural 
attitude is to overlook the way it simultaneously effaces and discloses its status as 
representation. Zeuxis does ‘realiz[e] his mistake’ and yields the prize to Parrhasius. 
Parrhasius’s curtain, ultimately, gives itself away. The viewer realizes that the curtain has 
“no being apart from [its] constitutio[n] as [an] image-subjec[t],” and this enables a 
phenomenological reflection, which marks a further departure from the natural attitude, 
“from the habitual givenness in our relation to things; instead of being there, ready to 
hand, they become obstinately painterly, merely representations.”14 
Instead of being only a mode of painting in the natural attitude that posits 
transparency as its goal, trompe l’oeil is also understood according to the disclosure of its 
trick. Inasmuch as it declares the obstinacy of its materiality, its goal is self-implication. 
As Caroline Levine writes, trompe l’oeil is “an art that compels us to reflect on the 
                                                
14 Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei, The Ecstatic Quotidian: Phenomenological Sightings in Modern Art and 
Literature (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2007) 220. 
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making of art.”15 Following Jean Baudrillard and Bryson, she understands trompe l’oeil 
as a simulacrum meant to implicate itself according to the artifice of its construction. 
“Even though trompe l’oeil appears to rely on mimesis,” writes Susan Siegfried, “it 
remains an unusually closed and self-referential system of representation that 
problematizes its mode of signification.”16 By limiting the interpretation of self-
reflexivity to problematization or self-implication, these scholars however cynically 
undercut what it means to reflect on the making of art. It is as if they imagine trompe 
l’oeil’s project to be one of catching the conventions of western art red-handed in the act 
of illusion, thereby condemning illusion and isolating it from any of its imaginative 
power.  
By limiting their interpretations of trompe l’oeil to its self-reflexivity these 
scholars, perhaps surprisingly, reprise something of John Ruskin on the subject, insofar 
as Ruskin complains that trompe l’oeil redirects the viewer’s attention from the 
imaginative power of a painting to the materiality of the constructed object.17 Moreover, 
they re-write that which Ruskin observed as its failure according to the discourse of self-
criticism, most readily and suspiciously associated with Greenbergian modernism. And 
while I agree that trompe l’oeil’s capacity to redirect spectatorial attention to the 
materiality of the art object is a critical part of its artistic deployment, I want to resist 
stopping short at this point alone. It is not as if trompe l’oeil has unique purchase in the 
history of art for drawing spectatorial attention to an artwork’s materiality. 
                                                
15 Caroline Levine qtd in Sybille Ebert-Schifferer, Deceptions and Illusions: Five Centuries of Trompe 
l’Oeil Painting (Washington, DC: National Gallery of Art, 2002) 362.  
 16 Susan Siegfried, The Art of Louis-Léopald Boilly: Modern Life in Napoleonic France (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1995) 183. 
17 Caroline Levine, “Seductive Reflexivity: Ruskin’s Dreaded Trompe l’oeil,” The Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism 56.4 (Autumn 1998) 366-375, 369. 
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Leo Steinberg writes, “All major painting, at least of the last six hundred years, 
has assiduously ‘called attention to art.”18 He describes the effect of reality in the 
paintings of the Old Masters as being, “as it were, between quotation marks.”19 Of the 
Sistine Ceiling, he observes, “the work is a battleground for local illusion, counter-
illusion, and emphasized architectural surface—art turning constantly back on itself.”20 
Of the storia figures in the corners of Niccolò di Pietro Gerini’s Crucifixion (1387) 
(Figure 0.1), he writes “their eager demonstrative gestures towards the Christ turn the 
illusionist scene of the Crucifixion back into a picture of it—complete with its own 
patterned frame. The artist here,” he continues, “does exactly what [Clement] Greenberg 
admires as a significant find in a crucial Cubist picture by [Georges] Braque: ‘(Braque) 
discovered that trompe l’oeil could be used to undeceive as well as to deceive the eye. It 
could be used, that is, to declare as well as to deny the actual surface.”21   
Greenberg rewrites trompe l’oeil according to the goals of modernism. Braque 
and Picasso did not employ trompe l’oeil within their collages to perpetuate the 
Renaissance goals of mimesis and to compel belief in their (deceptive) images, instead 
they use it for its capacity to undeceive, insofar as it ultimately discloses the material 
surface of the painting upon which the illusion is rendered. Unlike the viewer of William 
Harnett’s trompe l’oeil The Old Violin (1886) (Figure 0.2), who, according to a 
Cincinnati newspaper, bet $10 that a painted scrap of newspaper was an actual piece of 
newspaper pasted to a board, the viewer of Braque’s Cubist picture, according to 
Greenberg, is undeceived and incredulous, rather than deceived and credulous to its 
                                                
18 Leo Steinberg, Other Criteria: Confrontations with Twentieth-Century Art (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1972) 71. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Greenberg qtd in Ibid., 72. 
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trompe l’oeil illusion. Braque’s viewer navigates the painting’s “ceaseless optical 
oscillation,” until he can resolve it, ultimately as the flatness of the picture plane.22 “The 
abiding effect is a constant shuttling between surface and depth, in which the depicted 
flatness is ‘infected’ by the undepicted. Rather than being deceived, the eye is puzzled; 
instead of seeing objects in space, it sees nothing more than—a picture.”23  
For Greenberg it is the “use of art to call attention to art” that is the mark of 
modernism.24 This is in contrast to realist or illusionist art, which dissembles its medium, 
“using art to conceal art.”25 If the effect of pre-modernist paintings has to do with the way 
they “dissemble the medium, conceal the art, deny the surface, deceive the eye, etc.,” 
then their viewers seem to be wholly credulous to their illusion or realism. In this way, 
Greenberg conjures a credulous spectator of pre-modernist paintings, one who cannot 
“register two things in concert, to receive both the illusion and the means of illusion at 
once.”26 He projects the revelatory account of the trompe l’oeil viewing experience onto 
the history of spectatorship; at first the (credulous or pre-modern) viewer sees past the 
concealed brushwork of the painterly illusion, until recognition of (or attention to) its 
materiality as painting (via modernism) allows him to discover his error. Instead of its 
illusion of objects physically present in space, he now sees only their representation as a 
picture. Narrated as such, trompe l’oeil, like modernism, corrects for the error of 
credulous spectatorship, teaching viewers to discover the signs of a work’s construction. 
Braque and Picasso use trompe l’oeil to this end, discovering, according to Greenberg, its 
potential to undeceive.  
                                                
22 Ibid., 75. 
23 Greenberg qtd in Ibid. 
24 Greenberg qtd in Ibid., 68. 
25 Greenberg qtd in Ibid. 
26 Ibid., 75, 74. 
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The artist’s mastery by way of the trompe l’oeil painting instead becomes, by way 
of the incredulous spectator, an opportunity for spectatorial mastery. Wholly skeptical of 
a painting’s illusory effect, “we now believe that we are living in a world of codes, in a 
world that is encoded, and is, thus, artificial, manipulated and manipulable, mutable, 
clonable, mechanically and digitally multipliable and remasterable.”27 Such thinking 
insinuates its own kind of mastery over the existence of anything that might elude human 
knowledge—a noumenal beyond, according to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, or the 
real, according to the psychoanalysis of Jacques Lacan. Accordingly, as Melinda Szalòky 
helpfully articulates, “we have begun to imagine, and to believe that… ‘everything that 
exists, all existing things, are really just signs.”28  
If we limit our understanding of trompe l’oeil to its disclosure of the trick, then 
we cover over our experience of vulnerability to its illusion according to our regained 
mastery over its deployment of signs. But insofar as the trompe l’oeil trick accommodates 
even an infinitesimal experience of disorientation, it allows for something that is “held 
out to be ungraspable and unknowable for thought, something that should remain a 
promise, a residue never to be used up, a limitation within thought set or constituted by 
the nature of the thinking self” to re-emerge.29 Indeed, inasmuch as Parrhasius deploys 
this mode of painting in the representation of a curtain that refuses to be pulled back, he 
figures something of the Void of the unattainable object that Slavoj Žižek argues is the 
task of art today.30  
                                                
27 Melinda Szalòky, “The Reality of Illusion: A Transcendental Reevaluation of the Problem of Cinematic 
Reality,” Acta Univ. Sapientiae, Film and Media Studies 1 (2009) 7-22, 19. Accessed May 17, 2012. 
http://www.acta.sapientia.ro/acta-film/C1/film1-1.pdf. 
28 Ibid., qtg Theodor Adorno. 
29 Ibid., 20. 
30 Žižek summarized in Ibid., 19. 
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Žižek suggests that the fringes of this impenetrable beyond are represented in 
films, especially in the genre of the western, in the trope of the frontier as a literal 
horizon.31 In the trompe l’oeil tradition, “there is no horizon, no horizontality.”32 The 
curtain, for example, of the stage or the magic theater, or perhaps of a window, in 
contrast to the horizon, represents the threshold of a penetrable beyond. But, it is the 
painted curtain, in its refusal to yield, which reinsinuates the unreachability of a 
transcendental beyond into the archetypal trompe l’oeil scenario. In Chapter 1, “The 
Curtain as the Site/Sight of Credulous Spectatorship,” I locate the curtain as a site/sight 
of credulous spectatorship throughout not only a history of trompe l’oeil painting, but 
also of visual culture—from the stage to the cinema. I trace this iconographical motif 
from Pliny through trompe l’oeil painting to contemporary photography to explore the 
recurrence of this visual trope and its confrontation with the space of the credulous 
spectator.  
My use of examples from 17th-century Dutch painting to 21st-century German 
photography, from the ancient Greek theater to the cinema is not intended to overlook the 
often enormous differences between them, although perhaps it does this, or at the very 
least allows that work to be done elsewhere. Instead, I opt to attend to these examples in 
terms of their congruencies, which exist objectively and historically. The methodology 
aims to resemble something like a compilation of discoveries, inspired both by my 
experience as a curator of a not-fully cataloged photography collection and by the 
approach of Tacita Dean for her found photography book project, Floh (2001). Let loose 
in the collection stacks at Bryn Mawr College, the boxes of photographs I found there 
                                                
31 Žižek summarized in Ibid., 12-13. 
32 Patricia Allmer, René Magritte: Beyond Painting (New York: Manchester University Press, 2009) 71.  
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became the pool from which to gather samples; Dean, in turn, trawled flea markets to 
collect and amass her sampling of photographs. She compiled recurring subjects—an 
Audi, a pair of women, twin girls—while “never looking for anything specific, instead 
coming across appealing images by chance. So too, we might suppose, the two Audi 
drivers came across each other fortuitously: one, noticing how strange it was to encounter 
a matching car, could not resist capturing the moment.”33  
In Mark Godfrey’s article on Floh, the author plays the delighted reader, 
exclaiming, “As we turn each page with anticipation, we relive Dean’s experience of 
coming across the images in the flea market, each moment of enchanted discovery.”34 For 
my exhibition at Bryn Mawr College, Double Take (2011), this spectatorial sense of 
discovery was very much part of my curatorial aim, but beyond its delight I hoped that 
the pairings would “recreate, to a degree, my initial encounters with these photographs, 
by demonstrating how they initially withheld their meanings from me, challenging me to 
discover some of them over time and through repeated viewings.”35 I wanted to convey 
the opacity of the photographs through juxtapositions that prompted the viewer to look 
longer in order to discover more about the photographs than they may have done 
otherwise. I aimed to trouble notions of photographic transparency, the idea that these 
images had a single and fixed meaning. Similarly, Godfrey observes this in Dean’s 
project: “it is not as if the photographs Dean found had one fixed and clear meaning in 
their original context…. The initial, and eventual, meanings are opaque.”36 
                                                
33 Mark Godfrey, “Photography Lost and Found: On Tacita Dean’s Floh,” October (Autumn 2005) 90-119, 
93. 
34 Ibid., 96. 
35 Carrie Robbins, “Double Take,” Double Take: Selected Views from the Photography Collection at Bryn 
Mawr College, 1860s – Present (Bryn Mawr: Bryn Mawr College, 2011) 7. 
36 Godfrey 99. 
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In contrast with Dean’s artistic project, my job in collections was an archival 
project, and my invitation to exhibit was meant to introduce my findings to the wider 
campus community. What this came to require from me, most dramatically, was a 
seemingly endless supply of my text to accompany now (and forever) the objects piled in 
these boxes, which otherwise were unidentified, untitled, and unremarked upon. Floh, on 
the other hand, supplies no text. Dean has been emphatic about this; she writes, “I do not 
want to give these images explanations, descriptions by the finder about how and where 
they were found, or guesses as to what stories they might or might not tell. I want them to 
keep the silence of the flea market, the silence they had when I found them, the silence of 
the lost object.”37 Dean articulates something of the reticence I felt about attaching text to 
the objects I was finding, knowing that once I supplied the signified, the easy name or 
best guess about the object, they would function as if transparently according to those 
descriptions. It would take more work to detach that language or to consider the object 
differently, than to name it. My naming efforts thus tamed the photographs, perhaps in 
the way that Roland Barthes means when he writes, “Society is concerned to tame the 
Photograph, to temper the madness which keeps threatening to explode in the face of 
whoever looks at it.”38  
By turning the photograph into art or information, my words tamed some of the 
undecidability, multivalence, or madness at the heart of these photographs. Beyond that, 
the archival dictate to reorganize those photographs that were filed together according to 
their shared subject matter (Egypt, the Sistine Ceiling, family snapshots, for example) 
now according to the names of their makers (Frith, Braun, Allison) not only identified 
                                                
37 Dean in Seven Books qtd in Ibid., 92. 
38 Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida (New York: Hill and Wang, 1981) 117. 
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these objects as artworks rather than as illustrations or as documents, which some of 
these once were when they were used to study the objects they represent, it also 
recognized the individuals who made them as artists rather than technicians, machine-
operators, or heads of studios; but it also insinuated a priority of importance for those 
objects whose maker could be ascertained (or at least guessed) over and above those that 
remained anonymous. By refusing to supply text and by culling photographs of people 
she does not know by anonymous makers, Dean allows photography’s opacity to stand; 
while her selection and display of these found objects in book form does relate it to a 
kind of archival practice, it is a practice that simultaneously insists upon the surfeit and 
lack of meanings available in both the photographs and the archive, which the act of 
naming or describing covers over.  
Godfrey notes the importance of Dean’s (anti)archival act relative to its particular 
historical moment. “For Dean, facing digitalization, analog photography offers a messy 
and necessary kind of memory. Photographic memory is untamable rather than pristine, 
chaotic rather than censored.”39 The institutional initiative to digitize the college 
collection was that which made my work in the photography stacks possible. Digital 
cataloging organized the messiness of the collection into a database consisting of digital 
boxes to be filled by standardized constraints: artist’s name, title, year, medium, artist’s 
life dates, date of accession, etc. The experience of filling in these boxes with information 
that would be easily searchable resonates for me when I read Godfrey’s remarks that 
“digitalization leads to more organized forms of archiving. Will there still be flea markets 
full of old photographs in the near future? Will there be jumbles of unedited snapshots? 
Probably not. But what is so important about this? What is so wrong with efficient 
                                                
39 Godfrey 114. 
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archives of images?”40 As I filled in the database’s boxes, I felt the obsolescence for any 
future searcher of the kind of experience that I had when opening an unmarked box of 
photographs – the charming experience of surprise and discovery perhaps only available 
when one doesn’t know what to expect. As I filled in the digital boxes, I was supplying 
the expectations. I was eradicating the mode of finding to which I’d been privy, a “mode 
of finding,” which as Godfrey wonderfully articulates, “is important because it reveals to 
the finder the unexpected, points to unacknowledged desires and fears.”41  
While the loss of this kind of experience prompted me to structure my exhibition 
with what I hoped would be surprising pairs of images, so as to recreate something of my 
experience of discovery and of the photographs’ profound opacity or withholding of 
information rather than window-like transparency, I soon learned that digitalization’s 
efforts to name or archive did not necessarily eradicate the possibility of surprising 
discovery nor of the object’s withholding. Having recently presented a paper on Andrew 
Bush’s trompe l’oeil photographs of envelopes, which I discuss in Chapter 5, a colleague 
surprised me with a printout from the online catalog shared by Bryn Mawr and Haverford 
Colleges of another photograph of an envelope.42 This photograph, held in the collection 
at Haverford, had eluded my Bryn Mawr-centered cataloging efforts and thus my own 
discovery. Entitled 66 dead, 4/5 leafed clovers (2008) (Figure 0.3), the black and white 
photograph, measuring roughly 14x19 inches, of a slightly bulging and oft-handled 
envelope, was a work by Tacita Dean. How telling to have the anxiety about 
digitalization’s threat to this mode of finding, which I’d shared along with Dean, relieved 
and upended by another of her works. 
                                                
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., 115. 
42 Thanks to Nathanael Roesch for surprising me. 
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Beyond that, Dean’s envelope, which she shot straight on so that it seems to 
emerge slightly from the surface upon which it sits, accommodates something of a 
trompe l’oeil illusion. Scrawled legibly upon the envelope are its presumed contents, 66 
dead, 4/5 leafed clovers, but even this photographic transparency will not produce the 
clovers for us; they remain hidden from our view by the envelope which contains them. 
She employs a compositional strategy of emergence, typical of trompe l’oeil 
representations, so that the envelope seems present, inciting perhaps a desire to touch or 
to see inside. But this envelope inasmuch as it is photographed can never be opened to 
deliver its contents, just as Parrhasius’s curtain inasmuch as it is painted, can never be 
pulled back to reveal what is hidden behind it. The opacity of this representation 
challenges what might be (mis)characterized as the natural attitude of photography: its 
transparency. In Chapter 5, “Transparent Envelopes,” I consider Roland Barthes’s 
description of the photograph as a “transparent envelope,” especially insofar as this later 
characterization in Camera Lucida (1980) seems to fly in the face of his earlier insistence 
on deconstructing photography’s (seemingly transparent) content delivery system. The 
odd metaphor asks us to see through the bulkiness of the printed photograph, its image’s 
‘envelope,’ to the image’s referent. It was because the photograph seemed to show no 
trace of its construction that photography could become as deceptive as trompe l’oeil 
painting. It was this effect of photographic transparency of which Barthes had been 
suspicious in his earlier essays. But in this last consideration of photography, Barthes 
makes room for belief in photography; he plays the part, I want to say, of the credulous 
spectator.  
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But this return to belief comes in the face of decades of postmodern efforts, 
including Barthes’s own, to unmoor our supposedly naïve credulity relative to 
photography. Scholars insisted that we understand the discursiveness of photography, its 
necessary constructs and deployments, its lack of transparency and ultimately its 
unreality. Notably, their efforts feel motivated by a corrective impulse, which reveals 
their reliance on belief as the natural spectatorial attitude relative to photography. The 
postmodern insistence on becoming incredulous and skeptical spectators in the face of 
photography has had the effect of re-writing the history of photography as if it had a kind 
of then-and-now, them-and-us logic—then, they, those primitive and misguided 
spectators, believed simplemindedly and absolutely in the reality and presence of the 
photographic image, whereas now, we skeptics who know better understand the 
constructs of the photographic image and its capacities to deceive. Beyond this, it has had 
the effect of splitting our understanding of the medium itself—into one that was once 
straightforward and objective (analog) and one that is now manipulable and deceptive 
(digital). Across the board, I want to insist, these are misleading binaries. Photography 
has always been a simultaneously indexical and manipulable medium, requiring an active 
negotiation of belief and disbelief.  
We can look at a sign—a painting or a photograph, for example—according to its 
aspect as either a material signifier or an immaterial signified; moreover, as we look, our 
experience vacillates between these. An oscillation between disclosure and illusion has 
always been fundamental to the viewing experience not only of trompe l’oeil, but also, as 
Steinberg demonstrates, of the past 600 years of painting. I want to restore this sense of 
oscillation to the account of trompe l’oeil, which otherwise tends to be narrated as 
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painting that either deceives or undeceives. Pliny’s tale presents trompe l’oeil as a 
scenario that accommodates two conflicting beliefs. It is not just a tale of painting in the 
natural attitude, nor is it just a tale that corrects for the error of the natural attitude. 
Instead, Pliny’s tale articulates the way that painting allows for the spectatorial oscillation 
between positions of belief and disbelief, according to the painting’s oscillation between 
transparency and opacity. Trompe l’oeil stages the fundamental duality of the field of 
representation and its necessary (but often disavowed) address of the spectator.   
In Chapter 2, “Graspable Objects,” I revise Jonathan Crary’s suggestion that it 
was the stereoscope in the 19th century, which newly insinuated vulnerability into the 
experience of the observer. Whereas the intertwining of vision and touch, according to 
Crary, secured an experience of visual mastery in a pre-19th-century paradigm of vision, I 
suggest that the perceived need for ‘reciprocal assistance’ from other senses, such as 
touch, already demonstrates the subject’s experience of susceptibility to visual 
deceptions. Trompe l’oeil painting takes advantage of this vulnerability, exposing it, only 
to re-conceal it as play, just as Crary claims the stereoscope did.  
In Chapter 3, “Representing the Photograph as a Trompe l’Oeil Image-Object,” I 
consider the trompe l’oeil representation of photographs in paint, especially in John 
Peto’s paintings of the 19th century. By making another type of image the subject of his 
painting, Peto thickens the layers of illusion available in his trompe l’oeil works. Trompe 
l’oeil representations of image-objects, such as photographs, refuse to settle into either 
category of image or object; the trompe l’oeil jolt of discovery that what seemed to be 
materially present is instead merely representation does not halt its visual vibration 
between these two aspects. The discovery allows us to see the materiality of the painting 
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and of the photograph, as well as that material object’s image: the seeming presence of 
the photograph and the one-time presence of the photographic subject. It is not that we 
see the photograph through the painting in the natural attitude, nor that we see only its 
status as a sign, but that we see the subject alongside (necessarily through) its material 
conditions; it is knowable, but not entirely; its trompe l’oeil mode discloses, while 
preserving something of its unknowability, the unreachability of a noumenal beyond. 
I suggest that the trompe l’oeil representation of photographs and image 
reproductions, such as engravings or commercially reproduced objects, becomes 
additionally meaningful when we consider the historical context of widespread image 
proliferation in the 19th century, wherein images were readily translated from one 
medium to another. Trompe l’oeil lets the markers of material difference between these 
media seem discoverable, at the same time that it demonstrates their intertwinedness. In 
Chapter 4, “Auratic Disclosures,” I consider the way trompe l’oeil’s attention to the 
materiality of image-objects might remind us to see the material conditions of digital 
images in the contemporary era. So-called anxiety about the digitization of photography 
tends to center on the fear of being tricked by increasingly invisible manipulations of the 
image. This logic reinvests in the myth of a one-time truth-value for photography, or of 
an authentic photograph, returning the appropriate mode of our analysis to the 
connoisseurship of individuating marks; it reinvests in that which Walter Benjamin 
named the aura.43  
Trompe l’oeil paintings imitate the aura of the objects they represent by carefully 
rendering their signs of use or manufacture, while disguising their own marks of 
                                                
43 Walter Benjamin, “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” Illuminations (New York: 
Schocken Books, 2007). 
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manufacture. Moreover, inasmuch as the objects represented in trompe l’oeil paintings 
are images that are already reproductions of other images, they stage an ironic 
impossibility. It was, Benjamin argued, our willingess to accept a reproduction in place of 
the object it represents that destroyed the unique aura of the work of art. This willingness 
to accept the representation in place of the thing itself is alternately staged and critiqued 
in the trompe l’oeil painting, not just to restore the aura of the original or to expose it as 
merely an illusion. Instead, these marks simultaneously indicate the loss of aura while 
displacing that aura upon the reproduction; the availability of an aura oscillates relative to 
our encounter therewith. Indeed, the representation of these marks, inasmuch as they 
reinstall our distance from the object, makes room to discover Žižek’s ‘Void of the 
unattainable object.’ 
In Chapter 4, I also compare the representation of auratic marks to Benjamin’s 
recommendation to translators. Like those who fear we might mistake a digitally 
manipulated photograph for a ‘straight’ photograph, Benjamin worries that we might 
mistake a translation for the original text. He reinstalls the aura of the original, requesting 
that translators indicate their interventions—with marks of their own; he advocates the 
stutters of literal translations which disclose their intervention into the original rather than 
the smoothly communicated versions of the originally expressed ideas. Nonetheless, 
seeing or reading these signs of interruption falls to us, and it is with this onus that I 
conclude the penultimate chapter, considering digital photography by way of the tricky 
but emphatically analog photography of Thomas Demand. 
To the extent that my prose might not always cover over my abrupt transitions 
from an object from one century to another object from a different century, I intend 
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something of the effect of an interruption to draw attention to the seams along which the 
dissertation is constructed. And to the extent that my mapping of the congruencies 
between these otherwise disparate objects or ideas sometimes seems readily meaningful, I 
intend the transparency of this argumentational effect. Readers, like viewers, occupy a 
position that allows their oscillation between regard of the interrupting signifier and 
enjoyment of the signified. Caught between reading and seeing, between believing and 
disbelieving, I know but all the same; this is the fundamental structure of our encounter 
with the space of representation. And this too is the adventure of trompe l’oeil.  
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Chapter 1. The Curtain as Site/Sight of Credulous Spectatorship  
 
[Parrhasius] entered into a competition with Zeuxis, who produced a picture of 
grapes so successfully represented that birds flew up to the stage-buildings; 
whereupon Parrhasius himself produced such a realistic picture of a curtain that 
Zeuxis, proud of the verdict of the birds, requested that the curtain should now be 
drawn and the picture displayed; and when he realized his mistake, with a 
modesty that did him honour, he yielded up the prize, saying that whereas he had 
managed to deceive birds, Parrhasius had deceived him, an artist.44 
—Pliny, Natural History 
 
At least since Pliny’s ancient tale of Zeuxis tricked by Parrhasius, written accounts of 
duped or credulous spectatorship have served as persuasive rhetorical devices. In this tale 
Zeuxis loses an artistic contest to Parrhasius whose painting of a curtain is so convincing 
that Zeuxis asks him to draw it back so that he might see the picture behind it. Art 
historians typically invoke this account as the origin story for trompe l’oeil painting 
practice. Parrhasius represents his subject—a curtain—so convincingly that Zeuxis, the 
credulous spectator, mistakes it for the (represented) thing itself.  
Insofar as Zeuxis misapprehends the image of a curtain as a real curtain, he 
establishes the trompe l’oeil mistake of credulity. That is, throughout the writing of art 
history, the term, trompe l’oeil, operates as a kind of shorthand for the mistaking of an 
image for a reality, for one’s ignorance of the image’s status as image. This shorthand 
pivots upon (establishes and requires) the role of a credulous spectator, whose Zeuxian 
ignorance is frequently called upon and cited in accounts of the paintings’ reception. 
Such accounts are often meant to illustrate an aberrant form of primitive spectatorship—
one in contrast to which a discerning spectator should model him or herself—or they are 
                                                
44 Pliny: Natural History, Book XXXV, trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) 309, 
311. 
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meant to convince readers of an artist’s or a medium’s accomplishment. This chapter 
considers the iconographical site of the curtain in Pliny’s tale, tracing it across history 
and media for its relation to credulous spectatorship. Instead of dismissing this continual 
reinvestment in and redeployment of the curtain and the believing spectator as a trope or 
mere gag, I argue that it stages a pleasurable and necessary spectatorial negotiation of 
belief and disbelief relative to visual representation.  
The representation of a curtain in an illusionistic manner recurs throughout the 
history of art. A favorite illusionist trick among 17th-century Dutch painters is the 
representation of a curtain, not only within the space of a room represented, but also as if 
it were attached to and hovering in front of the material support of the painting. In 
Johannes Vermeer’s painting A Girl Reading a Letter by an Open Window (circa 1659) 
(Figure 1.1) a green curtain billows illusionistically at the threshold of the painting, 
seeming to hang from the painted rod that extends across the width of the canvas. The 
illusion confronts our presence as spectators before the canvas, even perhaps mocking 
our belief in the rest of the painting’s representational fiction by interrupting its seeming 
coherence. 
Vermeer’s represented curtain conforms to the 17th-century practice of covering 
paintings with a protective curtain, like the one behind which Gabriel Metsu’s maid peeks 
in another Dutch painting of similar subject matter, Woman Reading a Letter (circa 1665) 
(Figure 1.2). But Vermeer has us caught between zones of representation; between a zone 
that bars our entry (almost as much as the table between our space and hers) existing for 
us as optical surface only and another that implies our entry into the space, our having 
pulled back the curtain to see. It turns the representational logic of linear perspective 
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inside out.  Instead of receding, the objects seem to come forward into the space of the 
viewer. For this reason, trompe l’oeil subject matter tends toward vertically-oriented and 
shallow-spaced or flat compositions; i.e. letter racks, objects hung on or attached to doors 
or boards, bookshelves, curtains, etc. Norman Bryson describes the sudden intrusion of 
these represented objects into the space of the viewer as a shock; “instead of the objects’ 
obeying the subject’s sovereign gaze, they slip out…: they look back.”45 By disclosing its 
status as representation, the painting corrects for the Cartesianism of the natural attitude, 
which originally presumed not that this was a painting, but that this (painted) set of 
objects was laid out for my mastering gaze.  
It is over the course of one’s viewing then, that trompe l’oeil reveals itself (or is 
discovered by the viewer, depending on the assignment of agency) to be representation. 
Writing this according to its capacity to shock rewrites the natural attitude of this mode of 
painting—wherein its image was mistaken for a reality—as a modernist effort to 
undeceive.46 Recognition of the materiality of this painting as painting allows the now 
incredulous viewer to discover, instead of the frivolous enjoyment of its represented 
image, its status as a picture and the accomplishment of its maker.  
 Understood in this way, the representation of a curtain functions only as a symbol of 
revelation; via the trompe l’oeil discovery that Vermeer’s curtain is painted, the truth of 
its material status is revealed. This cuts short, however, the powerful calling structure of 
trompe l’oeil painting, which compels our belief in the fiction of an image (that there is 
something unseen behind Zeuxis’s curtain), at the same time that we are made aware of 
                                                
45 Norman Bryson, Looking at the Overlooked (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990) 143. 
46 In his essay on Baudelaire, Walter Benjamin describes the experience of the modern city according to the 
navigation of its shock effects. The cinema incorporates this strategy of shock in its rapid succession of 
images, according to his essay on the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction. (Walter Benjamin, 
Illuminations (New York: Schocken Books, 2007) 165, 238.)  
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its status as representation. In his painting The Holy Family (1646) (Figure 1.3), 
Rembrandt van Rijn paints a curtain as if pulled back to reveal a painting of the holy 
family. Like Metsu, he represents a historical practice of attaching protective curtains to 
the uppermost frames of paintings; but unlike Metsu, he severs this representation from 
the internal narrative of painting. Rembrandt’s painted curtain is not there for the figures 
within the painting, as it is for Metsu’s maid, instead it is there for us, appearing as if on a 
brass rod attached to the upper left and right corners of its frame. Eric Jan Sluijter 
describes the broad strokes and thick highlights with which Rembrandt paints the curtain 
and its rod as evidence of Rembrandt’s self-conscious (hence, modern) disclosure of the 
materiality of his painting. But, he continues, the curtain, rod, and frame have an entirely 
different light source than the scene of the holy family does, which competes with the 
disclosure of its materiality and enhances the illusion that the curtain, rod, and frame exist 
apart from the “painting,” which appears to be only that of the scene of the holy family. 
By painting his curtain as if it coincides with the dimensions of the painting, rather than 
the represented room, Vermeer similarly severs its representation from the internal 
narrative of the painting. But by placing it as if at the threshold of the room, Vermeer 
disguises its trompe l’oeil disclosure.  
 Gerrit Dou’s Painter Smoking a Pipe in a Window (circa 1647) (Figure 1.4) employs 
a curtain, but in a way that makes its role either within or as if apart from the represented 
scene undecideable. The curtain is represented as if attached to an undecipherable 
darkened span, which might represent the painting’s simple black frame, except that its 
slight edge conforms to the framing of the window represented within the image. Dou’s 
paint application does not assert its materiality, and his light source “from outside!,” 
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Sluijter observes, insinuates that it is shared by both the curtain and the scene inside the 
window. Neither his paint application nor representation of light disrupts the fiction of 
the painting. It is not clear that Dou wants to picture his pipe-smoking painter as if part of 
a painting protected by this curtain, but the representation (and seeming-presence) of the 
curtain keeps this possibility in play. Instead, Dou’s painting does not insist as much on 
the unveiling of a single illusion, as it does on our continual negotiation of its 
unresolvable layers of illusion and material reality throughout the duration of our 
viewing.  
 The representation of a curtain, in this way, foregrounds the scenario of painting as 
one that oscillates between veiling and unveiling, concealing and disclosure. The pulled 
back curtain assures us that this is a painting, at the same time that the shared light source 
(“from outside!”) re-enlivens our sense that the painter and the curtain seem to be here 
for us. Dou’s painter emerges from the curtained and darkened space of a rounded 
window into the light, casting his shadow back on the frame upon which he also leans. As 
his middle fingertip gently transgresses this most interior window ledge, our conviction 
in his presence (coming forward across the ledge into our space) turns into our delight in 
the painted illusion. This fingertip belongs to a hand that rests upon a book, lying upon 
that same windowsill, but the verso pages of that book spill out from the ledge, 
transgressing the window’s threshold even further than his fingers’ grasp. Our delight in 
negotiating the threshold of illusion or reality in this painting extends beyond the frame 
of the windowsill to the paper label that appears to be nailed to it. Seemingly attached to 
this frame, however, in the way that a label would have actually been attached to a 
picture frame, the window frame once again becomes a picture frame. Its practical usage 
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for identifying a painting conforms to convention, just as the curtain’s presence 
conformed to conventions for protecting paintings. The bent corner of the label suggests 
that we might peel it off of the frame, but any attempt to do so reveals both the label and 
the picture frame to which it seemed attached to be yet part of the picture.  
Victor Stoichita argues that the 17th century was “a period obsessed with the 
‘aesthetic boundary’ and the period that marks the birth of intertextuality” and that its 
“episteme was concentrated on the definition of the ‘ontological cut’ effected by the 
frame of all paintings.”47 Stoichita attends beautifully to the way that trompe l’oeil 
elements, including the depiction of framing elements, pierce the seemingly enclosed 
painting. “The reproduction of ‘real openings’ in painting,” by which he means windows, 
niches, doors, for example, “can be regarded as the image’s ‘autobiographical 
confession’… [as] confirmation of a meditation on the structural consubstantiality 
between the picture frame and all other types of enframement.”48 The depiction of 
enframing devices, in addition to the actual painting’s frame, increases the painting’s 
fiction “by the power of 2… establish[ing] itself twice as a representation.”49 Elsewhere 
however he seems to contradict this conclusion about the painted frame’s doubling the 
signification of the image’s representation. “Although the function of an effective picture 
frame is to act as a caesura between ‘art’ and ‘reality,’ the painted frame serves to blur 
this boundary.”50 Instead of seeing this as a contradiction within Stoichita’s summary of 
the effects of the painted frame, perhaps it is more productive to see this as evidence that 
the painted frame allows us to maintain contradictory beliefs.  
                                                
47 Victor Stoichita, The Self-Aware Image: An Insight into Early Modern Meta-Painting, trans. Anne-Marie 
Glasheen (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997) 30. 
48 Ibid., 55. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid., 60. 
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To explore the way the painted frame blurs art and reality, Stoichita also turns to 
Rembrandt’s Holy Family. This example has two painted framing devices: the arch-
topped and seemingly carved frame that surrounds the ‘nativity’ scene, as well as the 
trompe l’oeil curtain that seems attached to a painted rod that spans the width of the 
work. This second framing device, which Stoichita calls the “binomial false 
curtain/frame” has a long history, which he briefly tracks from the velum of Medieval 
altar paintings, where its veiling or unveiling corresponded to its liturgical function. 
Stoichita observes that by the 16th and 17th centuries this religious purpose “virtually 
disappears,” at which time the curtain becomes widely used in “presenting works of art of 
a private nature” and to “[protect] the painting from dust and bright lights. It is only open 
when the proprietor wishes to show the painting or look at it.”51 The representation of a 
curtain as if open might have compelled viewers to see past the status of the painted 
curtain to instead gaze upon the rarely seen painting.  
This desire to pull back the curtain to see the painting returns us to Pliny’s 
emblematic scenario of Zeuxis tricked by Parrhasius. Indeed the scenario was explicitly 
invoked by Leiden poet Dirk Traudenius, when he referred to Dou, as “the Dutch 
Parrhasius” or den Hollandschen Parrhasius.52 Traudenius writes, “If Zeuxis saw this 
banquet, he would be deceived again:/ Here lies no paint, but life and spirit on the panel./ 
Dou does not paint, oh no, he performs magic with the brush.”53 For contemporary Dutch 
critics, the goal of the art of painting is perfectly summarized by the antique anecdote: the 
ultimate deception of the eye. As Sluijter writes, Phillip Angel, a 17th-century critic, 
                                                
51 Ibid., 60-61. 
52 Eric Jan Sluijter, Seductress of Sight: Studies in Dutch Art of the Golden Age (Zwolle: Waanders 
Publishers, 2000) 209. 
53 Ibid. 
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“places great weight on imitation and the power of painting to obscure the boundary 
between appearance and reality.”54 To do so, Dou typically employed the framing device 
of a window in his paintings. But instead of allowing us to imagine his painting as a 
“window on the world,” as typically characterizes the Italian or Albertian project of 
perspective paintings, Dou reverses the point of view from one of looking through the 
window and out at the world, to one of looking in the window to the home. Yet seeing 
into the home does not seem to be the goal here either. Our ability to see in is interrupted 
by the figures he puts at the windows or even the curtain-like tapestries that are draped 
there. Frequently, his light source is placed outside the window, illuminating the objects 
in the foreground—at the windowsill—and not anything inside the house. Furthermore, 
his painted windows feature prominent sills used to display meticulously depicted objects 
in the foreground. As Sluijter writes, “The window motif – which he began using in his 
paintings in the 1640s – seems to have been developed in order to display this wealth of 
objects to their best advantage for the benefit of the viewer. The windowsill provides a 
highly suitable surface on which to arrange as a still-life all sorts of items painted in 
detail in the immediate foreground; they have a place there in a relatively natural way.”55  
 The windowsill also becomes a site of experimentation for Dou, allowing the 
placement of his figures to suggest a kind of forward projection, as if breaking through 
the picture plane. Sluijter describes this as “a superb transition from the painting’s space 
to that of the beholder… creating the illusion of proximity.”56 At the windowsill, the 
figure can grasp the frame, seeming to emerge from within the bounds of the picture’s 
enframement; this recasts the painted picture frame, which Dou’s master Rembrandt 
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employs in his Portrait of Agatha Bas, 1641 (Figure 1.5), as a painted windowsill.  
Instead of grasping the picture frame like Bas, Dou’s figures grasp (Maidservant with an 
Oil Lamp in a Window, circa 1660) (Figure 1.6) and even seem to lean out of the 
window, exciting a feeling of contact between the figurative space of the painting and the 
real space of the spectator.  
 Stoichita cites J. Chapelain’s 1630 letter to Antoine Godeau, which describes the 
spectator’s ‘surprised eye’ as establishing the dependence between two levels or plots 
within a painting.  
…a good draughtsman would never have only one plot, and if he accommodates 
others in recesses or in the distance, he will do it in such a way that they will have 
the necessary dependence on the first, but more so for they will at least be taking 
place on the same day, because the eye can only see one thing at a time and 
because its action is limited to one particular place; from which we would proceed 
if we did not want to bring the painting within the reach of the human eye which 
must judge it, so that instead of persuading and inspiring through the lively 
representation of things, and forcing the surprised eye to deceive itself for its own 
good, we should make it aim to enlighten the imagination as to the falseness of 
the objects represented, and we would cheat the art of its ending which wants to 
touch the spectator with its opinion on truth.57  
 
One such temporally- and/or spatially-split painting, Dutch Woman Bringing Fish into 
the Room (Figure 1.7) by Pieter Aertsen, as we know it from its engraving by Jacob 
Matham, separates the recessed scene from the main plot by a threshold across which two 
figures hang a curtain. Stoichita characterizes this “tactical use of the curtain” as 
“‘unveil[ing]’ the picture as though it were a theater.”58 
 Returning to Pliny’s tale of the contest between Zeuxis and Parrhasius, a 
historical footnote attends its publication, clarifying that “the pictures were hung on the 
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front of the stage buildings in the theatre.”59 The viewing context of a theater for these 
pictures further underscores the way that an awareness of representation foregrounded the 
trompe l’oeil contest. According to Xenophon’s account, Parrhasius is already an 
accomplished painter by 399 BC, dating his practice to the decades after the new Greek 
theater practice of using skenes, or small huts in which actors could change or await their 
entrances. The building of skenes accompanied the turn from a communal participation 
that characterized Greek theater-in-the-round to linearly structured plots performed by a 
few actors and requiring a temple or other building as the backdrop/locating scenery. By 
425 BC, these skenes were built in addition to a long front wall or proskenia. While the 
use of an actual curtain to cover over this stage, as would become typical for proscenium 
theater production in the 18th century, is not yet the case, the 4th-century BC shift toward 
realism and a focus on stage action, viewed against a wall and even through a kind of 
frame-like focusing device, accompanied a shift in the experience of the spectator from 
one of participant to one of viewer. Thus, the “stage buildings in the theatre,” on the front 
of which Pliny describes Zeuxis and Parrhasius’s paintings as hanging, would have been 
the backdrop that intervened against Greek spectatorial participation; indeed, it was this 
framing structure or proskenia that arguably trained Greek theater-goers to become 
viewers, not participants.  
 These “stage buildings in the theatre” are representations, but they are a typical 
form of illusion in the theater. As James R. Hamilton writes, “stage scenery is a set of 
devices which lead us to see (or think we see) rooms and such when what is in fact before 
us is so much canvas, wood, and paint, not really rooms at all, false appearances. We 
may also find this deceptive, even when we are not deceived; for the spectator has to be 
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asked not to disbelieve and this requires an effort of will (after all, ‘objectively’ the 
spectator should disbelieve.)”60 Hamilton refers here to a conventional spectatorial 
disposition in the theater, that of the suspension of disbelief, wherein theatergoers bracket 
the play’s status as representation so that they can be carried along by the narrative into 
the reality of the play. Hamilton takes to task ordinary descriptions of the theater as the 
creation of illusions or as trading in deceptive appearances. To understand theater 
accordingly is to (really) forget the institution and its set of cultural conventions as the 
framing devices that an audience is invited to temporarily forget or bracket in order to let 
themselves feel deceived. But this is not to say that theater-goers are actually deceived. 
“In the theater at least, we are invited to regard as true of the thing what is presented as 
true of the representation of it… In the theater, audiences are intended to regard certain 
relevant presentations about the representation as true of the thing it represents.”61 This is 
different than saying, for example, that “in the theater, audiences are intended to take a 
representation for the thing itself.”62 If this were the case, the audience would truly be 
deceived, having been “seduced into massive and wildly hallucinatory journeys [which] 
of course may be possible; but no one can reasonably suppose that it is the typical 
situation.”63  
 At least in the modern theater, the proscenium curtain is a conventional marker of 
the theater institution’s frame, through which an audience looks and is made aware of the 
theatrical fictions on stage. If audience members were not made aware of the play’s status 
as fiction, they would become “the Jonathan,” or the country bumpkin of Royall Tyler’s 
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1782 play, The Contrast (1782), who has never been to the theater and mistakes the 
experience for a magic show. Without knowledge of the theater’s institutional 
conventions, he is unaware of the signification of the curtain in particular and is able to 
be deceived. He exclaims, “Why, I vow, as I was looking out for him, they lifted up a 
great green cloth and let us look right into the next neighbour’s house. Have you so a 
good many houses in New York made so in that ‘ere way?”64  Tyler restages Pliny’s 
scenario of the credulous spectator at the site of the curtain within the text of his satirical 
play. This insertion of the play within the play centers on the experience of the audience, 
doubly underscoring the representational status of the play, so that Tyler’s audience can 
take knowing pleasure in Jonathan’s foolish mistake.  
 From Zeuxis to Jonathan and beyond, deceived and credulous spectators populate 
accounts of the illusionistic arts. Tom Gunning convincingly argues against the 
mythology of the “credulous” spectator within the context of early cinema in his seminal 
essay, “An Aesthetic of Astonishment: Early Film and the (In)Credulous Spectator.” He 
refuses to take reception accounts of supposedly duped cinema viewers at face value. He 
disputes typical reception of what is perhaps the Ur-story of cinematic illusionism, in 
which spectators at a screening of the Lumière brothers’ film Arrival of a Train at the 
Station (1897) reportedly “reared back in their seats, or screamed, or got up and ran from 
the auditorium” at their misperception of the train’s coming off the screen, straight 
toward them.65  
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Gunning observes, “This audience of the first exhibitions exists outside of the 
willing suspension of disbelief, the immediacy of their terror short-circuiting even 
disavowal’s detour of ‘I know very well…but all the same.’”66 This story casts and 
reinforces film’s power in terms of its “unprecedented realism, its ability to convince 
spectators that the moving image was, in fact, palpable and dangerous, bearing towards 
them with physical impact…the imaginary perceived as real.”67 Taking this story at face 
value perpetuates an underestimation of the basic intelligence and reality-testing ability 
of the average film viewer, and this tends to be retrospectively cast upon historic film 
audiences, as if to demonstrate our development as film viewers since a prior stage of 
child-like or savage credulity.68 But importantly, Gunning doesn’t just throw out this 
founding myth and its account of astonishment and terror; instead he historicizes it to 
better understand the “uncanny and agitating power” these images exerted on 
audiences.69 To do so, Gunning contextualizes early film reception within its broader 
visual culture, as, for example, a development of magic theatre, as practiced by Georges 
Méliès and John Maskeleyne. “The magic theatre laboured to make visual that which was 
impossible to believe. Its visual power consisted of a trompe l’oeil play of give-and-take, 
an obsessive desire to test the limits of intellectual disavowal—I know, but yet I see.”70  
But this characterization of early cinema as trompe l’oeil is more generous than 
the one Gunning will go on to employ. That is, he will cut short the pleasurable 
vacillation between belief and incredulity that trompe l’oeil shares with the cinema, when 
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he writes that whereas “the film first presents itself as merely image,” trompe l’oeil gives 
the initial appearance of being “actual butterflies, postcards, or cameos.”71 He does this in 
order to establish the kind of shock effect that the suddenly animated photographic 
projection had on early cinema-goers and how this shock differs from the gradual 
disquiet that arises from the divergence of what we see and what we know in the trompe 
l’oeil experience. But perhaps inadvertently, his doing so seems to insinuate that viewers 
of trompe l’oeil did not know the images at first to be images, but rather mistook these 
representations of objects for actual objects. 
This seems to reverse the understanding of trompe l’oeil that Gunning gained 
from Martin Battersby’s account, which he cites, wherein trompe l’oeil not only aims for 
accuracy of representation, but causes “a feeling of disgust in the mind of the beholder.”72 
This disgust is the product of the “conflict of messages” that characterizes trompe l’oeil 
reception: the simultaneous knowledge that one is looking at a painting while also 
feeling compelled to test its painted-ness via closer examination and touch. In this 
account, it is not that the viewer first sees an actual butterfly, but that s/he simultaneously 
has a competing set of beliefs and compulsions about the representation/reality of that 
butterfly.  
 Gunning’s argument is a compelling effort to demonstrate early cinema’s 
difference from the dominant narrative form of later cinema, by indicating its continuities 
with contemporaneous and earlier forms of visual culture – such as magic theater – that 
he describes as an entertainment culture of “attractions.” But I wonder if he doesn’t draw 
too firm a line between the sorts of “attraction” that were 19th-century magic theater and 
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those of trompe l’oeil painting. Beyond that, in arguing that viewers of trompe l’oeil 
paintings mistake representation for actuality, Gunning reinstates the same kind of 
spectatorial naivete for them that he rejects for viewers of early cinema. According to 
Gunning’s own terms, I think the display and spectatorial dynamics, as well as the 
reception histories that characterize trompe l’oeil painting anticipate those that Gunning 
uses to characterize his “cinema of attractions.”  
Beyond cinema’s shock factor, Gunning describes some additional differences 
between it and trompe l’oeil painting: the latter’s small scale and its evocation of a desire 
to reach out and touch it. Gunning characterizes this desire to touch trompe l’oeil painting 
as exactly opposite the viewing response to both cinema and the magic theatre, which 
causes viewers to “rear back” and keep their physical distance. But what spectatorial 
reactions to both trompe l’oeil painting and early cinema have in common, however, is 
the feeling that the represented objects are emerging from the screen or painting, rather 
than receding into represented space. What compels viewers to reach out and touch the 
trompe l’oeil painting is the feeling that the represented objects look as if they are 
actually there, emerging from the surface of the painted background. In the case of The 
Arrival of the Train at the Station, what supposedly caused viewers to “rear back” was 
the sense that the projected image was approaching from the screen toward viewers at a 
high speed. Gunning describes this as direct audience address, wherein the images “rush 
forward to meet their viewers.”73 This forward momentum is almost “an experience of 
assault” and is markedly opposite the sutured experience of narrative cinema, in which 
the audience is caught up in the narrative action or identifies empathically with the 
psychology of a character. Accordingly the viewer does not get lost in the fictional world 
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of the film, but “remains aware of the act of looking, the excitement of curiosity and its 
fulfillment.”74  
The forms of this direct address in the cinema of attractions might range from an 
implied emergence from the screen into the space of the viewers (as in the Lumière film) 
to characters’ nods or gestures off-screen toward the viewer, but it might also occur in its 
situation of cinematic display, wherein a showman lecturer would introduce the film or 
direct the audience’s attention throughout its run. Much like a “fairground barker,” this 
showman presenter would set up a heightened sense of reception and suspenseful 
presentation. For example, Gunning includes one script used to introduce The Black 
Diamond Express, another one-shot film of a locomotive rushing toward the audience:  
Ladies and Gentlemen you are now gazing upon a photograph of the famous 
Black Diamond Express. In just a moment, a cataclysmic moment, my friends, a 
moment without equal in the history of our times, you will see this train take life 
in a marvelous and most astounding manner. It will rush towards you, belching 
smoke and fire from its monstrous iron throat.75  
 
I think the showman operates here as a framing device, following from Stoichita 
and Louis Marin’s observations about Alberti’s “storia” figures. These “storia” figures 
are placed as if they were in the position of a commentator, admonitor, or advocator: 
“someone who alerts us, who shows us what is happening.”76 For Marin such storia 
figures are framing devices, especially because they are typically placed at or near the 
image edge; similarly, Gunning’s showman sits at the edge, even outside of the image 
space and yet prescribes the work’s reception: constitutively supplemental or parergonal, 
as in Jacques Derrida’s reading of the motif of the frame in Kant. Marin identifies the 
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storia figure not as the delegate of the spectator, but as the delegate of the frame, 
indicating the particular mode of the spectator’s gaze, indicating, for example, an 
expression of astonishment, which the spectator should mirror.77  
The extent to which we can see these forms of direct address at work in the 
experience of a trompe l’oeil painting, depends to some extent on revising the dominant 
(and Gunning’s repeated) assumption about trompe l’oeil: that it is apprehended from the 
first as the object it represents, rather than as a representation of that object. This will be 
part of my endeavor throughout this text. I am not looking to throw out this dominant 
understanding, for I think it is an important constitutive (but not necessarily primary) 
aspect of not only the spectatorial experience, but also of centuries of productive 
theorizations about trompe l’oeil. My hope is to complicate this assumption, showing that 
it can still stand, even if viewers were not, even initially, completely ignorant of the 
painting’s status as representation.  
If the showman figure in early cinema functions like a storia figure, framing the 
film’s reception for the audience, we might venture even further outside the frame of the 
work to consider the ways in which published newspaper accounts function like 
showmen to directly address viewers of 19th-century trompe l’oeil paintings. Not only do 
these accounts relate something of the public situation of display in which these paintings 
were exhibited and the interactive debates in which viewers took part, but they also set up 
an expectation about what it is that will be seen for viewers who have not yet (or will 
never) attend the exposition. Here, we can follow and add to Gunning’s own use of 
journalistic accounts that were showman-esque in tone. He cites one journalist, who in 
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1896 describes Lumière’s cinema as provoking “an excitement bordering on terror.” In 
saying so, Gunning assesses that the journalist both “prais[es] the new spectacle  and 
explain[s] its success.”78 
Let us turn our attention to some of the Zeuxian tales published in 19th-century 
American newspapers to describe the deceived viewers of trompe l’oeil paintings. In 
response to William Harnett’s painting The Old Violin (Figure 0.2), which was shown at 
the Thirteenth Cincinnati Industrial Exposition in 1886, a journalist for one Cincinnati 
newspaper describes the spectacle of a credulous spectator:  
“A painting [The Old Violin] has been added to the Art Gallery, which has created 
a furore. It has … a crowd of bewildered gazers continually about it. It represents 
an old violin hanging on an old time worn door. By it hangs the bow, and under 
the violin is a sheet of music with dog-eared corners. A blue envelope is stuck in 
the warped lower corner of the door, and above it is a newspaper clipping, that a 
man wanted to bet $10 last evening, was pasted on the board…. An old gentleman 
stood and gazed at it last night, through his spectacles, and finally said, “By Jove, 
I would like to play on that violin,” enthusiastically judging that many a touching 
melody had been wafted from its well resined strings. The gentleman never 
noticed the deception until he went closer to it and he was ‘completely got.’ A 
policeman stands by it constantly, lest people reach over and attempt to see if the 
newspaper clipping is genuine by tearing it off. They want to pull at the envelope 
as well.”79 
 
Elsewhere, another journalist writes: “Crowds still stand doubtingly before the famous 
Harnett violin hanging on the old door, uncertain as to how much is painting and how 
much reality.”80 And another local reporter, writing for the Cincinnati Commercial 
Gazette, similarly describes the work’s effect on credulous spectators, but this time 
identifies as one himself:  
“So real is it [The Old Violin], that one of Captain Wise’s specials has been 
detailed to stand beside the picture and suppress any attempts to take down the 
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fiddle and the bow…. The writer being one of those doubting Thomases who are 
by no means disposed to believe their own eyes, was permitted to allay his 
conscientious scruples by feeling of it, and is prepared to kiss the book, and s’help 
me, it is painted. Mr. Harnett is of the Munich school, and he takes a wicked 
delight in defying the possibilities.”81 
 
Notably, this journalist admits that credulity is not his standard disposition: that he’s 
more typically a “doubting Thomas,” and not, we might say, a ‘believing Jonathan.’ But 
so well-painted is Harnett’s Old Violin that it can turn even the incredulous and 
worldwise skeptic into the credulous country rube: note his colloquial turn of phrase, 
“s’help me.” 
Paul Staiti observes very carefully the spectatorial dynamics at play in Harnett’s 
reception, refusing to buy into a more simplistic account of trompe l’oeil, in which what 
is initially belief is then followed by assured revelation.  
What all these pictures invite viewers to do (and what the newspaper accounts 
claim that viewers did do) is to engage in a cycle of reading in which response is a 
steady movement toward the picture. Viewing begins with a distanced, genteel, 
dispassionate sighting of an entire painting: the ensemble of objects in it, their 
shapes, formal pattern, and position in a shallow space. Response is held in check 
at first, but it leads to a more proximate, lively, and finally, more troubled 
encounter with a surrogate reality. Teased closer by an ingratiating display of 
objects, the viewer moves to a new discourse. Leaving the large compositional 
issues behind, a viewer of Old Models of 1892 [Figure 1.8], for example, begins 
to constrict attention to irresistible details: the rosin dust beneath the violin 
strings, the ragged edges of ripped paper, the individual coils of violin strings, the 
broken green threads wriggling out of a ripped leather bookbinding, the crisp 
hairline crack in a ceramic pitcher on which the original painted design is 
indistinct beneath a thick glaze. He can believe, as one person wrote of After the 
Hunt, that ‘the wood is wood, the iron is iron, the brass is brass, the leather is 
leather.’ Without knowing it the viewer might find himself at the mercy of the 
picture, an unwitting conspirator in an illusionistic transaction. He may have 
begun his visual experience from a viewer’s sovereign space, but he eventually 
ruptures or ‘brackets’ it, then accepts, enters, and consensually participates in the 
illusionistic theater. In the case of the most accomplished trompe l’oeil and the 
most inexperienced viewer, his defenses crumble. He loses command over his 
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controlled, polite response. He may doubt the picture, doubt himself, and begin to 
flounder anxiously in a fictive world.82  
 
But even Staiti’s close reading of the complex play of belief and doubt narrates the 
viewing experience as if unfolding sequentially from the former to the latter; insofar as he 
relies upon the construct of “the inexperienced viewer” whose “defenses crumble,” Staiti 
preserves the notion of the credulous spectator.  
Instead of taking the reality of these newspaper accounts at face value, we might 
consider the way these journalists turn to the credulous spectator as a motif or a rhetorical 
gesture. We can recall that when one of these writers describes the newspaper clipping 
within Harnett’s painting, he immediately relates the way an onlooker “wanted to bet $10 
last evening, [that it] was pasted on the board.” We might imagine that if the newspaper 
clipping had actually been clipped from and not representative of a newspaper, the 
clipping could have been one such enthusiastic review of the painter’s accomplishment. 
Newspapers were a common visual motif in 19th-century American trompe l’oeil 
paintings. Sometimes the legible aspects of these represented clippings used 
inflammatory and bombastic language to declare the power of the artist’s painted illusion, 
which reflected actual journalistic practice. John Haberle’s Reproduction (circa 1886) 
(Figure 1.9) flaunts its illusionism via painted newspaper headlines in the bottom left 
quadrant of the painting. The painted but seemingly overlapping newspaper clippings, 
which look as if they have been affixed to a board, have headlines and text that proclaim: 
“A Counterfeit” and “John Haberle the Counter[feiter]/[de]ceives the eye into the belief 
that.”83 
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But even without having to be represented within the bounds of the painting’s 
frame, the newspaper participated in the work’s reception. That is, the writer, much like a 
storia figure or showman lecturer, directs our response, invoking the credulous spectator 
to show us the expression of astonishment or of bewilderment that we should have in 
front of the work, or that we should now know better than to have. Or both; that is, the 
newspaper writer assures us that we will not approach the representation and mistake it 
for a reality (certainly not initially, and thus, never fully); but he also encourages us to 
disavow our knowing better and to appreciate the simultaneous belief and doubt that the 
work provokes in us. 
The newspaper has a powerful ‘calling structure’ much like the one Stoichita 
observes of Metsu’s servant (who attracts) and his painted curtain (which eclipses), 
shaping our reception by interacting with both the representation and the self-awareness 
of the representation. Both the painted and the read versions of the newspaper work to 
attract and eclipse the spectatorial experience of the painting. Within the representation, 
the painted clipping attracts at the very least our desire to read what it says, only to deny 
the fulfillment of that desire by blurring or omitting some of the text. The circulating 
newspaper compels us to go see the exhibition of an astonishing painting, at the same 
time that it insists that we always already understand the painting’s intention to astonish 
us, confirming its status as representation.  
Just as newspaper accounts of duped spectatorship were inserted into the subject 
matter of trompe l’oeil paintings, much like Jonathan’s credulity was absorbed within the 
plot of Tyler’s play, similarly credulous spectators populate the plots of some early films. 
We might consider R.W. Paul’s The Country Man at First Sight of the Animated Pictures 
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(1901) or Edwin Porter's Uncle Josh at the Moving-Picture Show (1902), which spoof the 
country rube, who lacks the cultural framework needed to distinguish an image from real 
life. Uncle Josh is shown seated in a box to the left of the screen, where he applauds the 
bowing and dancing woman on the screen as if at a theater, until he becomes so 
compelled that he jumps over its threshold to join her dancing onstage. Further separating 
the screened images from the theater box in which he sits is an elaborate proscenium 
curtain, like that of Parrhasius, in front of which Uncle Josh looks at and reacts to the 
projected images. His presence in front of the curtain doubles its framing device for the 
audience of Porter’s film, becoming the source of the joke, especially when prudish 
Uncle Josh proceeds to tear down the film of a flirtatious young couple.  
In 1902, Uncle Josh at the Moving Picture Show is made amidst the historically 
changing role of the theater spectator, much like I suggested was true of the theatrical 
context for Pliny’s tale. Audiences of Vaudeville revues would have been encouraged to 
participate in something like the way that Uncle Josh does, or at the very least through 
their vocal expression of participation. But in the cinema, spectatorial participation 
becomes restricted; viewers were to be passive, silent, and well-behaved.84 Parrhasius’s 
curtain reappears, here as a proscenium curtain, at another historical revision of the 
spectator’s role at the theater: from active participant to silent viewer. Where Zeuxis had 
reached out to “tear down” Parrhasius’s curtain, to see the painting hidden beneath it, 
Uncle Josh reaches out, past the curtain, to intervene in the represented content, an 
inappropriate romantic advance, tearing down the white cloth that had served as the 
projection screen. Miriam Hansen understands Porter’s film as a didactic or disciplinary 
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instruction to film spectators, a version of the rule of “look, don’t touch.”85 But as Wanda 
Strauven has argued, it is more likely that Porter’s film already “was meant as a farce, a 
comedy to amuse the early, yet by then no longer inexperienced, cinemagoer.”86 And 
beyond this, it was capable simultaneously of provoking “nostalgia for the more 
interactive days of so-called precinema.”87 The hand-cranked projectors, showmen 
lecturers, live music, nonstop walk-in (and walk-out) screenings, as well as talking and 
smoking spectators, that is to say any of the (potentially) interactive elements of early 
cinema, were suppressed as the spectatorial role moved toward one of passive reception.  
It is the role of “confrontation” that further links trompe l’oeil painting to the 
culture of attractions, to which Gunning adds early cinema; this “confrontation” is a 
directness of display which focuses attention on “the immediate reaction of the viewer.”88 
Gunning describes early film programs as offering a series of short films, “all of which 
offer the viewer a moment of revelation.”89 It solicits a particular reaction from its 
viewer, and in this way is “exhibitionist” – which he adds is quite opposite the prevailing 
19th-century ideals of detached contemplation (the fourth wall in 19th-century naturalist 
theater or that described by Michael Fried as “absorptive.”)90 “These early films 
explicitly acknowledge their spectator, seeming to reach outwards and confront…. The 
viewer’s curiosity is aroused and fulfilled through a marked encounter, a direct stimulus, 
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43 
 
a succession of shocks.”91 Tempering the “violence” of this experience, he allows that at 
the very least “some sense of wonder or surprise” is at the heart of early cinematic 
viewing experience, even “if only wonder at the illusion of motion,” that is to say wonder 
at the apparatus, or perhaps, at the accomplishment of its maker.92  
Charles Musser works to trace a long history of the so-called precinema in his 
book, The Emergence of Cinema, by focusing on the element of the screen. “The genesis 
of the screen coincided with a profound transformation in Western culture, particularly in 
Holland (where magic-lantern inventor Christiaen Huygens was working).”93 There, he 
observes, amidst the seventeenth-century’s Scientific Revolution, a convergence between 
technological progress and cultural change took place in such a way as to allow the 
screen to emerge as a form of entertainment. The mystical terror provoked by projecting 
apparati diminished as a belief in ghosts declined and as witch burnings ceased. For 
Musser, “The demystification of the screen established a relationship between producer, 
image, and audience that has remained fundamentally unaltered ever since.”94 
While it was Dutch scientist Huygens who developed the simple lanterne 
magique in 1659, he did not exploit the magic lantern for its commercial possibilities. 
Instead it was Danish teacher and lens grinder, Thomas Walgensten, who, living in Paris 
in the 1660s, developed his own magic lantern and, by 1664, began giving exhibitions. 
He presented lantern shows to royalty in Lyons (1665), Rome (mid to late 1660s), and 
Copenhagen (1670).95 It is instructive to consider the context of such exhibitions abroad. 
When Walgensten returned to his homeland of Denmark in 1670 to exhibit his lantern 
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show, he did so in the year of King Frederick III’s death. But this was only two years 
after Frederick III had appointed Cornelius Gijsbrechts, a Southern Netherlandish trompe 
l’oeil painter, to his court. During his four-year stay in Copenhagen, Gijsbrechts 
produced a number of trompe l’oeil works for the Perspective Chamber in the monarch’s 
Cabinet of Curiosities, where the king’s guests would have been entertained by these 
modern trickeries, at the same time that the king’s interest in these works would have 
demonstrated his keen knowledge of contemporary developments in the arts and 
technology, as well as his knowing better about the status of their illusions. At least six of 
the 22 works produced during Gijsbrechts’ stay in Denmark, and now part of the national 
art collection in Copenhagen, prominently feature a curtain. The painted curtains are 
represented as if slightly pulled back, appearing to partially obscure and partially reveal 
either a (painted) letter rack or a (painted) still life. Isolating another element of 
Gijsbrechts’ 1672 painting Trompe l’oeil of a Letter Rack with Proclamation by 
Frederick III (Figure 1.10), we see the painted proclamation within the work, which 
arguably functions as a kind of signature, or at the very least as an acknowledgment of 
his painterly accomplishments. Gijsbrechts cites the king’s acknowledgment of his 
artistic ability not only pictorially, but also by demonstrating it in the mode of trompe 
l’oeil illusionism. This signature or acknowledgement of the work as a work of art would 
have allowed spectators to sort the levels of representation within the painting. Such 
acknowledgment of the work’s manufacturedness interferes with the popular notion that 
these paintings only would have fooled viewers about their status as representation. Thus, 
the demystification of the spectator, which Musser observes as the effect of 17th-century 
screen practice, occurs contemporaneously in 17th-century painting practice.  
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Musser attends to this historical moment in the decades following the invention of 
the catoptric lamp, a forerunner to the magic lantern described in Kircher’s 1646 Ars 
Magna, as one concerned with the demystification of illusion, wherein any understanding 
of illusion as the result of magic was forbidden. Instead, illusion became understood at 
this time as central to the display of the apparatus. For Musser this marked “‘a decisive 
turning point for screen practice when the observer of projected/reflected images became 
the historically constituted subject we now call the spectator.’”96 Gunning helpfully 
summarizes this point: “In other words, Musser would see demystification as essential to 
the existence of the spectator, and points out that a tradition of screen spectatorship 
preceded Lumière by centuries.”97 But this demystified spectator, nonetheless, continues 
to want to believe in the illusion, continues to find pleasure therein; this pleasure is now 
the result of the disavowal of this demystification. 
I am sympathetic with Musser’s effort, which is not to locate a new starting point 
for the history of cinema, nor to do away with the concept of origins all together, but 
instead to indicate “the possibility of so many starting points that the notion of a 
beginning is not only diffused but ultimately avoided.”98 Ultimately, he pursues an 
alternative perspective of placing cinema within a larger context of, what he calls, “the 
history of screen practice.”99 I hope that Musser would embrace the notion that this 
delimited context too might be reimagined as one of multiple or “so many” contexts, one 
of which might be thought of, following Gunning, as a history of the (in)credulous 
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spectator, but which moving on from Gunning, extends this history to trompe l’oeil 
painting practice. 
Insofar as turning our attention to 17th-century Copenhagen allowed us to see 
some intersections across visual media—both painted and projected—perhaps a similar 
attention to the American center of 19th-century trompe l’oeil painting practice—
Philadelphia—will prove productive. Alfred Frankenstein, the principal scholar of late 
19th-century trompe l’oeil and still life painter, William Harnett, describes the 
extraordinary resemblance that Harnett’s still life painting has to that of fellow 
Philadelphia painter, Raphaelle Peale. He writes, “Place a Harnett still life of the middle 
1870’s next to a Raphaelle Peale of 1815 and it is impossible to believe that they are 
separated by two generations, that the one belongs to the era of James Madison and the 
other to that of U.S. Grant.”100 He accounts for this according to a “direct line of 
descent,” but holds off on characterizing it: “if there are any intermediate links between 
them, they have yet to be discovered.”101 While both artists worked in Philadelphia, 
where something of a continuous tradition of still life painting can be traced, there is little 
evidence to support Harnett’s awareness of Peale’s work.102  The link, as Nicolai 
Cikovsky argues, is that both employ a common practice of illusionism, in its most 
extreme form: trompe l’oeil. My question attempts to link these symptoms; does the 
practice of trompe l’oeil illusionism shared by these historically separated painters relate 
to the other forms of visual culture then available in Philadelphia? 
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The kind of deception that characterizes the viewing experience of trompe l’oeil 
was not a common goal for all makers of still life painting; “it was a special and 
historically infrequent occurence.”103 Raphaelle Peale and his father, Charles Willson 
Peale exhibited “Deceptionist” works at the 1795 Columbianum exhibition in 
Philadelphia and in exhibitions at the Pennsylvania Academy of Fine Arts through 
Raphaelle’s death in 1825, after which point there is little evidence of a continuing 
tradition of deceptive illusionism at least as far as we can tell from the titles of exhibited 
works. But neither Cikovsky nor Frankenstein consider what may have been the most 
prominent intervening event in the passing years between Peale’s and Harnett’s 
illusionistic image production: the invention of photography in 1839. 
Alan Trachtenberg allows for a productive intertwining of painting and the pre-
history of photography and notably does so using Charles Willson Peale’s 1822 painting 
The Artist in his Museum (Figure 1.11). The painting features a standing self-portrait of 
Peale in the foreground, who lifts a curtain to reveal his Philadelphia museum: a room of 
shelves, rendered in dramatic linear perspective, housing natural specimens. Trachtenberg 
describes it as a painting that prepares the way for photography, insofar as photography 
will be the art form tasked with making visible the order of nature, while providing an 
exact copy thereof. The painting is divided into two modes of representation: the linear 
perspective of the room behind the curtain and the trompe l’oeil representation of the 
foreground.104 Trachtenberg argues that Peale’s gesture, lifting the curtain, positions him 
as a showman figure, mediating between the tasks of entertainment and instruction, to 
provide a model for the ambitions of photography.  
                                                
103 Ibid., 20. 
104 Alan Trachtenberg, Reading American Photographs: Images as History, Mathew Brady to Walker 
Evans (New York: Hill and Wang, 1989) 10.  
48 
 
As Geoffrey Batchen makes clear in his book Burning with Desire: The 
Conception of Photography, while the technical accomplishment of photography was 
made official via 1839 publications and decrees, its conceptual and metaphorical origins 
have a much longer pre-history, which includes some of the visual culture practices I 
have already been tracing here. Following him and Trachtenberg, I look for additional 
intersections between early photographic practice and contemporaneous trompe l’oeil 
painting practice, some of which take place at the level of discourse, wherein reception 
for both media are characterized by claims of astonishment and deception, as well as 
seeming presence.  
In his book The Pencil of Nature (1844), William Henry Fox Talbot struggles to 
articulate what photography is and how it works. Batchen observes that Talbot seems 
unable to decide between terms like “render” and “imitate,” or between its “hav[ing] 
drawn its own picture” or its having been “effected” or “impressed” by the “boundless 
powers of natural chemistry.”105 Around the same time, Talbot recounts anecdotes about 
the reception of his photographs of lace, describing those to whom he showed the images 
as being “unable to tell the difference between the picture of lace and the piece of lace 
itself.” 106 As Batchen points out, the story unconsciously seems “to mirror his own 
linguistic uncertainty about the relationship between image and referent.”107 Insofar as 
Talbot’s story relates the possibility of an unknown observer mistaking a picture of lace 
for actual lace, we can recognize another invocation of the credulous spectator, but this 
time in the context of the new medium of photography.  
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Talbot invokes the credulous spectator to relate the fidelity of his apparatus’s 
reproductions, but he does so while also observing something undecideable about the 
status of the photograph. Indeed his text affirms his own vacillation about how to 
articulate what photography accomplishes and what a photograph is. Photography, at this 
moment and arguably throughout its history, produces an object that is both credible and 
incredible, nature and artifice, art and science; it is undecideable. And Talbot shows his 
photogenic drawing of a piece of lace to an audience who wants its status as 
representation to be undecideable (Figure 1.12). Talbot reports that he asked his 
audience, “whether it was a good representation” and that they replied “that they were not 
to be so easily deceived; for that was evidently no picture, but the piece of lace itself.”108 
Despite their skepticism, they nonetheless become Zeuxises for Talbot’s purposes. They 
rhetorically reach out to pull back the piece of lace—which they took to be physically 
present—even though its representational status had already been disclosed. Talbot 
illustrates the “strange implosion of representation and reality” that is photography by 
way of Pliny’s iconography: he gives us an image of lace, a fabric used as a curtain.109  
 The intersection of trompe l’oeil painting, the theater of attractions, and early 
photography exceeds the discursive realm in the practice of Louis-Jacques-Mandé 
Daguerre. Before his invention of daguerreotypy, Daguerre was best known for his 
trompe l’oeil scenery designs, which he later displayed, not just as theatrical backdrops, 
but as objects that were by themselves on view as diorama paintings. One of the most 
successful of Daguerre’s dioramas, according to Helmut and Alison Gernsheim’s account 
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of its reception, was a trompe l’oeil curtain, which was a widely admired representation 
of an immense blue drapery with a gold cord.110 Other dioramas included landscapes, 
such as La Fôret de Sénart, about which admirers declared that they saw a “real stream, 
trees, and grass”111 or another of the Canterbury Cathedral, which resembled a window, 
through which one could see a construction scene of the cathedral, including a few 
workmen. One credulous woman reportedly asked to be accompanied down the steps to 
the building. The diorama pictures measured approximately 22 x 14 meters and were 
framed by a proscenium-like opening in the wall at the end of a 13 meter tunnel; the 
audience remained stationary in a cylindrical room (with a diameter of 12 meters and a 
height of 7 meters) that slowly revolved (rotating 73 degrees, turning on a pivot) to reveal 
a second diorama picture. Each painting, which was painted on linen for its transparency, 
was hidden from view by a curtain and was painted in such a way that it was both 
translucent and opaque, allowing shutters and screens to modify the daylight that entered 
through a skylight and from long vertical windows behind each painting to dramatic 
scenic effect. Each viewing of the two dioramas lasted approximately 15 minutes. They 
had such a strong illusion of depth that spectators reportedly threw coins or paper balls at 
the picture. Insofar as the reception accounts of the diorama invoke credulous spectators 
that mistake the diorama’s image for reality, the Gernsheims characterize the diorama’s 
effect as one of trompe l’oeil.  
It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand precisely the type of illusion 
generated by the diorama, as few are extant and we are not 19th-century viewers. If 
viewers felt provoked to throw coins in toward the represented scene, we might infer that 
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the scene appeared to recede in space, following the rule of linear perspective, rather than 
seeming to emerge toward the viewer. But perhaps like in Peale’s painting, this diorama 
employed two modes of representation: recall Gernsheim’s description that the cathedral 
diorama resembled a window, through which visitors could look at the construction 
scene. For this window to have compelled viewers to look out from it, we might guess 
that it was rendered in a trompe l’oeil manner, as if emerging from the surface of the 
diorama, much as the diorama of blue curtain with its gold cord is described; perhaps the 
cathedral window would have inspired viewers to want to lean through or up against its 
seeming glass, believing momentarily in its tactility just as they would have wanted to 
pull the gold cord of the blue curtain, provoked perhaps to touch it, or even like Zeuxis to 
pull it down.  
But again, we must remember the viewing context and allow it to inform the way 
we understand reception accounts. Viewers would have had to enter a special proto-
cinematic auditorium to look at the dioramas, even paying an admission fee. Thus, their 
knowledge of the image’s status as representation precedes their willingness to suspend 
or bracket that knowledge. As one spectator remarked, they were “an extraordinary 
mixture of art and nature, producing the most astonishing effect.”112 Additional critical 
reception reported that spectators felt “transported by some magic spell to the scene 
itself.”113 As Batchen points out, by 1839 Daguerre would claim this same astonishing 
effect for his daguerreotype. 
Returning to the context of 19th-century Philadelphia, German emigrants 
William and Frederick Langenheim introduced several new photographic 
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processes to the United States in the 1840s and fostered the later production of 
photographic lantern slides in the 1850s. An 1851 article in London’s Art-Journal 
described these slides accordingly:  
The new magic-lantern pictures on glass, being produced by the action of 
light alone on a prepared glass plate, by means of the camera obscura, 
must throw the old style of magic-lantern slides into the shade, and 
supersede them at once, on account of the greater accuracy of the smallest 
details which are drawn and fixed on glass from nature, by the camera 
obscura, with a fidelity truly astonishing. By magnifying these new slides 
through the magic lantern, the representation is nature itself again, 
omitting all defects and incorrectness in the drawing which can never be 
avoided in painting a picture on the small scale required for the old 
slides.114  
Thanks to the Langenheims among others, Philadelphia became the center of the 
American photographic and lantern-slide industries for several decades.115 Having 
improved the magic lantern in the 1860s, optician Lorenzo J. Marcy moved his business 
from Rhode Island to Philadelphia, where he marketed his sciopticon, a double-wicked 
projector that burned more strongly and brightly. Casper W. Briggs moved his slide 
lantern business from Boston to Philadelphia in 1872 and remained the nation’s dominant 
slide producer until World War I. Musser observes, “Audiences, accustomed to projected 
images painted on glass, were overwhelmed by the realism of life-size photographs on 
the screen.”116 Or at least this was the claim of the advertisements for and the journalistic 
reception of the slide presentations. When some photographic slides by Alexander 
Gardner, the photographer for the Army of the Potomac, were shown in New York, an 
1864 advertisement in the New York Daily Tribune announced, “The views…bring the 
battle fields, their incidents and localities, before us in the most faithful and vivid 
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manner, each view being reproduced on a canvas covering a surface of over 600 square 
feet.”117 Here we can see the way newspaper and advertising accounts function as 
surrogate showmen, directing and determining spectatorial expectation and experience of 
photographic slide shows, just as they will within the next decades for trompe l’oeil 
painting.  
Of Gardner’s slides of the Army of the Potomac, one journalist from the New 
York Tribune wrote, “The dead appear almost to speak; the distant to overcome space and 
time and be close and palpable.”118 This feeling of or desire for proximity and palpability 
is perhaps heightened or already fostered by the visual experiences of the Peales’ 
deceptionist paintings, as well as another optical device, the stereoscope. The 
Langenheim brothers also introduced the stereoscope to the United States in 1850. It was 
a hand-held device that positioned two photographic images side-by-side, each taken 
from a slightly different angle; when viewed together, the two images appeared to 
combine, giving the illusion of three-dimensional depth. Insofar as the viewing 
experience gives the impression that the represented content is emerging from the surface 
of the photograph, the stereoscope shares a visual history with trompe l’oeil paintings that 
seem to reverse linear perspective, allowing represented objects to seem to emerge from 
the surface of the painting, as well as with early cinematic works such as Arrival of the 
Train at the Station, wherein the filmed train is shot in such a way that it seems to emerge 
from the screen toward the spectator, rather than receding into space. Because the viewer 
holds the binocular peephole-like device in his or her hand, we might imagine how 
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tempting it would have been for some viewers to reach out with the other hand to test the 
reality of the image’s impression of depth.  
In an 1859 article for The Atlantic Monthly, Oliver Wendell Holmes famously 
observes that photography and its application by the stereoscope allow form to be 
“henceforth divorced from matter…. Give us a few negatives of a thing worth seeing, 
taken from different points of view, and that is all we want of it. Pull it down or burn it 
up, if you please.”119 The remark, which appears in the first of his three articles on the 
subject of photography for this predominantly literary journal, is typically taken as proof 
of Holmes’s belief in photographic objectivity. So sufficient a substitute or copy is the 
photograph, Holmes can advocate the destruction of the physical object from which its 
form is taken: “burn it up, if you please.” But to read Holmes in this way is to divorce the 
form of his rhetoric from the content of his remarks. A closer look at the historical and 
rhetorical context of his statement complicates its meaning.  
Instead of taking Holmes’s epigram as an indication of his belief in photographic 
objectivity, I follow Gunning to instead cast doubt on the naïve credulity of this spectator. 
Just as Gunning recommends that we not underestimate “the basic intelligence and 
reality-testing abilities of the average film viewer,” similarly, we should not 
underestimate Holmes, a physician and Harvard Medical School professor, who 
vigorously critiqued conventional medical practices, such as bloodletting and 
homeopathy, as “imbecile credulity.”120 Indeed, his “chief relevance today” according to 
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a 2009 article in The New England Journal of Medicine is “his legacy as a skeptic:” he 
was “a key spokesperson for an ‘age of uncertainty.’”121 
My effort here, however, is not a playground rebuttal, a simple reversal of terms; 
if Holmes’s remark has been understood as reflective of a nineteenth-century belief in 
photography, my intention is not to upend this to insist that he and his public were instead 
wholly skeptical. Certainly, Holmes enjoys photography’s “faithful” and “perfect copy” 
of nature; and at the same time, he understands the processes involved in making the 
picture, including those that “meddle with” the image—whether through coloring, 
staging, or error. This vacillation between belief and disbelief, if we can call it that, is, as 
Gunning observes of early film, “part of the attraction of the new invention;” it cultivates 
an aesthetic of astonishment.  
In his essay, Holmes self-consciously adopts the style of the “showman lecturer,” 
building throughout the course of his essay an atmosphere of expectation that stresses the 
novelty and astonishing properties of the attraction and its capacity for transformation. 
Indeed, he admits to using “a certain rhetorical amplitude not doubtfully suggestive of the 
lecture-room” relative to new inventions, such as the railroad car, the telegraph, or 
chloroform; but in this essay revises that instinct, deciding that it is “hardly necessary to 
waste any considerable amount of rhetoric upon wonders that are so thoroughly 
appreciated.”122  Unlike these other inventions, however, it is the “invention of the mirror 
with a memory, and especially that application of it which has given us the wonders of 
the stereoscope,” which Holmes writes, “is not so easily, completely, universally 
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recognized in all the immensity of its applications and suggestions.”123 By Holmes’s own 
logic then it is due some rhetorical amplification because, as he observes, photography 
“has become such an everyday matter with us, that we forget its miraculous nature.”124 
Rather than a reflection of photography’s dominant reception, Holmes’s essay is an effort 
to intervene into an already jaded public opinion—an effort to restore a sense of 
astonishment to "this," as he writes, “triumph of human ingenuity… [this] most 
audacious, remote, improbable, incredible…of all the discoveries man has made.”125  
To restore a sense of astonishment, Holmes first directs our attention to the 
apparatus itself. He proceeds, in the mode of a scientist, with an itemized and lengthy 
outline of the technologies involved with the daguerreotype, the photograph, and the 
stereoscope. This section, notably omitted from Alan Trachtenberg’s well-known edited 
version of the essay, reads like an instruction manual, dryly detailing the chemicals 
required for preparation of photo-sensitive plates, the length of exposure, and the 
processing of the exposed plate. It is relative to the necessary reversal of negative to 
positive, however, that he begins to employ showier prose. Instead of the truth effect of 
the negative, he observes its “perverse and totally depraved” qualities. He writes, “the 
glass plate has the right part of the object on the left side of its picture, and the left part on 
its right side; its light is darkness, and its darkness is light. Everything is just as wrong as 
it can be…”126 His emphasis here on how incorrect the photographic negative looks is a 
set-up for a suspense-laden reveal. He continues, “Extremes meet. Every given point of 
the picture is as far from truth as a lie can be. But in traveling away from the pattern it 
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has gone round a complete circle, and is at once as remote from Nature and as near it as 
possible.”127  
Holmes understands that “astonishment,” as Gunning observes, “derives from a 
magical metamorphosis rather than a seamless reproduction of reality.”128 Holmes 
dramatizes the metamorphosis of the photographic negative into the photographic 
positive by suddenly and seemingly inexplicably transforming the style of his prose. “—
‘How far is it to Taunton?’ said a countryman, who was walking exactly the wrong way 
to reach that commercial and piscatory centre. —‘’bäout twenty-five thäousan’ mild,’—
said the boy he asked, --‘ ‘f y’ go ‘z y’ ‘r’ goin’ näow, ‘n’ bäout häaf a mild ‘f y’ turn 
right räoun’ ‘n’ go t’other way.’”129 The regional dialect of this wise-fool, represented 
both visually and phonetically, showily enacts the contradiction that is the photograph—
at once remote from and near to nature—in the voice of another contradiction—the wise-
fool. Doing so acts out what Gunning calls “the contradictory stages of involvement with 
the image, unfolding, [as in] other nineteenth-century visual entertainments, a vacillation 
between belief and incredulity.”130 
Like the country man who must turn around to be set on the right path, the 
negative must be turned around “to,” as Holmes writes, “give birth to a positive—this 
mass of contradictions to assert its hidden truth in a perfect harmonious affirmation of the 
realities of Nature. Behold the process!,” he exclaims. The exclamation point follows a 
statement that directly addresses the reader, rupturing the prose at least as much as the 
regional dialect of the earlier dialogue. Moreover, the exclamatory statement shifts our 
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attention away from the realistic effect of the photographic positive, back to the means of 
its production: “Behold the process!”  
This exclamatory direct address is repeated just three paragraphs later as he 
continues to describe the procedures by which the positive is made: “For, lo! when the 
sensitive paper is laid in the sun under the negative glass, every dark spot on the glass 
arrests a sunbeam….”131 His exclamations directly confront the reader and solicit a 
reaction of astonishment. Furthermore, the direct address of these phrases emulates the 
direct address of the stereoscope itself—the device he goes on to describe—which 
accommodates only a single viewer at a time.  
To operate the stereoscope one inserts a stereograph—a card with two seemingly 
identical pictures that are actually taken from slightly different angles—into the 
stereoscopic viewer, and then looks through it. The stereoscope reproduces the effect of 
binocular or natural vision; “the everyday truth” as Holmes writes, is that “our two eyes 
see two somewhat different pictures, which perception combines to form one picture.”132 
Holmes articulates this perception as if it were motivated by desire, “the pictures are two, 
and we want to slide them into each other, so to speak, as in natural vision, that we may 
see them as one.”133 That which is disavowed in natural vision is illustrated and made 
explicit by the situation of viewing through the stereoscope. Viewers know the difference 
between what is on the card and what is seen through the viewfinder, and yet the sudden 
transformation can be astonishing.  
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Holmes defines the stereoscope according to its astonishing effect of 
metamorphosis: “A stereoscope is an instrument which makes surfaces look solid.”134 
That is, when viewed through a stereoscope, the two images of the stereograph combine 
into a single, seemingly three-dimensional image. This transformation of surface into 
solid, however, is an effect, an appearance. “By this instrument,” he proclaims, “that 
effect [of solidity] is so heightened as to produce an appearance of reality which cheats 
the senses with its seeming truth.”135 His words recall those of scientist and lecturer 
Michael Faraday, who during an 1846 lecture at the Royal Institution describes the 
experience of viewing the Electro-magnetic Chronoscope as one in which we are 
“cheated by our senses out of the true observations.”136 When viewed in a darkened 
room, the sudden illumination of the chronoscope’s spinning disk quite accidentally 
allowed him to observe a single frozen instant of its otherwise continuous motion. 
Faraday reproduces this experiment on a grander scale for his live audience to expose an 
illusion of natural vision: although a disk, such as that depicted here, might appear 
entirely white while in motion, a sudden flash of gunpowder reveals its color as clearly as 
if it were at rest. Like the chronoscope, the stereoscope reproduces an illusion of natural 
vision. As Holmes observes of the stereograph, “the pictures are two, and we want to 
slide them into each other, so to speak, as in natural vision, that we may see them as 
one.”137 Holmes, like Faraday, disrupts our sensory illusion with a sudden revelation of 
truth, as if to exclaim, ‘See for yourself!’  
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Unable to illustrate the illusory effect of the stereoscope within the unillustrated 
pages of The Atlantic Monthly, Holmes uses his authorial intervention to rhetorically 
perform its astonishing accomplishments. Indeed, he does this in the mode of a showman 
lecturer, who says, “See for yourself!” His exclamatory direct address directs our 
looking: “Behold the process!” and later, “Look!” This later exclamation arrives to point 
out a discrepancy between the stereograph’s supposedly twin images. Of a stereograph of 
two women at Bern’s Ogre Fountain, he observes, “In the right picture two women are 
chatting, with arms akimbo, over its basin; before the plate for the left picture is got 
ready, ‘one shall be taken and the other left’; look! On the left side there is but one 
woman, and you may see the blur where the other is melting into thin air as she fades 
forever from your eyes.”138 Holmes alerts us to a discrepancy that the illusionism of the 
stereoscope will overcome, unless, as he exclaims, we “Look!” (Figure 1.13).  
Returning to Holmes’s hyperbolic divorce of form from matter, we now recognize 
in the direct address of his remark, “Pull it down or burn it up, if you please,” a 
solicitation of our astonishment. Indeed, he prefaces this remark by admitting the 
extravagance of his speculations.139 And we can recognize hyperbole in that which 
follows: “There is only one Coliseum or Pantheon; but how many millions of potential 
negatives have they shed,—representatives of billions of pictures,—since they were 
erected!...We have got the fruit of creation now, and need not trouble ourselves with the 
core.”140 Transformed into ‘billions of pictures,’ might we now discard these landmarks 
of antiquity as we would an apple core? Holmes continues to amplify rather than to 
diminish the stakes of such ostentatious waste: “Men will hunt all curious, beautiful, 
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grand objects, as they hunt the cattle in South America, for their skins, and leave the 
carcasses as of little worth.”141 Rather than celebrating the trophy-like accomplishment of 
photography, Holmes warns against the potential for hubris—that hunting for the skins 
we might devalue and destroy the world we deem photographable, as so many animal 
carcasses left to rot.  
Photography may astonishingly transform matter into image, but not without 
consequence. One “consequence,” Holmes writes, “will soon be such an enormous 
collection of forms that they will have to be classified and arranged in vast libraries, as 
books are now.”142 It is notably the persistent materiality of these forms which becomes 
his concern. Beyond this, because the camera lens has no “fixed standard of focal 
length,” we risk the  “possibility of being misled by those partialities which tend to make 
us overrate” familiar objects, rather than being able to objectively compare them.143  
When Holmes declares that photography turns matter into form, this is less a 
pronouncement of his faith in the medium than a rhetorical performance of its astonishing 
transformation—one directed at an audience who already finds its accomplishment 
unremarkable. The hyperbole lets him vacillate between belief and skepticism without 
finally deciding between them. While for Holmes the stereoscope exceeds its popular 
reception as a “pretty toy” or “a charming novelty,” signaling “a new epoch in the history 
of human progress,” just what the future of this media will be is to be determined by the 
imaginations of future users.144 That is, he concludes by handing over responsibility for 
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its use and its meaning to us: “Let our readers fill out a blank check on the future as they 
like,—we give our indorsement [sic] to their imaginations beforehand.”145 
Just as Holmes directs popular reception of stereography by incorporating the 
rhetorical style of the showman, some photographic slide shows import the showman into 
their representational content. Henry R. Heyl presented a series of photographs of a man, 
each with his lips in different positions; shown in quick succession this phasmatropic 
projection created the illusion that the man, Brother Jonathan, was speaking.146 Brother 
Jonathan was the personification of the United States from about 1783 through the War 
of 1812, when Uncle Sam replaced him.147 The term Brother Jonathan is a reclamation of 
a mild aspersion used by British Loyalists against Colonial Patriots and its usage 
continued through the Civil War, but would likely have been somewhat outdated by the 
time of Heyl’s exhibition in 1870. Nonetheless, Heyl’s exhibition at the Academy of 
Music in Philadelphia was “the first public exhibition of moving pictures in which 
photographs of living objects were shown as if in motion by projecting the views upon a 
screen.”148 The phasmatrope consists of a disc that revolves intermittently to project a 
series of images, so that Brother Jonathan’s lips appear to speak the words 
simultaneously spoken from behind the screen during its exhibition.  
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Ladies and Gentlemen: We are tonight to see for the first time, photographs of 
persons shown upon a screen by the aid of a magic lantern, the figures appearing 
to move in most lifelike ways. How this effect is produced we cannot briefly 
explain, but you will have the evidence of your own eyes to convince you that this 
new art will rapidly develop into one of the greatest merit for instruction and 
enjoyment. 
This beginning of greater things is not an imported product but it was 
perfected right here in Philadelphia, where it adds one more to the list of 
first inventions of real merit that stand to the credit of the City of 
Brotherly Love. The photographs were made at 1208 Chestnut Street in 
the studio of Mr. O. H. Willard, which place may now be well named 
"The Cradle of the Motion Picture."149 
From its mode of address, “Ladies and Gentlemen,” to its calling attention to the 
apparatus and its description of the apparatus’s effect on the audience, Brother Jonathan’s 
script is remarkably similar to the scripts of showmen who had accompanied previous 
photographic slide shows. Now however, the showman’s enframement of the spectacle is 
absorbed into the subject matter; he enframes and performs the attraction.  
Some of the earliest photography already self-consciously addressed its own 
deceptive illusionism by aligning itself with trompe l’oeil motifs. A carte de visite in the 
collection of Philadelphia’s American Philosophical Society shows a bearded man in an 
elaborately painted trompe l’oeil studio setting, much like the arched windows that 
populate Dou’s 17th-century Dutch trompe l’oeil paintings. Window sets became popular 
in studio photography later in the 19th century, but the example of Bearded Man Posed in 
an Artificial Window (Figure 1.14) dates to the late 1860s.150 In it, a bearded man leans 
out from an elaborately framed arched window; his right arm rests outside the window 
along its ledge. As Janice Schimmelman points out this particular tintype was encased in 
an embossed Potter ferrotype card mount, the Gothic arch frame of which doubles the 
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studio’s window frame within the image. The raised stars and edges of the frame on the 
embossed card, which the tintype viewer could have felt by running her fingers across the 
mount, might have had an additional impact when paired with the trompe l’oeil 
photography studio set, supplementing its play between haptic and optic experiences. 
Although it is unlikely that she knew this particular photograph, though possible 
that she was aware of the larger 19th-century practice, contemporary German 
photographer Annette Kelm’s Your House is my Castle of 2005 (Figure 1.15) almost 
seems to cite the Philadelphia carte de visite, Bearded Man Posed in an Artificial 
Window. With her hands resting on the ledge of the windowsill, the artist dons a false 
beard and looks out at the camera/spectator. She strains to maintain an upright posture, by 
pressing her left shoulder against the window frame, having to do so because the window 
and the tower in which it is situated lean dramatically to her right. While the window in 
the carte de visite was a set built for the indoor photography studio, the tower is situated 
in a wooded landscape in the Italian hillsides, the mannerist Sacro Bosco pleasure garden 
complex built at Bomarzo in the 16th century by Pier Francesco Orsini in memory of his 
recently deceased wife. There, the leaning tower is joined by sculptures of monsters from 
antiquity and a giant hell mouth—the terror of Dante’s inscription, “Abandon all hope, ye 
who enter here,” is upended by the picnic table that sits just inside its threshold (Figure 
1.16). While not trompe l’oeil in any of the ways so far discussed, the park exhibits a 
mannerist self-consciousness meant to solicit a particular kind of response—
astonishment—from its visitors.  
Recent reception of another contemporary German photographer, Thomas 
Demand, reanimates the 19th-century reception of trompe l’oeil painting. Richard Eoin 
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Nash concludes his review of an exhibition of works by Demand with an anecdote in 
which he describes trying to peek through the vertical blinds of an office window.  
Expecting a view into a curator’s office, instead he discovers that he has been “fooled” by 
Demand’s photograph Window (1998) (Figure 1.17) whose “trompe l’oeil” window is 
capable of convincing a viewer that a representation is a reality.151 Rhetorically Nash 
turns Demand’s photograph into a painting by asserting its effect as one typically 
reserved for that medium. For other critics too the power and the threat of Demand’s 
trompe l’oeil effect is that it troubles the indexical link between the photograph and its 
referent; this is a point I will address more fully in Chapter 4. But insofar as Demand’s 
photographs, at first glance, might look to be of real places, Nash describes the 
spectator’s experience as one of being tricked. This critic repeats the terms of Pliny’s 
emblematic trompe l’oeil tale, casting himself in the role of Zeuxis, the credulous 
spectator, who mistakes a represented curtain for a real one—one that he wants to look 
behind.   
For his 2009 solo exhibition at Berlin’s Neue Nationalgalerie, Thomas Demand 
hung curtains of weighty gray fabric throughout the space (Figure 1.18). Instead of 
mounting free-standing walls within Ludwig Mies van der Rohe’s glassed and wall-less 
structure, he opted for curtains to help define the space. His frame-less images (sealed 
between a layer of aluminum and Perspex) hung from or near the curtains, somewhat 
improbably as if affixed to their folds or hovering slightly in front of them. Exhibition 
reviewer Kirsty Bell described this as drawing the focus “away from the constructed 
images’ trompe l’oeil effects” to allow instead for “a constant shift in scale and 
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attention.”152 I want to say, however, that rather than drawing our focus away from his 
works’ trompe l’oeil effects, the curtains foreground the work in the Ur-scenario of 
trompe l’oeil, Parrhasius’s presentation of the painted curtain. By drawing our attention 
away from trompe l’oeil, Bell wants to avoid reiterating the subject of most of Demand’s 
critical reception: Demand’s meticulous paper sculpture construction of the scene he then 
photographs. While she (productively, I think) wants to relocate focus to our spectatorial 
experience in front of these works, one in which our attention is constantly shifting, she 
overlooks the way that trompe l’oeil already insists upon the spectatorial experience of 
the work of art. The drawn curtain not only thematizes the secrecy of Demand’s shrouded 
meanings, as Bell indicates, but also incites our Zeuxian desire to have it unveiled.  
Whereas Demand’s works typically reference a historically rich site, his titles 
refuse to specifically identify it. Demand’s exhibition display in Berlin included table-
like vitrines on which large white books displayed short texts. Similarly, these texts did 
nothing to help identify the source material for his resulting images. Instead the texts lead 
the viewer away from the representational content of his image toward considerations of 
his or her spectatorial experience in front of the work. One such text reads like a 
(showman’s) script directing and/or describing in second-person address the viewer’s 
uncertainty: “And what are you seeing? You are watching your own forgetting. Yes, you 
are gazing out upon the river of forgetfulness.”153 
In 2011 Demand stepped into the role of curator to organize an exhibition, La 
Carte d’Après Nature, which occurred at two venues: the Villa Paloma in Monaco and at 
Matthew Marks Gallery in New York. In the latter installation, which I visited, Demand 
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returned to the curtain as a site upon which to hang three works by René Magritte (Figure 
1.19). This time, however, the curtain surpassed its iconographical association with 
Parrhasius’s trompe l’oeil feat; indeed, it was deployed in the mode of trompe l’oeil, 
which I describe as a specifically photographic mode of trompe l’oeil. That is, Demand 
wallpapered two of the gallery walls from floor to ceiling with the image of a regularly 
folding red curtain. Given his prior installation of an actual curtain upon which to hang 
works of art, its status as photographic wallpaper is not immediately apparent; that is, its 
flat coincidence with the wall could go unnoticed until it was approached or attended to 
at all. In the installation at Matthew Marks, the wallpaper curtain was the only piece by 
Demand included in the show, as such it was listed on the corresponding checklist/map 
that each visitor received upon entering the space. Here, he realizes the trompe l’oeil 
mode of his photography in the exhibition display; rather than hanging actual curtains, he 
wall-papers the image of a curtain and builds free-standing white walls to form a (maze-
like) configuration of rooms within Matthew Marks’ otherwise undivided space. The 
labyrinthine quality of his built environment further underlines the artist-curator’s interest 
in giving visitors a playfully disorienting experience.    
As curator of this exhibition, Demand featured the work of several artists 
preoccupied by the way representation of reality. Most prominently, he featured the work 
of a lesser-known Italian photographer, Luigi Ghirri, whose color photographs, spanning 
the 1970s through the 1980s, frame reality with a self-conscious wink to the often-banal 
results of this act. His photographs “[document] the collision of everyday life with banal 
representations of nature, such as those from advertisements…”; they “[show] nature 
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with a nod to that in the photograph that was also ‘not nature.’”154 Demand continues, 
“Ghirri doesn’t select this photo for its realism or its picture-perfect narrative, but for the 
disorienting effect it creates, in which it looks as if the couple [in his Alpe de Siusi 
(1979)] are walking toward a movie set backdrop, or into a postcard…. This is what 
Ghirri does best—taking a typical scene, even loaded with clichés of landscape, and 
making it confusing, strange or unresolved, not unlike what Magritte did in his 
landscapes. We are torn between belief in the romantic idea of this idyllic vista and doubt 
about its veracity” (Figure 1.20).155  
 As I already mentioned, Demand selected several paintings by Magritte to hang in 
his show and on his trompe l’oeil wallpaper, at least in its New York exhibition. It is 
from Magritte’s art journal, sporadically published between 1951 and 1965 and 
consisting typically of a single postcard, that Demand takes the title of his exhibition. 
Following Magritte’s interest in the obdurate impossibilities and failings of 
representation, Demand takes up the “semantically irresolvable connection between 
‘nature’ and ‘carte’” that constitutes his title.156 Arguably he takes up the curtain motif as 
another nod to Magritte, who featured curtains in his paintings, including The Human 
Condition (1933) (Figure 1.21) and La Gioconda (1964) (Figure 1.22). In the former, a 
grassy field traversed by a dirt path under cottony white clouds is seen through a window 
framed by curtains, but the view is obstructed by a painting standing on an easel, which 
shows (at least what appears to be, or what visually matches) the very same landscape we 
see outside through the window behind it. The viewer is thus challenged to determine 
which landscape is the real one, but also knows that “of course the answer is neither one. 
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They are both equally made of paint, and painted on the same flat surface. Magritte dryly 
satirizes the Albertian art historical notion that painting should provide a window onto 
the world. For him, a painting may be a window, but it is a painted window, and that 
world is a painted world.”157 The curtains open to reveal this conundrum of 
representation.  
Christy Lange suggests that Demand brings Magritte and Ghirri together in his 
show according to their shared “penchant for drawing back the curtains on the 
representations of nature that surround us, revealing rather than their resemblance to 
nature, their artificiality and constructedness.”158 For Lange, the metaphor of “drawing 
back the curtains” means exposing the “artificiality and constructedness” of the 
representation, revealing the apparatus. But neither Demand’s wallpaper, nor Parrhasius’s 
paint will ever allow their represented curtains to be drawn back. While the paint’s 
refusal to yield has the effect for Zeuxis of metaphorically drawing back the curtains to 
expose the curtain’s status as representation, this stages that which Magritte terms, the 
“human condition:” “our gaze [tries] always to go further, to see the object, the reason for 
our existence.”159  
What lies behind the painting for the famously sardonic Magritte is, “the wall;” he 
insists, in this way, that there is nothing to find behind the curtain of representation. But 
neither Parrhasius’s painting nor Demand’s wallpaper will ever show us even this. While 
Magritte’s trompe l’oeil efforts, following Patricia Allmer, might be to “radically 
undermine Western valorizations of the sublime,” the representation of the curtain 
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continues to hold out the promise of something behind.160 This desire ‘always to go 
further, to see the object, the reason for our existence’ continues to condition our human 
experience. I will return to this powerful aspect of representation in the final chapter by 
way of Roland Barthes, who in Camera Lucida (1980) reclaims belief in images by 
becoming a credulous spectator. Tellingly, the frontispiece for this text, Daniel 
Boudinet’s Polaroid (1979) (Figure 1.23), shows us a pair of drawn curtains, barely 
parted—perhaps just enough to incite our desire to see beyond them. While to attempt 
literally to see beyond them will result only in our Zeuxian discovery of the photograph’s 
obdurate materiality on the page, to do so imaginarily is the gift of human consciousness 
and a purpose of art. We go to the theater or a film, not so that we can feel embarrassed 
about the way its illusions can dupe us, but so we can participate in its imaginary 
scenarios, despite knowing better. We want to be carried away, perhaps, from the reality 
of material limitations, which is always also disclosed.  
                                                
160 Ibid., 71. 
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Chapter 2. Graspable Objects 
 
In his seminal text, Techniques of the Observer (1990), Jonathan Crary argues that 
the nineteenth-century invention of the stereoscope insinuated a break in the way that 
vision had been understood previously. From the 16th through the 18th centuries, he 
writes, “from Descartes to Berkeley to Diderot, vision is conceived in terms of analogies 
to the senses of touch.”161 These thinkers insisted “that knowledge, and specifically 
knowledge of space and depth, is built up out of an orderly accumulation and cross-
referencing of perceptions on a plane independent of the viewer.”162 They could thus 
have known “nothing of the ideas of pure visibility to arise in the nineteenth century. 
Nothing could be more removed,” in Crary’s account, “from Berkeley’s theory of how 
distance is perceived than the science of the stereoscope.”163 For Crary, the stereoscope is 
the archetypal device of the nineteenth-century, through it “tangibility (or relief) is 
constructed solely through an organization of optical cues (and the amalgamation of the 
observer into a component of the apparatus).”164 As such, it “eradicates the very field on 
which eighteenth-century knowledge arranged itself.”165  
But the stereoscope’s break with an older paradigm of vision may not be as clean 
as Crary would like. Indeed, the older paradigm may not be as uniformly coherent as he 
portrays it. Although the shift he identifies is located in the observer, rather than in the 
field of representation, he suggests that Jean-Baptiste-Siméon Chardin’s 18th-century still 
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life paintings are exemplary of a model of vision still based on the relation of touch and 
sight. This is in contrast to modernity’s distanced image—an image set off solely for the 
eyes—which had not yet become dominant. Instead, the “shallow, stage-like ledg[e] 
populated with forms,” in Chardin’s Basket of Wild Strawberries (1761) (Figure 2.1), 
Crary argues, allows the artist to transpose the immediacy of sense experience “to a 
scenic space in which the relation of one object to another has less to do with sheer 
optical appearances than with knowledge of isomorphisms and positions on a unified 
terrain.”166 Chardin’s still-lifes, Crary continues, “underscore the primacy of a vision, 
belonging to a specific historical moment, in which tactility was fully embedded.”167 
Chardin’s 18th-century viewer apprehends the objects represented on the table in the 
natural attitude, as “out there,” across the visual threshold of the table ledge, in all their 
plenitude; the strawberries organized in a perfectly pyramidal geometry are surrounded 
by other objects—a glass of water, two carnations, two cherries, a peach—upon the 
ordering and independent field of the table. Chardin’s still lifes are for Crary “a last great 
presentation of the classical object in all its plenitude, before it is sundered irrevocably 
into exchangeable and ungrounded signifiers or into the painterly traces of an 
autonomous vision.”168 
Mieke Bal counters Crary’s argument, observing the way that even art which fit 
clumsily the paradigm of the perspectival regime, “baroque and especially rococo art, 
although not ‘knowing’ the stereoscope, was in its own way putting the body back into 
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the act of viewing.”169 The centuries-long tradition of trompe l’oeil painting might also be 
thought of as ‘putting the body back into the act of viewing,’ inasmuch as objects are 
represented as if they are actually present—as if they are graspable. Let us consider, for 
example, paintings that include a single trompe l’oeil element as if it could be lifted from 
the surface of the painting, the image of which is not otherwise organized according to a 
trompe l’oeil logic of spatial emergence. In Francisco de Zurburán’s The Annunciation 
(1650) (Figure 2.2) at the Philadelphia Museum of Art, a small piece of paper appears to 
be adhered by melted wax to the lower left quadrant of the painting’s surface; this 
painting, apart from this element, conforms to a logic of linear perspective, made visible 
by the orthogonals of the raised step upon which Mary suddenly kneels in 
acknowledgement of Gabriel’s arrival. The depicted window along the back wall of 
Mary’s interior, with its shutter open to allow a glimpse of blue sky and trees, doubles the 
motif of Zurburán’s painting as a window. A cloud full of cherubs bathed in golden light, 
however, interrupt the view through this window, just as the trompe l’oeil note interrupts 
our view through the window that is Zurburán’s painting; instead, its insistent reminder 
of the painting’s surface disrupts our spectatorial entry.  
Another painting of a divine vision, El Greco’s Saint Francis Receiving the 
Stigmata (circa 1585-90) (Figure 2.3), also includes a trompe l’oeil representation of a 
small piece of paper as if adhered by melted wax. According to curators at the Walters 
Art Museum, where the painting is on view, the mundane reality of the slip of paper 
contrasts with the otherworldly effect of Francis’s vision.170 While ecstatically transfixed 
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upon a vision of the crucified Christ, which otherwise emerges amidst ethereal clouds 
from total darkness, St. Francis receives the stigmata—the material manifestation of the 
wounds of Christ. An adherent of Augustine’s imperative to imitate Christ, St. Francis 
advocated both a spiritual and a physical imitation thereof. El Greco’s depiction of St. 
Francis at the moment he receives the stigmata attends to his most exemplary physical 
imitation of the wounded Christ. 
El Greco’s trompe l’oeil representation of a piece of paper as if adhered to the 
surface of the painting would seem to undermine the spiritual truth of St. Francis’s 
imitation of Christ, revealing it, in turn, to be merely an illusion. But insofar as the piece 
of paper bears the artist’s signature—written in the artist’s native language—El Greco 
seems to reinvest in, even identifying with St. Francis’s act of meaningful imitation.  For 
it is through Christian imitation of Christ—even if as a less physically injurious imitation 
than that of Francis—that one might enter, not just imaginarily through the painting, a 
world beyond this one.  
The banal seeming-reality of the piece of paper is a reminder to a Christian 
audience not to set its thoughts on worldly things, but instead on things above; the rest of 
the scene holds more truth for those who believe in a reality beyond that of this life.171 
But this truth is available only to those who believe without the ability to verify through 
touch. As St. Francis’s vision reminds us, Christian belief in the resurrected Christ 
famously subjects Christ to at least two touch tests: the first given by Mary Magdalene 
who reaches out to touch (perhaps to verify his physical existence) the resurrected Christ 
                                                                                                                                            
to the canvas and bearing the words “Domenikos Theotokopoulos Made This” in Greek, expressing El 
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and the second by Thomas who touches his wounds. According to the book of John, 
Christ admonishes Mary Magdelene not to touch him—noli me tangere172—but only ten 
verses later invites Thomas to do so, saying “Put your finger here, and see my hands; and 
put out your hand, and place it in my side. Do not disbelieve, but believe.”173 El Greco’s 
trompe l’oeil detail tempts the viewer to touch the canvas, just as the doubting Thomas 
touched the wounds of Christ to verify, but also scolds the viewer in the manner of Christ 
to Mary by refusing to disclose as certitude what must be maintained as belief. The 
Walters Art Museum echoes this Christ-like admonishment, in its institutional mandate, 
“Do not touch.” As both image and earthly object, El Greco’s painting employs the 
illusionistic device of the trompe l’oeil cartellino as a reinvestment in the imaginative 
power of Christian faith and as a reminder about the earth-bound acts that promise eternal 
life. He foregrounds his painting as thus necessarily split between the material and 
imaginative (or spiritual) realms, as is Christian life.   
Another seemingly present slip of paper beckons our hand in Louis-Léopold 
Boilly’s Trompe l’oeil of an Ivory and Wood Crucifix Hanging on a Wall (1812) (Figure 
2.4), a work which also takes a reminder of Christ’s crucifixion as its subject. Whereas 
the wounds of the stigmata are understood to be a bodily reenactment of Christ’s 
suffering on the cross, the crucifix makes available an imaginary remembrance thereof. 
As the site of Christ’s sacrifice, the crucifix does not represent his resurrection, but 
instead represents the promise of resurrection into eternal life. As a subject, the crucifix 
stands in as the foremost site of Christian negotiation of belief and doubt, one whose 
truth-claim is attested by way of Mary and Thomas’s desire to verify the sight of the 
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resurrected Christ by touching him.174 Boilly restores this Christian desire to touch in 
order to verify by way of his trompe l’oeil painting of the crucifix.  
Additionally striking is the internal competition of illusions: the piece of paper 
seems to be adhered to the surface of a painting—Siegfried describes it as seemingly 
“wedged between the frame and the canvas,” although the slip of paper does not reach all 
the way to the painting’s edge. Still, the direction of its shadow conforms to the more 
dramatic shadow seemingly cast by the crucifix; both the slip of paper and the crucifix, 
these shadows imply, are objects affixed to a two-dimensional surface. It is this surface 
that is internally riven—between the surface of the painting-as-object (material) and the 
surface of a represented wall (image).175  
Siegfried notes the way that the slip of paper looks “ready to be plucked out by an 
interested passer-by, a prospective client perhaps” and finds this to be “at odds with…the 
apparent devotional content of the painting.”176 As in El Greco’s painting, the piece of 
paper legibly discloses the name of the artist; to this, Boilly adds his address, directing 
prospective clients to his door. But again the shadow that seems to be cast by the ivory 
and wood crucifix suggests that it too is available to be plucked. It compels the hand in 
the way that Christ’s resurrected body compelled the hands of Mary and Thomas. Rather 
than the painting’s mode of trompe l’oeil being at odds with its devotional content, it 
actually reanimates the symbolic reference of the crucifix to both Christ’s and the 
spectator’s resurrection into eternal life in terms of a desire to touch, and thus to affirm, 
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this belief. The spectatorial negotiation of illusion and reality relative to the painting thus 
underscores the Christian effort to believe in the face of doubt. Again, as at the Walters 
today and likely at the Salon of 1812 where Boilly exhibited this painting, it is the art 
institution that admonishes us with “do not touch” as a further echo of Christ’s noli me 
tangere: Do not touch, rather believe. 
The conflict inherent in Christ’s opposite sets of instructions to touch and not to 
touch becomes the spectatorial dilemma of trompe l’oeil paintings. When praise for 
trompe l’oeil painting was expressed in 19th-century newspaper accounts, it often 
described the painting’s effect in a way that put the body back into the act of viewing, 
and in ways that implicated the viewing subject’s vulnerability to deception. Of a 19th-
century painting by American trompe l’oeil artist John Frederick Peto, L. Placide 
Canonge wrote, “One reaches out to touch the canvas as if in spite of oneself. Yes, in 
looking at this strange composition—if it is a composition—the eye is deceived 
throughout. The hand longs to play with that string, which seems to move and flutter. 
One would like to unfold and read that copy of the Picayune…”177 Another critic 
identifies what he perceives to be a failure in John Haberle’s trompe l’oeil painting 
Grandma’s Hearth (1890) (Figure 2.5) by singling out the bowl of flowers on the mantel, 
which “lack the ‘tactilely perceptible’ forms best suited for trompe l’oeil 
performances.”178 Indeed another of Haberle’s paintings Blackboard I (Leave Your Order 
Here) (c.1895) (Figure 2.6) calls out specifically for a kind of tactile engagement with the 
work. This painting presents itself as if a blackboard, framed in wood, with a type-faced 
invitation to “LEAVE YOUR ORDER HERE.” What appear to be partially erased 
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messages, signatures, or cartoons rendered in chalk turn out to be as painted as the piece 
of chalk on a string that seems to hang from the uppermost frame. Haberle’s painting, 
however, excites the spectator’s desire to pick up the chalk and leave one’s own graffiti-
like mark, just as many others seem to have done. 
While this impulse to touch may be more frequently discussed, especially by way 
of entertaining anecdotes of credulous country rubes, such accounts simultaneously serve 
to caution against being duped into touching the painting. This admonishment is 
sometimes foregrounded in the imagery, as when Boilly represents paper artworks as if 
behind broken glass, as in A Collection of Drawings [with Boilly and Elleviou] (1800) 
(Figure 2.7). It is in reference to this painting that the term “trompe l’oeil” was first used 
as a noun, although the genre long predates its French name.179 In such paintings, the 
represented broken glass interferes with the viewer’s desire to test the reality of the 
painting by touching it. Reluctant perhaps to risk cutting oneself, the viewer resists the 
(Thomas touch) test that would confirm the painting’s illusion.  
In the trompe l’oeil examples from the 16th through 19th centuries already 
discussed in this chapter, we have seen the ways in which the technique of trompe l’oeil 
was already exploiting the assumption of a unified space of order, purposefully disrupting 
its coherence. Although Crary does not specifically address the relevance of trompe l’oeil 
painting to this end, we might imagine the ways in which trompe l’oeil painting and its 
reception history might and might not fit into his narrative. Insofar as trompe l’oeil 
compels the (credulous) observer to touch the painting to negotiate its seeming reality 
from its status as representation, it relies upon the reciprocity of the senses. Vision is far 
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from privileged over the other senses, as it is, per Crary, in the nineteenth century. 
Instead, touch corrects for its failings. In his Letter on the Blind (1749), Diderot describes 
the dissimilarity of the senses in a sighted person as being able to provide knowledge 
about the world through “reciprocal assistance.”180 This intrusion of the sense of touch, in 
this case, did not interrupt the Cartesian illusion of mastery; “the certainty of knowledge 
did not depend solely on the eye but on a more general relation of a unified human 
sensorium to a delimited space of order on which positions could be known and 
compared.”181 
The illusion of graspable, material presence appeals to the hand and can be readily 
tested by means of close study, or better yet, of physical touch. Trompe l'oeil exploits this 
impulse. The seeming presence of the curtain prompts Zeuxis to reach for it, so that he 
can examine the painting presumed to lie behind it. In reaching out to grasp it, however, 
he discovers the error of his vision, discovering the flatness of the painted surface—the 
painterly illusion he sought was already there before his eyes. The intrusion of his touch 
disrupts the (false) certainty of his sight, but only to reciprocally assist him in the 
understanding of it as painterly illusion. His mastery, in this way, is seemingly restored.  
Like Zeuxis, when Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand III is shown a painting of an 
engraving by Alsatian-born and Flemish-trained painter, Sebastian Stoskopff (1597-
1657) (Figure 2.8), he reaches out to grasp the print. Or at least this is the account of the 
artist and art theorist Joachim von Sandrart (1606-1688), who writes, “the Emperor tried 
to remove the print with his hand. The emperor then laughed—endlessly—about the 
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artful deceit and decided to hang the work in his art gallery in Prague.”182 Now savvy to 
the painting’s trick, the emperor is no longer credulous to his initial mistake. With the 
reciprocal assistance of touch, both Zeuxis and the emperor become disabused of the 
object’s seeming presence, which they now understand to be representation. The emperor 
reclaims the vulnerability the painting exposed in him as enjoyment by repeating his 
compulsion to possess the work; where his desire to possess the engraving caused him to 
reach out and grab for it in error, now, knowing better about the terms of its 
representation, he takes possession of the painting and its potential trickery of other 
viewers by placing it in his gallery. Ferdinand learns the way the surface of this particular 
painting is ordered and thus regains mastery over it, even enjoying his mistake.  
Insofar as trompe l’oeil reception is narrated as a tale of revelation, it is 
reinscribed in a scenario of mastery. This places ‘certainty of knowledge’ as the goal of 
the painting’s haptic-optic negotiation. As such, trompe l’oeil fits within the older 
paradigm of vision identified by Crary. David Lubin describes the successful negotiation 
of the trompe l’oeil revelation as giving 19th-century masculine viewers a sense of 
triumph, but Michael Leja, in contrast, finds no clear sense of victory in the reception 
accounts.183 Instead, these accounts bear out a viewing experience marked by confusion 
and doubt. The destabilizing effect of Zeuxis’s mistake, for example, might send him 
back to the painting, looking closely at how its effect was materially accomplished. 
Vulnerability to the painting's subjective sensory impressions, whether or not 
successfully reinscribed as mastery, is already central to the viewing experience of this 
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centuries-old painterly mode. Trompe l’oeil letter rack paintings, for example, simulate 
an ordered and coherent field independent of the viewer, on which objects are organized 
in spatial relation to one another. The success of their representation compels not just a 
rationalizing or imaginative, but also a bodily interaction with the represented objects. It 
is the observer’s movement from an otherwise fixed (or disembodied) viewing position as 
s/he approaches the painting, even prior to any actual touching thereof, which reveals its 
illusion. We might say it is the desire to physically grasp, rather than merely conceptually 
grasp the represented objects that makes apparent both the embodiedness of the observing 
subject in this older paradigm of vision and his or her vulnerability to painterly illusion.     
Joan Copjec observes the way that this “incapacity for intellectual mastery” is 
already disclosed in perspectival models of vision.184 She finds it “altogether curious that 
Crary reads into [perspective] the ‘autonomous individual ego[’s]…capacity for 
intellectual mastery” when its constitutive orthagonals literally point to, by converging to 
meet, the so-called ‘vanishing point,’ at which the illusion of mastery of the infinite 
vanishes.185 Beyond this, several scholars argue persuasively that the older paradigm of 
vision is not as obviously disembodied as Crary claims. By attending closely to the 
diagrams used to illustrate perspective theories, Lyle Massey observes the way the body 
is already implicated in both the production and representation of the perspectival 
illusion. The diagram pictures the embodied act of production—the eye looks and the 
hand draws—and the embodied object of representation—that which is drawn is often 
figured as a body around which space is visually organized. In both ways, the body was 
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always already part of perspectival representation, even if as a central problem in its 
geometrical efforts to achieve disembodied, purely mathematical space.  
Massey observes the way that perspective diagrams ask the “artist/viewer to 
imagine being split, occupying both real and imaginary space at one and the same 
time.”186 In Vignola’s diagram for the first rule of perspective, for example, the body of a 
woman is figured at the distance point, representing the metaphorical viewer but also 
seeming to occupy concrete space in front of a picture plane that imaginarily extends into 
the infinite. The viewer of the diagram is given both an illusion on a flat surface, as well 
as a demonstration of the geometric congruence of reality and its representation. 
In Albrecht Dürer’s woodcut Draftsman Drawing a Nude (1525) (Figure 2.9), 
which is easily the best-known illustration from the history of perspective, a mostly nude 
woman reclines on a table divided from the draftsman by a gridded veil, or Albertian 
‘window.’ His single-point perspective never varies, as his eye’s position is aligned with 
the tip of an obelisk in front of him. Despite the obelisk’s pointed indication of the ideal 
line of sight, which in another diagram by Dürer Jacob Keyser’s Device (1538) (Figure 
2.10) he illustrates as a cord that comes from behind the artist’s head, as if a ‘view from 
nowhere’ and thus posited as objective, rational, and neutral, Massey locates the way 
both diagrams simultaneously represent the bodies of the artist. That is, Dürer 
complicates the supposedly transcendental view of perspective by contrasting it with “the 
situated, embodied gaze of the artist, a gaze that must somehow interact physically with 
the device to complete the movement of the ideal eye…a hindrance to the demonstration 
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of its ideal and purely geometric properties.”187 Dürer’s diagram represents the moment 
just prior to the one in which the artist must look away from his subject in order to 
represent her; “perspective was predicated on the principle that the hand must provide a 
translation from eye to image.”188 
While the embodiedness of production in these perspective diagrams might 
illustrate Crary's points about the interconnectedness of sight and touch in this earlier era, 
this is fundamentally different than the embodiedness of vision Crary reserves for the 
19th-century. That is, in the 19th-century, vision becomes so sequestered from touch that 
the subject experiences a new vulnerability to appearances (now newly divorced from 
matter). Massey, however, suggests that theorists of perspective in the 15th –17th centuries 
already understood the type of vulnerable, embodied vision that Crary identifies as newly 
inaugurated in the 19th-century. Indeed, these early theorists had to elect whether to 
represent these distortions, which occur naturally in vision, or to correct for them. 
Followers of Alberti, who used a Euclidean model of optics, corrected for them by 
controlling the viewpoint, as in single-point perspective.189 In contrast, da Vinci opted to 
reproduce the visual field along with its concomitant distortions and aberrations.190 Da 
Vinci maintains the literal look of a distortion within his representation, even though it 
may come at the expense of legibility or communication.191  
The practice of anamorphosis accommodates and/or confuses both of these goals: 
rigidly controlling the point of view at which the otherwise seemingly deformed image is 
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resolved through strict one-point perspective, while also requiring an active viewer, who 
negotiates the spatial conflict produced by this form of perspective. Hans Holbein’s 
painting The Ambassadors (1533) (Figure 2.11) features an anamorphic representation of 
a skull, which can only be resolved at an oblique vantage point; that is, by “moving to the 
right of the inchoate shape that hovers uncannily in the picture’s foreground.”192 In this 
way, as Robert Klein argues, “the integration of perspective thus comes up against the 
problem of illusion; but also collides with the problem of ‘participation.’ The precise 
question upon which the two factions confront each other is that of the connection 
between the fictional space and the space of the spectator.”193 In anamorphosis, Massey 
writes, the viewer is forced “to see perspectival space as a fiction of geometry and to see 
the pictorial surface as an object that stares back,” which in this way turns inside out the 
window analogy of perspective.194 
Insofar as still life paintings tend to be organized compositionally as shallow 
spaces, they similarly reverse the pictorial strategy of linear perspective. This is most 
apparent in the flattened compositions of trompe l’oeil paintings, in which, as Hanneke 
Grootenboer observes, “the rhetorical paradigm of the image comes to the surface and 
lays bare its strategies, which otherwise remain buried in the depth of the pictorial 
field.”195 She describes the complexity of perspectival organization in trompe l’oeil 
painting. Whereas in the classic construction of perspective, the sense of space is 
constructed according to two points—the vanishing point (located on the imagined 
horizon of the picture) and the point of view outside of the picture (marking the ideal 
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beholder’s position)—that are connected at a vertical axis (the picture plane) by two sets 
of orthagonals mirroring one another. In trompe l’oeil painting, the two triangles formed 
by these mirrored orthagonals are folded into one another, so that the two points merge 
with one another. “The mathematical space that is supposed to be depicted in the picture 
has been hollowed out in a forward direction and has to be imagined outside, in the space 
of the actual viewer…. The gaze of the viewer is no longer able to look ‘into’ the painting 
but instead ricochets off the surface of the picture, bouncing back to the viewing eye, the 
place from which it originated.”196 The optical effect is insecurity in the form of 
deception, insofar as the blind spot of the vanishing point (which is posited as that point 
that can never be reached or seen) merges into the point of view.  
In The Ambassadors the image of a skull looks back at the subject from the place 
where he sees, suggesting the disappearance of the viewer as the painting’s true content; 
Jacques Lacan uses this to theorize the split between the eye and the gaze.197 As Massey 
summarizes it, “Neither completely absorbed into the gaze, nor completely outside it, the 
viewer as subject sees himself in this screen as a kind of stain or spot—a something that, 
like Holbein’s skull, hovers between appearing and being. Thus, the screen seems to be 
equivalent to a picture in that it functions to block the effect of the gaze.”198 For Lacan, 
the subject’s corporealized vision is made visible to him as a kind of stain or spot, as 
something that hovers between appearing and being. He is vulnerable to disappearance, 
but he remains present as a stain; the corporealized experience of his vision is that which 
remains able to be seen. 
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Massey describes some makers of perspective diagrams as “eschew[ing] both the 
unitary view of linear perspective and its attendant Cartesian overtones, defending instead 
a conception of multiple viewpoints or perspectives that reveal the phenomenal reality of 
the world that is not independent of human perception…. For [them], the curious nature 
of perspective insures that the subject is but another object in and of the view itself.”199 It 
is in this way that the older paradigm of vision already accommodates the 
corporealization of vision that in Crary’s account is new to the nineteenth century. The 
subjective impressions due to the physiology of the eye inscribe themselves, like a stain, 
upon that which the observer sees. Massey observes the expression of this in perspective 
diagrams as well. “It is in the very structure of perspective that the viewing subject 
appears to him or herself as a stain—neither pure representation nor pure being but in 
some way suspended between the two.”200 
 Of trompe l’oeil paintings, Grootenboer asks, “is it the painting, which despite its 
hyperrealism presents its own flatness instead of the illusion of depth? Or is it the optical 
deception caused by our own eye, which, assuming depth, is confronted with its own 
annihilation?”201 These questions seem to be crucial for Crary’s account because the 
latter aligns with his characterization of the corporealized sense of vision which 
structures that of the 19th-century, whereas the former articulates its effect in terms of its 
spatial organization on a plane (in terms of its tangibility of vision or sudden lack 
thereof). The answer to these questions requires that they be intertwined; the depth which 
is not available in the flattened plane of the trompe l’oeil picture “extends in our eye, 
behind our pupil, there where we cannot see but from where our seeing is made 
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possible.”202 The vanishing point that structures perspective’s recession into deep space 
and marks a point beyond the scope of our perception is pulled inside out and is found to 
reside in the eye. As Lacan describes it, “I am not simply that punctiform being located at 
the geometrical point from which the perspective is grasped. No doubt, in the depths of 
my eye, the picture is painted. The picture, certainly, is in my eye. But I am in the 
picture.”203 In the process of looking at the picture, which in its display seems to be 
submitted to the look of the beholder, the beholder discovers himself (in what Merleau-
Ponty describes as the ‘fundamental narcissism of all vision’) because his look veils the 
picture in the process of seeing it. We see according to our desire, our belief.  
At the same time, the painting seems to stare back, as if with mastery over me, 
indeed it confronts me with my failed perception; its deception is actually my mistake 
about the truth it told in its appearance. Lacan describes the simultaneity of these looks 
(mine and its) simply, “things look at me, and yet I see them.”204 Merleau-Ponty 
illustrates this as two mirrors facing one another, producing an infinite series of mirror 
images that do not belong either to one surface or another, but which form a ‘couple.’205 
In Kaja Silverman’s summary, “The look has never coincided with the gaze” and “has 
never possessed the mastering and constitutive functions that have traditionally been 
attributed to it. The body to which it stubbornly belongs has also always been positioned 
within spectacle.”206 
In paintings that employ linear perspective this instability tends to be disavowed 
according to, rather than being foregrounded in, the spatial organization of the image. 
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That is, its structure “hides behind its own invisibility as the painting’s secret. It is a 
framework that signifies without revealing—in our perception—how its meaning comes 
about.”207 Both anamorphosis and trompe l’oeil paintings, in contrast, disclose this 
instability: in anamorphosis by making visible its spatial disorganization and through the 
viewer’s necessary participation in making it coherent (choosing to see/believe), and in 
trompe l’oeil painting by making visible painting’s inherent flatness, as well as through 
the viewer’s necessary participation in its so-called deception (mistaking this as depth) 
and revelation (seeing the truth of its appearance).  
Dürer’s perspective drawings, however, disclose rather than disguise the 
instability of their pictorial structure. William Ivins observes something irresolvable in 
them: they posit two competing points of view. It is as if he looked at figures from below 
and at buildings from above, and then combined them within a single work, he claims. 
“Both were right, but taken together, both were wrong.”208 This is not a failure, for Ivins, 
rather “this fundamental contradiction of one of the great intuitive bases of experience 
produces a subtle psychological malaise in the beholder of his work that, not being 
readily traceable to an obvious cause, is doubtless one of the principal reasons for the 
peculiar fascination that his work has always exercised over the mind of man.”209 Marie-
Louise d’Otrange Mastai suggests that this instability was, in fact, Dürer’s intention, 
allowing him to flaunt the rules of perspective, in ways that he could not have done if 
illusionism had been his only purpose. She revises Ivins’ description of the effect of 
Dürer’s combined perspective system on the viewer; instead of “subtle psychological 
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malaise” she suggests that it “would have verged on optical insecurity for the viewer.”210 
This “something irresolvable” in the picture looks back from the place from which the 
viewer can’t see, making him aware of his susceptibility of being seen on all sides; in this 
something irresolvable, he experiences the gaze.  
Instead of perspective’s organization of a stable and ordered relationship between 
inner and outer worlds, in Crary’s terms, Dürer’s diagrams already expose the way that 
this stability is illusory. Geoffrey Batchen describes perspective diagrams by Alberti and 
Dürer in terms of their capacity for destabilization. The perspectival apparatus, which 
Alberti describes in della Pittura (1435) as a ‘window,’ is both transparent and opaque, 
so that it is also a ‘veil.’ These terms “destabiliz[e] any simple oppositional structure—
[suggesting] something that simultaneously allows and denies the gaze, depending on 
which side of its surface the viewer is positioned.”211  
Batchen goes on to describe our spectatorial position in Dürer’s woodcut and the 
ways in which it denies us the ‘seeing-through’ that the Latin word perspectiva implies; 
that is, we are unable to see through the draftsman’s window. Dürer’s woodcut, for 
Batchen, provides a critique of perspectival representation: the blankness of the 
draftsman’s page shows us the dilemma of the draftsman’s project, its impossible call to 
order and transparency, and its failure to ‘fix’ its object in place. The blank page too 
doubles the nearly blank view through the window on the left side of the wall in Dürer’s 
image; both surfaces should depict that which perspective accommodates, but both 
remain blank. According to Louis Marin, the blank surface framed by the window 
permits the mechanism of the “background” to come into view, repudiating “the depth 
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illusorily realized by the perspective mechanism that delves into the distance, even to 
infinity, an infinity represented through the atmospheric working of the horizon.”212 By 
attending to the horizon line, which is all that we see “through” the window, we allow it 
to become a framing mechanism, drawing attention to its role in representation by 
denying its representation of spatial depth. In doing so, we witness “how, conversely, the 
background is brought forward through the relative neutralization of depth and through 
the negation of any distant figures.”213 The background, the view “through” the window, 
instead becomes a blank surface, as blank as the page set before the draftsman; both 
blank spaces await representation via the artist’s work at the same time that their 
blankness calls attention to itself as representation.  
While Dürer doesn’t represent distant figures outside the window on the right, he 
does give us represented objects on its windowsill. What we are able to see, he writes, is 
a potted shrub on a large windowsill next to the draftsman, a potted shrub that “exceed[s] 
the strictures of its framework of sticks,” suggesting, for Batchen, that it might be a 
“microcosm of perspective at work.”214 I locate a similar critique of perspective available 
in the representation of the pitcher on that same windowsill. Insofar as the pitcher edges 
up uncomfortably to the drawn edge of the windowsill, it refuses to be fixed upon the 
representational plane of its ledge. Indeed it seems to come forward, almost as if it might 
fall from the windowsill into the space of the draftsman, which Batchen describes as our 
space as well, since it is his side of the grid that we see. If we remember, as Batchen 
suggests, that Dürer made this woodcut as an illustration to a text meant to introduce the 
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methods of Italian perspective to a Northern European audience, his subtle critique of its 
method undermines the so-called naturalness of linear perspective, “mak[ing] it plain that 
perspective is an Italian, rather than a universal, way of seeing.”215 Indeed, in the 
representation of the pitcher, which seems to come forward in space as if toward the 
viewer, perhaps we can recognize something of that which comes to characterize a 
Northern European way of seeing.216 
In Svetlana Alpers’ definitive text The Art of Describing (1983), she sharply 
distinguishes Dutch art from that of Italy according to the condition that the former are 
non-Albertian images.217 Dutch art, she says, is an art of describing, rather than an art of 
narrating as in the Italian tradition. There is an attention to the surface of the world 
described in Dutch art that comes at the expense of narrative representation; it is an art of 
space and not of time, thus the preference for the still life. Indeed, Alpers describes Dutch 
pictures as surfaces like mirrors or maps, and not like windows, as in the Albertian 
tradition. Alpers uses the particular examples of mirrors and maps, insofar as they are 
devices that represent the world or the subject to itself, to suggest that a central mode of 
self-consciousness was consistent with Dutch visual experience generally.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, Eric Jan Sluijter locates this self-consciousness of 
representation in the Northern tradition of painting figures as if emerging through a 
window, such as Gerrit Dou’s Painter Smoking a Pipe in a Window (circa 1647) (Figure 
1.4). This painting accentuates the picture plane itself, and destabilizes its spatial 
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representation so that “we are simultaneously looking into a space while also beholding a 
beautiful surface.”218 Indeed, this beautiful surface also seems graspable, inasmuch as the 
curtain compels our interaction therewith. In this painting, a man leans out of a window; 
his elbow rests upon the sill as he lifts his long slender pipe to his lips to draw smoke 
through it. His idle hand rests upon an open book, a single fingertip crossing the 
threshold of the ledge. The book spills out from the window ledge upon which it casts a 
stark shadow, its pages splayed as if we too could run our fingers across the edges. He 
looks back at us. 
It is not this painting, although it could have been, that Crary uses to describe the 
relation of touch and sight in pre-19th century models of vision. Instead, he offers another 
painting by Chardin, Boy Blowing Bubbles (1739) (Figure 2.12). In this painting, a boy 
leans out from a window ledge; he rests his elbows against the sill as he raises a long 
slender straw to his lips to blow a bubble through it. His idle hand crosses the threshold 
of the window ledge, gripping it. In front of the ledge, a transparent round bubble 
emerges from the straw. Of the scene, Crary writes,  
This depicted act of effortless mastery, in which vision and touch work 
cooperatively (and this occurs in many of his images), is paradigmatic of 
Chardin’s own activity as an artist. His apprehension of the coidentity of idea and 
matter and their finely set positions within a unified field discloses a thought for 
which haptic and optic are not autonomous terms but together constitute an 
indivisible mode of knowledge.219  
 
If this painting reflexively stages Chardin’s activity as an artist, then the activity depicted 
also undermines his “effortless mastery.” The boy blows a soap bubble—an ephemeral 
object whose structure will inevitably fail when it necessarily bursts. The haptic and optic 
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modes operate together, arguably in a kind of reality testing, not only to sustain the 
illusion of Chardin’s mastery but also to anticipate its failing, thus foregrounding its 
status as illusion.  
Chardin’s boy breathes into being a floating object, and this substitutes for his 
own projective entrance into the world. For Merleau-Ponty, “it is through my body that I 
go to the world,” and for Alexander Nemerov, the body enters the world of Raphaelle 
Peale’s still life painting Blackberries (1813) (Figure 2.13) as a projection: “[Peale’s] 
paintings suggest the body thrown into the depicted space, where it adheres as the 
density, the vitality, of the objects shown there.”220 The body is thrown into depicted 
space, as if a bubble, and the simultaneous density and vulnerability of this specific thing 
accommodate the body’s corporeal reality, allowing us to apprehend our own physicality 
by way of an exterior object. Merleau-Ponty describes this as the ‘reversibility’ or 
‘intertwining’ of body and object. Indeed Nemerov describes the way that Blackberries 
“simulates a person seeing his own body within the very objects into which he has blown 
the breath of a corporeal life.”221 This spectatorial breath is quite literally represented and 
thematized in Chardin’s painting, as an object made of air and ever-thinning soap; its 
existence is ephemeral, but as paint it lasts forever, or at least as long as the viewer 
suspends her disbelief about its material status as such.  
While ‘seeing one’s own body’ by way of a projection, or fantasy of bodily 
intertwining, is not the same as ‘seeing one’s own body’ according to the physiological 
distortions of vision in which Crary locates the newly corporealized vision of the 19th-
century. Both, however, cast light on the (necessarily) blurred status of body and world in 
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vision, which was already disclosed in perspective diagrams and trompe l’oeil paintings. 
All of these refuse a model of vision for which seeing an object ‘out there’ takes place 
from a safe, distanced, and mastering position ‘in here.’ Instead, seeing involves “a kind 
of self-regard, the blurring of the distinction between vision in here and object out 
there.”222  
Nemerov uses Peale’s 19th-century still life painting of a basket of blackberries to 
complicate the kind of clean break from the older paradigm of vision represented in 
Chardin’s basket of strawberries. For Nemerov, tactility remains fully embedded in the 
model of vision available from Peale’s Blackberries (1813), at the same time that vision 
is rooted in the observer's body. Objects are shown at close proximity, on “a ledge that 
implicitly extends into the viewer’s space or comes close to doing so; and they are shown 
in a raking light that rounds them into a three-dimensional materiality that seems to 
indicate the hand that placed them there. In their dense proximate physicality, that is, 
these objects seem to exist for somebody—and not, by any means, as a pure emanation of 
consciousness.”223 In Nemerov’s assessment, Peale’s represented objects are not yet set 
back at a greater distance, available thus for the eyes only, as they are in works by Peale's 
contemporary, John Johnston. Whereas “Johnston’s still life augers the nascent 
‘autonomization of sight’ in the early nineteenth century: the broad-based theory of 
vision as, in Crary’s words, ‘sundered from any relation to the observer’s position within 
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a cognitively unified field,’” Peale’s paintings “root sight in the observer’s body, and 
operate thus within an older paradigm of vision.”224 
For Crary, however, it was the new way in which sight became rooted in the 
observer’s body that marked the break; the stereoscope demonstrated the body’s active 
and vulnerable, rather than passive and mastering involvement with vision. As Laura Bird 
Schiavo helpfully clarifies, “by inducing the illusion of solidity with only binocular cues, 
and prompting the experience of solidity where no depth actually existed, the stereoscope 
called into doubt the alleged subordination of vision to touch, an assumption predicated 
on the belief in a self-present world ‘out there.’”225 By “introducing the body and its 
productive capacities” into the model of vision, “the stereoscope contested the idea that 
vision could be represented geometrically,” Schiavo writes; but as we have seen, 
perspective diagrams themselves already insinuated this challenge.  
 Insofar as Peale’s still life of a basket of blackberries upon a table represents 
objects in the near-ground in a way that roots sight in the observer’s body, Nemerov 
understands this as a continuation of the older paradigm of vision. And it is as part of this 
older paradigm of vision that Crary locates Chardin’s still life of a basket of strawberries 
upon a table. But the objects in the near-ground of Chardin’s still life did not root sight in 
the observer’s body in the same way as the stereoscope. Its “shallow, stage-like ledg[e] 
populated with forms,” Crary observes, allows Chardin to transpose the immediacy of 
sense experience “to a scenic space in which the relation of one object to another has less 
to do with sheer optical appearances than with knowledge of isomorphisms and positions 
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on a unified terrain.”226 Chardin’s still-lifes, Crary continues, “underscore the primacy of 
a vision, belonging to a specific historical moment, in which tactility was fully 
embedded.”227 
Michel Foucault describes the great project of Enlightenment thought as an 
ordering of the world into “simple elements and their progressive combination; at the 
center they form a table on which knowledge is displayed contemporary with itself. The 
center of knowledge in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is the table.”228 John 
Locke demonstrates the harmonization of the senses through another example involving 
objects on a table. This example posits a man, who has been blind since birth and thus 
taught to distinguish between a cube and a sphere by way of touch. “Suppose then the 
cube and sphere placed on a table, and the blind man be made to see: quaere, whether by 
his sight before he touched them, he could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, 
which the cube?”229 The problem was, in Etienne Condillac’s summation, “how the 
senses could ‘reconvene,’ that is, come together in the perceiver.”230  
In the nineteenth century, this concern with ‘reconvening’ pertains not to one 
sense with another, but to one eye with the other. It is, Crary claims, binocular disparity 
that becomes the object of study in the 1830s; “given that an observer perceives with 
each eye a different image, how are they experienced as singular or unitary?”231 Both the 
chiasma between the different perceptions and its unification are internalized as taking 
place within the human subject; both the error and its resolution are thus corporealized. 
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Charles Wheatstone finds that the human organism has the capacity under most 
conditions to synthesize retinal disparity into a single unitary image. But as objects are 
brought closer to the observer, the difference between their independent perspectives is 
made greater; reconciling the disparity of these two distinct views becomes a form of 
play by way of the stereoscope. 
Wheatstone invents the stereoscope as a more adequate form of representation 
than painting for objects at close distance. He finds painting better equipped in the 
representation of objects at a great distance; he contends that “if those circumstances 
which would disturb the illusion are excluded,” its frame, for example, then we could 
mistake a representation, a painted landscape, for reality.232 But he finds this type of 
faithful representation of objects in the near distance heretofore unavailable to painters. 
He, and Crary does not correct him, thus overlooks or finds insufficiently convincing, 
works such as those by Chardin or Peale, and moreover centuries of trompe l’oeil still life 
painting. Or perhaps it is trompe l'oeil's simultaneous disclosure of its trick, which, like 
the frames of landscape paintings, too successfully disrupts its illusion. This is despite his 
having aligned the intended effect of the stereoscope with that of trompe l'oeil; “the 
desired effect of the stereoscope was not simply likeness,” Crary articulates, “but 
immediate, apparent tangibility. But a tangibility that has been transformed into a purely 
visual experience.”233 It was painting’s inability to “be confounded with the solid object,” 
which made room for the stereoscope, in Wheatstone’s account.234 The success of the 
landscape painting occurred according to our capacity to “mistake the representation for 
reality,” which painting, in Wheatstone’s opinion, was unable to accomplish relative to 
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objects represented as if close to the viewer; the stereoscope instead was intended to 
accommodate this type of illusion for objects in the near-ground.235 Wheatstone’s 
stereoscope “aimed to simulate the actual presence of a physical object or scene.”236 It is 
its representational ability to be confounded with a solid object, to be mistaken for reality, 
and to simulate a physical object’s actual presence that defines the representational goals 
of trompe l’oeil painting—at least as much as these goals also must fail.   
But such prior opportunities within the history of art are overlooked. Instead, as 
Schiavo writes, it was “by creating a situation in which we ‘see’ that which is not really 
there” that the stereoscope insinuated a heretofore-unknown “arbitrary relationship 
between stimulus and sensation.”237 “By suggesting that vision could be manipulated into 
causing observers to see what was not really there, and by challenging the equivalence of 
the exterior world and the retinal image, the stereoscope suggested a model that ceased to 
suppress viewer’s subjectivity in the manner of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century 
visual paradigms.”238 Crary's study isolates the technology of the stereoscope from its 
application in photography, instead using drawings of geometrical shapes to demonstrate 
binocular disparity and the subjectivity of vision apart from the mimetic effects of 
photography. As such, “Crary displaces photography as a dominant perceptive model, 
deemphasizes the centrality of photography to stereoscopy, and overlooks the ways in 
which the distinctions between the two media were obscured in the practice of 
commercial stereo-photography.”239 Insofar as he looked to isolate photography and its 
mimetic effect from his study of the implications of stereoscopy, it is not surprising that 
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he would also isolate it from trompe l’oeil and its mimetic effect. But the overlaps 
between stereography and trompe l’oeil may not have been as overlooked in the 19th 
century as they are by Crary.  
Indeed, a trompe l’oeil effect seems particularly sought out in both the still life 
photography and stereography of the Alsatian firm, Adolphe Braun & Cie. In the mid-
1860s, Braun made eight large photographic game pieces (Figure 2.14) “suitable for 
decorating a dining room,” according to the Braun company catalog.240 These 
photographs continued a trompe l’oeil tradition that dates at least as far back as Jacopo 
de’ Barbari’s 16th-century Still Life with Partridge, Iron Gauntlets, and Crossbow Bolt 
(Figure 2.16) and includes the 17th-century Dutch example of Johannes Leemans’ 
souvenir or trophy paintings of the hunt. We might infer the success of Braun’s 
photographic trompe l’oeil effect from their use by 19th-century American trompe l’oeil 
painter, William Harnett, as referential models for his After the Hunt series of the 1880s 
(Figure 2.17). In the paintings and photographs of these game and hunting still lifes, 
objects inventorying a hunt are hung against a flat, wood-grained surface. Douglas R. 
Nickel argues that Harnett’s paintings were made to conform to the realist goals of 
photography and that indeed they took photography as their paradigm.241 But, as 
Elizabeth Jane Connell says, these “photographers, in turn, admired Northern European 
paintings and wished to create works that would be aesthetically and symbolically equal 
or superior.”242 She lists several 19th-century photographers, other than Braun, who took 
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up this subject matter, including Charles-Phillipe-Auguste Carey, Louise Laffon, Francis 
Edmond Currey, William Lake Price, Dr. Hugh Welch Diamond, and John C. Browne. In 
addition to their shared subject matter—a “game bag, circular horn, dead rabbit and duck, 
diagonally slung rifle, nails,”—Braun, for one, shared with Harnett the use of a 
“directional, raking light to enhance the volume of their subjects,” as well as a trompe 
l’oeil mode of representation.243 Indeed, Braun’s photographs were described as “so exact 
that under glass they have already fooled people.”244  
In Nickel’s summary, “With their large scale, centralized compositions, and 
strictly limited depth, Braun’s trophy pictures represent an approximation of trompe l’oeil 
painting that was rare in nineteenth-century photography.”245 Additionally, the carbon 
process that Braun used for printing his photographs produced a physical relief when held 
to raking light; this contributed to the tactile qualities apparent in his work. Beyond this, 
Nickel reports that some of Braun’s game compositions were also pursued in “a more 
prevalent form of photographic illusionism:” the stereograph (Figure 2.18).246  
Nickel concludes that by attending to the “incidental truths” of “irrelevant 
details,” “primarily for the interest of their visual appearance,” Harnett conformed his 
painterly goals to the “optical” goals of photography: “The popularity of the stereograph 
helped promote an aesthetic of ocularity, one in which the sensation of viewing tended to 
displace concern for conspicuous meaning.”247 Nickel thus recasts the haptic-optic goals 
of Harnett’s trompe l’oeil into an aesthetic that is wholly ocular; this privileging of the 
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visual over the other senses is, for Crary, characteristic of the 19th-century rupture of the 
otherwise classical model of vision.  
But this seems to sell short the goals of both stereography and trompe l’oeil 
painting, as if they provide nothing more than ocular pleasure, as if their appeals to three-
dimensionality do not also incite a perception of tangibility or a desire to touch, which 
would place this genre, pursued by both media, in a visual history that accounts for touch 
within the field of vision. By recasting the historical timeline for these concerns, we can 
see that “photography” did not yield a uniform experience; some photography, such as 
Braun’s large plates of dead game on the wall, gave us objects ordered on a plane that 
seem to exist as if independently from the viewer. My visual experience of these objects 
seems analogous to touch; but the seeming presence of these objects compels my hand in 
a way that ruptures my scenic relationship to them. Braun’s stereographic representation 
further ocularizes the experience of tangibility, at least in Crary’s estimation, by 
translating it into a “purely visual experience.” But the compositional effect is one of 
spatial emergence, predicated on a mistake of the senses. By correcting for photography’s 
lack of color, for instance, Harnett heightens the mimetic effect of this compositional 
strategy and the spectatorial compulsion to touch, further aligning its haptic-optic goals 
with those of the classical model of vision at the same time that its trompe l’oeil effect 
hinges upon the rupture of the illusion of my mastery. And insofar as Braun’s 
composition and its illusionary effect was already sourced from extant and centuries-old 
trompe l’oeil paintings, his stereoscopic redeployment returns the subjective experience 
of instability available in the viewing of trompe l’oeil paintings to the experience of the 
stereoscope. 
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Whereas prior to its use with photography, the stereoscope laid bare the 
“phenomenological event and physicality of binocular vision—its productive, human 
labor—” afterward, according to Schiavo, the stereoscope was “nothing more than a tool 
for the enhancement of mimetic representation…. The illusion here was one of positivism 
and avowed transparency. Conceptually, the new stereoscope rested on a classical notion 
of transparent, unmediated representation.”248 This, she adds, was increasingly reified by 
its reception as “the actual visual equivalent of the object or objects signified.”249 But the 
illusion of dimensionality in the stereoscope is, according to Barbara Stafford, the way 
the brain resolves the retinal disparity of viewing two slightly different images.250 The 
stereoscope mimics the lived experience of binocular parallax, both of which ask for our 
disavowal of the physical and physiological apparatus through which vision occurs.  
Schiavo observes that photography recasts the theory of vision disrupted by 
stereoscopy into one “that held fast to Crary’s classical model of vision with its 
suppression of subjectivity and its grounding in a faith in human optics as an accurate 
reflection of the external world.”251 She notes the proliferation of claims of 
stereography’s “eminently reproducible, truthful depictions of lifelike solidity,” in trade 
publications and editorials, describing this as “a far cry from theories being presented in 
physiological optics about the productive nature of vision.”252 The distinct technologies 
of the stereoscope and of photography became conflated in the public imagination. 
“Reconfigured as constituents of commercial photography,” Schiavo writes, 
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“stereoscopic views were removed from the field of phenomenological inquiry and 
contained in the language of fine arts as models of mimetic representation.”253 
As evidence of the way its application in photography recasts the subjectivizing 
rupture of stereoscopy into its capacity for objective representation, Crary offers the 
account of a credulous spectator: “even as sophisticated a student of vision as 
Helmholtz.”254 Quoting Helmholtz, writing in the 1850s, he continues: 
these stereoscopic photographs are so true to nature and so lifelike in their 
portrayal of material things, that after viewing such a picture and recognizing in it 
some object like a house, for instance, we get the impression, when we actually 
do see the object, that we have already seen it before and are more or less familiar 
with it. In cases of this kind, the actual view of the thing itself does not add 
anything new or more accurate to the previous apperception we got from the 
picture, so far at least as mere form relations are concerned.255 
  
Helmholtz observes that what the stereograph gives us is an accurate plotting of form 
relations; this is so accurate that it cannot be improved by actually viewing the thing 
itself. This assessment of the stereograph as so sufficient a substitute for the actual object 
photographed, “at least as mere form relations are concerned,” resonates with a similar 
pronouncement of the stereoscope's capacity to divorce form from matter, which I 
discussed in Chapter 1. Writing in the same decade as Helmholtz, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes famously observes that photography and its application by the stereoscope allow 
form to be “henceforth divorced from matter…. Give us a few negatives of a thing worth 
seeing, taken from different points of view, and that is all we want of it. Pull it down or 
burn it up, if you please.”256 But just as we ought not to misconstrue Holmes's remarks as 
evidence of his credulity, we must not assume that Helmholtz is only convinced by the 
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sufficiency of the stereoscopic image. Indeed, Crary attends to Helmholtz's remark to 
discover the ways in which it nonetheless betrays a visual experience of vulnerability. 
Because Helmholtz characterizes our viewing of the actual object, having already been 
seen in the stereoscope, as if a kind of déjà vu, or seeing again, a feeling that “we have 
already seen it before,” Crary describes it as “uncanny.”257 And by way of Sigmund 
Freud’s essay, “The Uncanny” (1919), which uses the term to relate the vulnerability of 
the modern subject, we can understand the uncanny effect of the stereoscope to undergird 
its mimetic effect with a latent experience of vulnerability.  
Helmholtz may be expressing surprise or concern about the accuracy—again, in 
terms of ‘mere form relations’—enabled by this ‘apperception.’ But, in Crary’s terms, he 
may also be relating what it means to feel newly vulnerable to appearances (now 
divorced from matter), or perhaps, rather than vulnerable, he feels in this something 
thrilling (the democratizing effect of the destruction of the aura). Crary, however, opts for 
the former interpretation. If he can discover moments of vulnerability in Helmholtz’s 
otherwise enthusiastic reaction, I think he frees us similarly to look for evidence of 
vulnerability in other (often less ambiguous) historical accounts of visual astonishment, 
such as Sandrart’s or Pliny’s, which in turn should direct us to art works or strategies in 
which vulnerability, rather than or in addition to mastery, was already available and 
deployed.   
 Rather than naturalizing the otherwise rupturing effect of the stereoscope, 
Holmes’s prose efforts to restore something of its rupturing effect by performing his 
astonishment and by reminding us of its cheat. I want to suggest that some practitioners 
of the photographic application of the stereoscopic technology, such as Braun, insinuated 
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this effect of rupture within the field of representation. Braun did this by appropriating 
subject matter and compositional strategies that were traditionally the domain of trompe 
l’oeil.  
Roger Fenton’s still-life stereographs of the 1860s also reinscribe the destabilizing 
effect of stereoscopy’s corporealized vision within photography’s mimesis. He produced 
at least 48 still life genre photographs, including five that depict game, six with Chinese 
objects, and 37 arrangements of fruit, flowers, textiles, vessels, jewelry, statuettes, and 
glassware.258 When first exhibited his still life Spoils of Wood and Stream (1859) (Figure 
2.19) was displayed alongside a painting by George Lance, an English painter best 
known for reviving the genre in the 19th century. While Pam Roberts supposes that 
Fenton’s impulse to photograph still life stemmed from this photographic encounter with 
Lance, she also remembers that Fenton would have gained practical experience 
photographing objects when he worked for the British Museum from 1853-1859.259 
During this time, Fenton photographed sculptures, paintings, engravings, ivory carvings, 
relics, and collections of geological, ethnographic, and anthropological specimens. Many 
of these photographs were produced and published as stereo views for Stereoscopic 
Magazine between 1859 and 1861. Working for the museum, Fenton learned how to use 
stereography to enhance the three-dimensional effect of his three-dimensional subjects, 
and thus for mimetic effect. When published in the April 1861 issue of Stereoscopic 
Magazine, the following caption described his still life stereo photograph Chinese 
Curiosities (1860) (Figure 2.20): “The object in the centre is an ivory casket, laid on its 
side to show the carving on the top, which it will be seen is in high relief, executed with 
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the ingenuity and neatness for which the Chinese are celebrated.”260 The caption suggests 
the attention Fenton paid to securing a three-dimensional effect from his compositions; he 
shoots the casket on its side, so that he can secure a frontal view to maximize the depth 
effect of its relief. This is a strategy he would have learned while shooting sculpture in 
relief at the British Museum, as can be seen in both Ivory Carving, Jesus Sustained by the 
Angels (1857) (Figure 2.21) and Ivory Carving, The Temptation (1858) (Figure 2.22).  
Indeed, it is the mimetic effect of these photographs, rather than their opportunity 
for visual rupture, which is most often praised in the reception. This seems to underscore 
Crary’s point about photography’s mimetic effect covering over the opportunity for 
stereoscopic rupture in such viewing experiences. When a non-stereo version of Chinese 
Curiosities was exhibited, along with eleven other still lifes in January 1861, all were 
well received and even were compared to Lance: “Mr. Roger Fenton has come out in an 
entirely new character, and may now be regarded in the photographic world in the same 
light as Lance amongst painters… ‘How delighted Lance would be with these!’”261 
Roberts remarks, “it is the reality of these images, the three-dimensional density of their 
compositions of fruit piled upon fruit, that is most startling. And because they are so 
abundantly real, these displays are transmuted into something lush, sensuous, and 
ultimately bound to decay—true nature morte.”262  
Fenton seems preoccupied with the different effects of dimensionality that can 
result from different shot set-ups. Stereography is one way to achieve three-
dimensionality, but he directly compares this effect with non-stereo versions of the same 
subject. Fenton would photograph each still life with three different cameras, only one of 
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which was stereoscopic, setting up all three at the same time. Each camera, a six-lens 
stereo, a 15x15-inch-plate, and a 20x16-inch-plate, frames the scene slightly differently: 
the stereo uses a wide shot, capturing more of the background (usually a bare wall draped 
with cloth); the 15x15 uses a medium shot, eliminating most of the background; and the 
20x16 is more of a close up with the still life objects filling the frame. The three views 
would have allowed him to directly compare the variable effects of dimensionality 
achieved in each.  
For Roberts, all of these views share a tremendously real effect, as well as a 
symbolic meaning. She notes the multitude of grapes throughout 33 of his 39 (extant?) 
still life photographs and writes that he “obviously intended this series of still lifes to 
express homage to the grape.”263 She observes how he emphasizes this point by including 
wine-related objects, such as decanters, goblets, a glass beaker, a Parian wine vase and 
silver and ivory tankard—each of which feature grapes in relief. But her use of the word 
“obviously” points to her lack of interpretation about why Fenton would have wanted to 
express homage to the grape, even though I think she suggests one when she insists upon 
the realism of his representations. Perhaps Fenton is invoking Pliny’s Zeuxis—the painter 
of grapes so real-seeming that birds flew down to eat them—suggesting that the camera, 
in its many forms, has entered the archetypal artistic contest. Beyond that, he incorporates 
the rupturing effect of vulnerability available to the viewing subject by way of the 
stereoscope into photography’s mimesis. He does so while referencing another visual 
precedent in which this was already achieved. Just as Braun incorporates trompe l’oeil 
compositional strategies and subject matter, Fenton iconographically reminds viewers of 
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trompe l’oeil’s disruptive effects; both photographers contend that the effects of 
vulnerability can persist within photography’s mimesis.  
While for Crary Fenton’s stereograph Group of Fruit and Flowers (1860) (Figure 
2.23) might illustrate the way that photography’s mimetic effect reinscribes the 
opportunity for stereoscopic rupture within its terms, this is to overlook the ways in 
which this opportunity for rupture remains available to the viewing experience. For 
Crary, its subject matter, a still life of fruit and flowers on a table-like surface, would 
realign the depth effect of its binocular disparity with the goals of mimesis. Instead of an 
illustration of physiological optics, its seeming tangibility is no longer experienced as 
wholly optical; its subject matter instead allows us to relate to it as we would within the 
older paradigm of vision. Is Fenton’s still life thus an extension of the model of vision 
epitomized in Chardin’s Basket of Wild Strawberries, one in which tangibility is fully 
embedded? Or might the opportunity for stereoscopic rupture continue to destabilize the 
seeming coherence of this image, returning to such compositions the subjectivity of 
vision that arguably was always already there?  
At the same time, does looking through a stereoscope at a composition similar to 
Chardin’s immediately divorce it from the older paradigm of vision, through which we 
would have been compelled to understand the reciprocal assistance of sight and touch in 
our relation to this perceived space? Holmes describes the visual experience of the 
stereoscope as an imaginative bodily interaction with the objects depicted therein. He 
writes, “A stereoscope is an instrument which makes surfaces look solid…we see 
something with the second eye which we did not see with the first… By means of these 
two different views of an object, the mind, as it were, feels round it and gets an idea of its 
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solidity. We clasp an object with our eyes, as with our arms, or with our hands, or with 
our thumb and finger, and then we know it to be something more than a surface.”264 The 
observer can only understand the image through the stereoscope by relating to it as if 
bodily, as if it were an object in space that s/he could clasp in his or her hands. This act of 
imagination then allows the observer to know it as something it is not, “more than a 
surface”—the discrepancy perhaps resulting in something of an experience of 
vulnerability.265 
Although Crary might understand Holmes to be translating a bodily experience 
into purely optical terms—clasping as if with our eyes—Holmes also orders the visual 
field in a way that resonates with a 17th- or 18th-century model of vision. The stereoscope 
sets up a field out there, at which I can look by way of the stereoscope. Indeed this 
stereoscope might even sit upon a table, as at least two versions included as illustrations 
to Crary’s text do (Figure 2.24). The observer then leans against a tabletop, while looking 
at the image of another tabletop, upon which objects are arranged so that they seem 
actually present. In his account, Holmes conceives of vision as an analogy to touch; he 
describes the way the mind “feels” its way around the depicted object. Sight and touch 
operate with Diderotian ‘reciprocal assistance’ in the rhetoric of his description. Notably, 
too, although Holmes’s viewing subject experiences something of her vulnerability to its 
deception, insofar as she sees something with the second eye that she didn’t see with the 
first, she is subsequently able to know something in a fuller way; the second eye 
compensates for that which a single eye could not see, allowing “more” to be seen. 
Rather than stopping short at this experience of vulnerability or failed mastery, the 
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subject continues looking. Even if that which can be seen is “merely” an appearance, the 
stereoscope allows something to show itself to us and in a way that makes it seem 
present.  
Of Lorenzo Ghiberti’s doors of the Bapistery in Florence, Vik Muniz observes the 
way their “fusion of an ancient three-dimensional medium, haut-relief, and the most 
sophisticated perceptual technique of Ghiberti’s era for rendering two-dimensional 
pictures, three-point perspective,” produces an effect that “overwhelms the senses and 
confuses the eye, which unable to decide what language to follow, is arrested in the 
surface of the picture” (Figure 2.25).266 Already in 1403, Ghiberti combines a three-
dimensional element and a pictorial one, and in doing so, “forces the viewer to become 
aware of the image’s syntax, to assume an active role in the apprehension of the image. 
Apprehension,” he continues, “means capture, arrest, and control, making something your 
own—but it also means hesitation, trepidation, and uneasiness.”267 
The stereoscope marks a continuation of this doubly-meant apprehension, the 
effect of which is the result of another combination of a three-dimensional element—
even one that is simulated, rather than sculpted—and a pictorial one. As in Ghiberti’s 
doors, its effect similarly depends upon the juxtaposition of representational elements in 
the near ground, as if emerging toward the viewer, as well as elements that seem to 
recede in perspectivally-rendered space. Just as Crary sought to isolate the effect of 
stereoscopy on the viewer from the effects of pictorial mimesis, so too does he isolate it 
from the unifying efforts of linear perspective. He writes, “pronounced stereoscopic 
effects depend on the presence of objects or obtrusive forms in the near or middle 
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ground; that is, there must be enough points in the image that require significant changes 
in the angle of convergence of the optical axes. Thus the most intense experience of the 
stereoscopic image coincides with an object-filled space….”268 In this way, it seems, 
Crary qualifies which types of images, even which types of photographic images, when 
viewed through the stereoscope, can optically produce the corporealized experience he 
describes. Those stereo views, which demonstrate standard perspectival recession, for 
example, roads or railroad tracks converging toward a central vanishing point, or those of 
open spaces with few intervening elements, produce little impression of depth or 
dimensionality. 
Rosalind Krauss, in contrast, describes the perspectival effect of stereography in 
terms quite opposite those of Crary: “Stereographic space is perspectival space raised to a 
higher power. Organized as a kind of tunnel vision, the experience of deep recession is 
insistent and inescapable.”269 As Krauss describes it, the hyper-perspectival effect of the 
stereoscope would not only accommodate imagery that conforms to the deep orthagonals 
of linear perspective, but could transform all imagery into an experience of deep space. 
But she amends this description of the “steep gradient” of stereography’s “tunnel vision” 
and “deep recession” to say instead that discrete planes organize the space into fore-, 
middle-, and background; they are layers “of different planes stretching away from the 
nearby space, into depth.”270  
Rebecca Solnit concurs with the description of stereography’s sense of deep space 
as having to do with the way represented objects seem to sit on several flat planes within 
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it. She describes its hyperdimensional effect as being “less like the depth of field and 
dimensionality of ordinary binocular vision than it was like the pop-out valentines and 
paper theaters popular in the era.”271 To enhance its spatial effect, she writes, 
“photographers sought views that would emphasize the stereograph’s strong points: 
deeply receding space with solid objects distributed throughout the foreground, middle 
ground, and back ground.”272 Observers, in turn, actively scanned the illusion of 
stereoscopic space. Krauss observes that “as one moves, visually, through the 
stereoscopic tunnel from inspecting the nearest ground to attending to an object in the 
middle-distance, one has the sensation of refocusing one’s eyes. And then again, into the 
farthest plane, another effort is made, and felt, to refocus.”273 And Crary can agree with 
this model of an active viewer; as he narrates the experience, “our eyes never traverse the 
image in a full apprehension of the three-dimensionality of the entire field, but in terms of 
a localized experience of separate areas….Our eyes follow a choppy and erratic path into 
its depth: it is an assemblage of local zones of three-dimensionality, zones imbued with a 
hallucinatory clarity, but which when taken together never coalesce into a homogenous 
field.”274 For Crary, this loss of a coherent field meant “the loss of touch as a conceptual 
component of vision.” Thus the eye was freed, or “unloosened” from “a network of 
referentiality incarnated in tactility and its subjective relation to perceived space.”275 And 
this made the observer newly vulnerable to appearances, that is, to forms that exist for the 
eye only, radically divorced from matter.  
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But just as this experience of vulnerability may not have been as profoundly new 
as Crary casts it, nor was it so disabling to the viewer’s experience. Just as Zeuxis or 
Ferdinand suffer the humiliation of their defeat by the painting’s illusion, and yet yield up 
the prize to the artist who accomplished it, the viewer of stereoscopic images can 
discover the subjective errors of his vision, but continue to enjoy its mimetic effect. The 
experience of enjoyment or of perfect mimesis does not wholly recast the subject’s 
vulnerability as mastery, rather masterful knowledge and subjective vulnerability remain 
in productive tension as a condition for viewing. It is in the face of a competing reality, 
one that I know to be true, that belief in my mastery is compelled most convincingly.276  
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Chapter 3. Representing the Photograph as a Trompe l’Oeil Image-Object 
 
“Materiality is that which halts transparency.”277 –Michael Ann Holly 
 
In 2012 an exhibition of paintings, sculptures, photography, video, and installations made 
since 1960 was organized at the Walker Art Center in Minneapolis according to the ways 
in which these works seemed real or, per the exhibition’s title, Lifelike. Given my interest 
in trompe l’oeil, which according to this exhibition catalog is “a technique of illusionism 
to test one’s ability to discern between what seems to be and what is,” I was compelled to 
see the exhibition to learn if, and if so which, works of art made since 1960 could be 
claimed as trompe l’oeil.278 I expected to find, for example, representations of objects that 
disguise the hands of their makers, representations that prompt viewers to participate in 
the trompe l’oeil game of seeming or being, representations that could, at least potentially 
and initially, be mistaken for that which they represent. I was dismayed to find at the 
entrance to the gallery Jonathan Seliger’s 9-foot tall bronze milk carton Heartland (2010) 
(Figure 3.1), which cartoonishly and hyperbolically refuses a goal of seeming real. Its 
scale, instead, insists that this is not the milk carton of everyday use.  
Scale continues to interfere with the seeming reality of the art objects inside the 
exhibition’s first gallery. Instead the exhibition seems to recast trompe l’oeil’s goal of 
lifelike illusionism as an issue of iconography, according to the everydayness of its 
subject matter. In other words, the only criterion for inclusion in the exhibition seems to 
be that the work of art takes something familiar from the realm of lived reality as its 
subject. The first section of Engberg’s catalog essay, entitled ‘Common Objects,’ 
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reinforces this point. Following Norman Bryson, in Looking at the Overlooked, she wants 
to place the objects she exhibits in a continuing tradition of rhopography, or the 
‘depiction of those things which lack importance.’ And so it is that we find in this first 
gallery representations of everyday subject matter, executed in a variety of realist modes: 
from the loosely painted, high angle view of Vija Celmins’ Eggs (1964) (Figure 3.2) to 
the more tightly rendered ‘photorealist’ approach of Robert Bechtle’s Fosters Freeze 
(1970) (Figure 3.3), or from the painted lead relief sculpture of Jasper Johns’ Bread 
(1969) (Figure 3.4) to the over-scaled, 5-foot tall fiberglass sculpture of Alex Hay’s 
Paper Bag (1968) (Figure 3.5).  
Just as the scale of the milk carton foregrounds the status of the object as 
representation, the strategy of enlargement continues to put everyday subject matter at 
odds with its otherwise recognizable and everyday nature inside the exhibition’s first 
gallery. Vija Celmins’ Eraser (1967) (Figure 3.6) recreates a familiar and commercially-
produced object—a pink pearl eraser— at an exaggerated scale, now 20 inches wide. 
Another of her works, Untitled (Comb) (1970) (Figure 3.7), reimagines a familiar 
handheld hair comb as a 6-foot tall wooden sculpture, now leaning against the wall. Alex 
Hay translates the strategy of enlargement he used in Paper Bag to the wall in Cash 
Register Slip (1966) (Figure 3.8). While, in some cases, the scale of these objects may 
cause a spectatorial experience of awe or fascination about how the works were made, it 
mainly has the effect of estranging the objects represented from their everydayness. At no 
point in the course of viewing these over-scaled representations are visitors deceived 
about the nature or status of the object before them.  
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Also included on the wall of the first gallery is Chuck Close’s Big Self-Portrait 
(1967-68) (Figure 3.9). Its inclusion here, amongst so many over-scaled representations 
of everyday objects, is perhaps puzzling, insofar as its subject matter seems to be that of 
portraiture and not still life. In this way, its placement here only seems to make sense 
relative to its enlargement, rather than according to its subject. But this curatorial 
dissonance is remedied if we consider the source of his painting—a photograph—and 
thus understand the painting to be an enlarged representation of a photograph— rather 
than as, or in addition to its being a self-portrayal. Indeed, the painting reveals its source 
insofar as it looks ‘photographic’: it is tonally rendered to reproduce the look of a black 
and white photograph, its vertical format remains consistent with that of a photo-booth 
print, it has a single point of focus, and a camera’s flash is reflected in the lenses of his 
glasses. While it is typical to describe Close’s paintings as being paintings of 
photographs, this usually refers to his photorealistic use of the image as a source for the 
subject of his painting; what if instead we understood this relationship more literally? 
Suddenly, I was grateful to have visited this oddly-assembled exhibition, because it 
allowed me to see something I’d been overlooking. Like the eraser, comb, paper bag or 
cash receipt that Celmins or Hay enlarges, it is the everyday object of the photograph that 
Close here recreates as a painted enlargement. The photograph is not just an image source 
then, but is an object—a paper photograph—and it is insofar as the photographic object is 
the subject of Close’s painting that we might understand his work as trompe l’oeil.  
In the specific case of photography, enlargement is not necessarily at odds with its 
reality as an object, unlike with the eraser, comb, paper bag, cash receipt, or milk carton. 
That is, at least since the 1970s, especially within the context of the art museum, it is 
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increasingly common to see photographs enlarged to be wall-sized, in what Michael 
Fried calls tableau photography. Enlargement alone should not be enough, then, to 
declare that this (seeming) photograph—Close’s subject matter—is actually a painted 
representation of a photograph. It is sufficient in the context of this exhibition gallery, 
where visitors come to recognize enlargement as code for an artistic intervention, but it is 
not enough to do so in another gallery. If Close’s painting had been placed in a gallery of 
enlarged photographs, for example, its painted status might have been less apparent. 
Indeed, it may also have been overlooked. That is, it would have been so lifelike, so much 
like a real photograph, that its painted status would not have been revealed. 
Because the exhibition also includes enlarged photographs, such as Thomas 
Demand’s Barn (1997) (Figure 3.10), James Casebere’s Landscape with Houses 
(Dutchess County, NY) #8 (2010) (Figure 3.11), and Esteban Pastorino Diaz’s Cuatro 
Vientos (2006) (Figure 3.12), the viewer gains a familiarity with large photographic art 
objects. Each of these photographs has its own tricks to play at the level of its image and 
its internal relationship to a photographic referent, so that an attentive visitor to Lifelike is 
looking for signs of these types of tricks within the imagery of large photographically-
rendered representations, rather than at whether or not the work is actually a photograph. 
Now familiar with large photographic-looking objects that actually are photographs, 
viewers come to expect the photographic nature or status of this type of object. This 
expectation makes one vulnerable to being deceived by a photographically-rendered 
painting, which occurred, at least for me, in the ensuing gallery from the one that 
displayed Demand’s, Casebere’s, and Diaz’s photographs. In this gallery, many feet 
above eye level, there hangs another wall-sized and photo-realistically painted portrait, 
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Rudolf Stingel’s Untitled (after Sam) (2006) (Figure 3.13). Less familiar with Stingel’s 
work than with that of Close, I found myself able to mistake this painting for a very large 
photograph. Stingel’s 2006 painting, measuring 11 x 15 feet, is nearly three-times the size 
of Close’s painting, but otherwise, is also rendered in black and white and executed from 
a (gridded) photographic source. My mistake helped me understand the trompe l’oeil 
potential for both of these works. That is, the manner in which the object—a 
photograph—is represented—painted—allows it to seem real, to seem like a real 
photograph. To say this is not yet to enter into a consideration of the photograph’s 
relation to a real referent; it is instead to think about a photograph as an object 
represented in paint, yet another object represented as a trompe l’oeil still life.  
While the height at which Stingel’s painting hangs might interfere with the kind 
of close looking that trompe l’oeil representations court, Close’s painting readily 
accommodates this viewing experience. Indeed, Lifelike curator, Siri Engberg beautifully 
narrates the way that Close’s painting rewards close looking. She writes, “While the 
veracity of the image is astonishing, vestiges of the penciled grid are faintly visible 
beneath the veil of acrylic paint, a reminder that this is a work from a photograph that has 
been reinvented, and has declared itself a painting.”279 In this way, Enberg narrates the 
viewing experience as one of trompe l’oeil—as a revelation that the object is painted 
(rather than how it is painted) which takes place over the course of one’s looking. This is 
the revelation that is constitutive of the trompe l’oeil experience; its trickery hinges on 
the viewer taking (eventual) notice of a particular detail that reveals the seemingly real 
object’s status as (painted) representation.  
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To understand Close’s or Stingel’s mode of representation as trompe l’oeil, we 
must understand that the subject matter of their paintings is the photograph itself, rather 
than the human subject of that photographic object’s image. The extent to which these 
paintings participate in the longer history of trompe l’oeil has to do with the way their 
photorealist paintings have the potential to deceive the viewer about their material status 
as paintings. That is, its reception as trompe l’oeil has to do with the possibility of its 
being mistaken for a photograph—not insofar as it looks photographic, but insofar as it 
looks like a photographic object: an actual and printed photograph. Photorealism, I want 
to say, only accounts for the specific manner in which the image is rendered; it does not 
account for one object—the painting—being mistaken for another object—a photograph. 
Of course, the use of a photorealist style facilitates the illusion that this painting appears 
to be a photograph, just as a particular kind of painterly illusionism—one that similarly 
disguises the brushwork of its maker—facilitates the trompe l’oeil illusion that a painted 
curtain or fly appears to be an actual curtain or fly. Accordingly, if photorealist works are 
to be considered trompe l’oeil, it is to the extent that a photorealist style of painting 
facilitates the illusion that a painted representation of a photograph appears to be an 
actual photograph.    
It might help then to consider trompe l’oeil photorealist paintings, such as Close’s 
or Stingel’s, as analogous to chantournés, a type of painting for which the shape of the 
canvas is cut to be “fully congruent with the shape of the object represented.”280 Insofar 
as photorealist paintings of photographs are congruent with the photograph’s shape, they 
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might be thought of as chantournés. This artistic effort to disguise the material objecthood 
of the painting for that which the painting represents has been employed since the 17th 
century. Indeed, a two-part work by Cornelius Norbertus Gijsbrechts Cut-out Trompe 
l’oeil Easel with Fruit Piece (c. 1670) (Figure 3.14) asks viewers to mistake a painting 
for an actual easel holding a painting; this work also includes The Back of a Picture (c. 
1670) (Figure 3.15), a painting of the reverse-side of a stretched canvas, which leans 
against a wall behind the painted easel. Victor Stoichita concisely interprets this detail, 
when he writes, “The object of this painting is the painting as an object.”281 That is, the 
material objecthood of the literal painting—the framed canvas—is made congruent with 
the subject of its painted image—the verso of a stretched canvas—so that it can be 
mistaken for an actual verso—one that should be able to be turned around to reveal its 
painted picture. Sybille Ebert-Schifferer differentiates this type from archetypal 
chantournés, such as Gijsbrechts’ easel in which the “contours are cut in the irregular 
shape of the thing they represent,” by calling it a “chantourné in a natural way.”282 By 
this she means, “the painting’s outline and format collapse into each other.”283 Another 
way to say this, I think, is that the conventional format of this painting’s represented 
subject—a painting—conforms to the quadrilateral outline of this material object—the 
framed canvas. The same is true of mid-20th century photorealist paintings: the 
conventional format of the painting’s represented object—a photograph—conforms to the 
rectangular outline of the painting itself. So, to revise Stoichita’s summary, the object of 
the trompe l’oeil-photorealist painting is the photograph as an object.  
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At the turn of the twentieth century, the American trompe l’oeil artist John Peto 
revives the theme of the painting’s verso and adds to it what appears to be an oval 
photograph of Abraham Lincoln. The oval version of this portrait of Lincoln appears in a 
great number of the artist’s letter rack pictures, but usually as one object among many 
others. Its isolation and odd placement, as if nailed to the back of a painting, in Lincoln 
and the Pfleger Stretcher (c. 1900) (Figure 3.16) therefore deserve special attention. The 
inclusion of the photograph, painted as if materially present as an actual photograph 
nailed to the wooden surface of the framing device, repeats an illusionistic motif in 
Gijsbrechts’ The Back of a Picture. In that painting, Gijsbrechts included the 
representation of a piece of paper as if adhered by melted wax to the upper left corner of 
the painting’s verso. Instead of an image, Gijsbrechts depicts the number 36 as if it were 
written on a curling slip of paper. Scholars have speculated that the 36 signifies the 
work’s availability for sale, further enticing the viewer to turn the thing around to see its 
picture, but also further insisting upon its material status as an object—a commodity. 
Rather than solely reinforcing the materiality of the painting as an object, Peto’s tacked 
inclusion illustrates the materiality of this object too. This image-object, the photograph, 
seems as materially present as the painted verso. But unlike the painted verso, which if 
turned around would be found to be actually present as the backside of this painting, the 
photograph exists only as painted image. Instead of revealing its status as “merely 
image,” we might instead say that Gijsbrechts’ painting of the verso holds out the 
promise that representation can be made real in the material world; it is realized in the act 
of turning it around to reveal an actual verso. If so, then Peto might be similarly hopeful 
about his represented image. By representing his portrait of Lincoln as if present, he 
122 
 
illustrates materiality, not as “only illusion,” but as an illusion that seems present; this “as 
if” presence vacillates between image and object.284  
But the experience of trompe l’oeil is conventionally characterized as an 
experience of revelation: that which seems actually present is discovered instead to be 
merely represented (only an illusion). So, my suggestion that the experience of trompe 
l’oeil’s illusion of presence might itself constitute a kind of presence upends the nature of 
its revelation. Indeed, instead of an experience of revelation, trompe l’oeil becomes an 
experience of oscillation. Whereas Ebert-Schifferer characterizes the actual content of 
Gijsbrechts’ paintings as posing a “skeptical question about the ontological status of 
painting: vision or object?,” I will insist that this question remains unresolvable.285 Just as 
a painting is both a vision (image) and an object, indeed, so too is a photograph; I will 
understand her use of the word “or” then, not to require a choice between these 
ontologies, but instead to signal painting’s oscillation between them. It is this oscillation 
which trompe l’oeil painting stages.  
The oscillation between vision and object takes place according to the (seeming) 
transparency or opacity of the materiality of the painting itself. In order to “deceive 
perfectly,” according to Ebert-Schifferer, a work’s “painting must be invisible as 
technique.”286 She elaborates:  
“Trompe l’oeils must expunge the individual features of artistic style such as 
brushstrokes and other marks left by paint application: in order to be convincing, 
painting must truly transform itself by mimicry into the material it represents. In 
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perfect mimesis, art moves invisibly behind its product and is thus self-denying: a 
point that Ovid had made early on in regard to Pygmalion’s creation: such art his 
art concealed.”287  
 
This transparency of technique allows Gijsbrechts’ The Back of a Picture to seem, at least 
initially, like the back of an actual picture (perhaps even an already extant picture). The 
compulsion to touch or to turn around this object is an effort to resolve the dissonance of 
its competing ontologies. This desire to touch is thus testament to the work’s otherwise 
continual oscillation between vision and object, illusion and reality, seeming and being, 
appearance and presence.  
 But trompe l’oeil painting cannot be so transparent, so self-denying, that its trick 
remains undiscovered. In the case of Gijsbrechts’s painting, close looking, especially 
from the side of the object, allows viewers to recognize its trick in the flatness of the 
painting—that which appeared to be materially present is present instead as 
representation. Although this recognition of the painting’s trick is arguably the 
constitutive moment in the experience of trompe l’oeil, this recognition does not entirely 
halt the experience of its oscillation to instead reveal it as merely representation. That is, 
once tricked, we try to reconstruct the experience, returning to the now opacified 
transparency of its technique to marvel at how skillfully its now visible technique 
convinced us.  
Beyond this, Michael Leja observes that suspicious viewers are most vulnerable 
to being deceived by an image (paradoxically) when they are tricked into letting down 
their guard. Once savvy to the painting’s trick, assured of its status as painting and of the 
limits of its painterly mimesis, the viewer lowers her guard and is surprised again by 
something else that seems to surpass representation. Leja makes this point relative to a 
                                                
287 Ibid. 
124 
 
work by another American trompe l’oeil painter, William Harnett. That painting, The 
Artist’s Letter Rack (1879) (Figure 3.17), includes a represented newspaper clipping 
which refuses legibility. That is, its text is painted to imitate the shapes and graphic 
frequencies of a typographic format without representing anything coherently alphabetic. 
The illegibility of the newspaper scraps or of the illustrated magazine is in striking 
contrast to the seeming presence of each object, rendered as if adhered to its wooden 
board support or as casting a shadow across other seemingly present objects.  
As a regularly-issued, delivered, and received object, the newspaper “relates back 
to,” what Ebert-Schifferer refers to as, “the tactile experience of moving things: taking 
them away, for instance of tidying up.”288 That is, in their dailyness, they relate to a 
habitual frame of mind, one in which “we pay little attention, partially switching off the 
brain’s normal mechanisms for inspection.”289 In this way, the iconography of the 
newspaper further assists the painting’s effort to catch us off-guard. By juxtaposing these 
conflicting impressions, Harnett solicits a spectatorial experience of cognitive 
uncertainty. 
 Peto also represents an illegible newspaper clipping in his own rack picture of that 
same year. But this “rack picture” is another verso, which he titles Mr. Abraham Wiltsie’s 
Rack Picture (1879) (Figure 3.18). The verso becomes a rack insofar as he represents two 
addressed and stamped envelopes as if stashed inside the shallow pocket produced 
between the wooden frame and the canvas it appears to hold taut. A presidential portrait, 
this time of George Washington, appears in this earlier verso too, in the form of the stamp 
adhered to an envelope addressed to another Abraham. The newspaper clipping is painted 
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as if adhered to the lower right corner of the verso’s frame; its length drops below the 
lowest edge of the framed canvas, insinuating that it would be seen if the painting could 
be viewed from the front. In this painting, he uses a transparent medium—watercolor—to 
represent transparently the different materialities of wood, canvas, wire, metal, and paper 
as if they were actually present. Moreover, he uses one medium to represent the 
appearance of others, insofar as this is a watercolor of an oil painting’s verso—signified 
by the stretched canvas—and insofar as this is a watercolor of print reproductions—the 
newspaper and postage stamps. 
 Wilmerding describes the influence of both Harnett and Peto on the more 
contemporary work of Roy Lichtenstein. In his Things on the Wall (1973) (Figure 3.19), 
Lichtenstein paints a verso that is not exactly a trompe l’oeil, but an imitation of the 
techniques of photo-mechanical reproduction. Although he notes Lichtenstein’s attention 
to imitating the look of three-color Benday dot reproduction techniques, Wilmerding does 
not attend as closely to the way Peto takes reproduced objects as the subject of his letter 
racks. Wilmerding is not alone in ignoring this. Doreen Bolger interprets the letter rack 
paintings as portraits; she relates the addresses that appear on envelopes or the (legible) 
headlines of newspaper clippings to the lives of the paintings’ owners. Doing so requires 
that she look past the specific objects represented—envelopes, postcards, photographs, 
etc.—to instead read that which appears within this iconography. In this way, she treats 
the represented objects as if they were actual found objects—real envelopes with 
addresses or actual newspapers with published text. 
But Peto’s paintings complicate biographical interpretations of letter rack 
paintings. His Office Board for Christian Faser (1881) (Figure 3.20) represents many of 
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the same objects that appear in his painting Office Board for Smith Bros. Coal Co. 
(Figure 3.21) of that same year: an 1881 almanac, a greeting card with flowers and 
berries, a card advertising Smith Brothers Coal, a torn envelope on which the words 
“Important Information Inside” appear, a generic U.S. postal card, as well as a card with 
a flower. The intended recipients, at least according to the paintings’ titles, seem to have 
nothing to do with one another; Faser was a frame-maker who was not associated with 
the coal company.  
Letter rack paintings, as pictures of the accumulation of things, insist on the 
obdurate physicality of those things, even at the same time that their trompe l’oeil 
deployment competes with this thingliness to instead remind us of its painterly illusion. 
We especially experience this oscillation relative to one of the represented objects, which 
may or may not be common to both of these paintings. On the Smith Brothers board, 
there is a postcard depicting a flower and a bee; and on the Faser board, there is a similar 
postcard of a (pink, rather than white) flower, but a small paper scrap obscures the card at 
exactly the spot where the bee should be. On the Smith Brothers board, the bee’s location 
seems to vacillate between seeming to be part of the picture postcard and seeming to sit 
on the surface of Peto’s painting itself. In this way, Peto reinvents and redeploys the 
traditional trompe l’oeil representation of a fly as if having just alighted on the painting. 
Whereas the fly seems to be either present upon the surface of the painting or represented 
in the painting as image, Peto’s bee seems to be either present upon the surface of the 
painting or represented in the image as a representation. While one layer of illusion can 
be resolved in the manner of Cimabue, who according to Vasari, tried to shoo away the 
fly painted by his student Giotto, another layer of illusion cannot be. That is, whereas the 
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fly’s refusal to budge from the space of representation assures us that it is in fact painted, 
we cannot learn in this way whether the bee was intended to seem present upon the 
surface or to seem represented as part of the postcard, which is also represented so that it 
seems present. To ascertain whether or not the bee is part of the actual postcard, we 
would need to compare it to the actual card represented—which Wilmerding does relative 
to another greeting card repeated in both paintings—but this is to treat the representation 
as if it were a found object, as Bolger does. Or perhaps we could compare it to another of 
Peto’s representations of it, but the artist denies us this opportunity for assurance by 
changing the color of the flower and by obscuring the card at exactly this place in the 
Faser board.  
By taking other (photographic or otherwise reproduced) representations as the 
subject of his (painterly) representations, Peto thickens the layers of illusion available in 
his trompe l’oeil works. Rather than posing the revelatory trompe l’oeil question 
suggested by Ebert-Schifferer—vision or object?—Peto adds a third term which 
oscillates between these ontologies: image-object. His trompe l’oeil bee is not resolved 
from its seeming to be actually present as an object on the surface of the painting through 
our discovery of its representation as image. Instead, it is further embedded within the 
image, as part of the design of a postcard, so that its illusion might not be resolvable.  
This type of illusionary oscillation requires that we see the postcard as if actually 
present. It is in this way that I am beginning to suggest the iconographical significance of 
objects that are also images as the subjects of trompe l’oeil paintings. These image-
objects refuse the kind of binary sorting associated with trompe l’oeil—image or object—
and instead allow its illusionary status a further oscillation as an object with an image and 
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an object as an image. To have sorted the illusion of Peto’s bee in the way that Cimabue 
sorts the illusion of Giotto’s fly—image or object—is to see through the intervening 
device of the postcard—image-object. The illusion of the postcard stages the ease with 
which we look past the materialities of images. We look past the photographic or printed 
image’s status as an object, to see instead its subject—that which it represents—in ways 
that the trompe l’oeil mode efforts to expose. That these paintings of other images are 
made at a historical moment of widespread image proliferation seems to me additionally 
meaningful.  
Peto’s paintings reflect upon the increasingly widespread practice of translating 
one medium into another for the purposes of mass reproduction. The relationship 
between photography and printmaking is materially intertwined in the mid-nineteenth 
century because mass reproduction and circulation of photographic images still requires 
the intermediary step of engraving. Photographs often served as the basis for wood 
engravings of paintings that appeared in periodicals, including L’Illustration and 
L’Artiste; indeed this became common practice by the mid-1850s. In their history of the 
photobook, Martin Parr and Gerry Badger write, “As far back as 1839-40 daguerreotypes 
were acid etched to provide a plate suitable for printing in ink—a technique that achieved 
a limited degree of success. More frequently, daguerreotypes and other photographs were 
copied by hand, using the simple expedient of tracing them and making plates for 
reproduction as etchings, engravings or aquatints.”290  
Beyond their material intertwined-ness, photography and engraving are 
conceptually entangled, especially insofar as they are understood to be technologies of 
image reproduction. Even though he describes its freedom from the artist’s hand as that 
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which differentiates it from engraving, William Henry Fox Talbot has difficulty 
conceptualizing photography apart from its role in image reproduction. In The Pencil of 
Nature, published in installments between 1844 and 1846, he writes that the plates of 
photographs are “formed or depicted by optical and chemical means alone, and without 
the aid of any one acquainted with the art of drawing. It is needless, therefore, to say that 
they differ in all respects, and as widely as possible, in their origin, from the plates of the 
ordinary kind, which owe their existence to the united skill of the Artist and the 
Engraver.” He continues, “They are impressed by Nature’s hand.”291 Photography is 
thereby imagined as an image reproduction technology that removes human agency—
even human consensus of painter and engraver—from the process of image reproduction, 
but only insofar as the agency of its making—imagined as a pencil—is instead turned 
over to nature. That is, Talbot removes the drawing pencil from the hand of the 
printmaker, only to put in back in another hand, that of nature. Carol Armstrong 
productively understands the rhetoric of “the pencil of nature” as “the nineteenth-century 
way of speaking about the photograph’s indexicality.”292 That is, Talbot’s conflation 
assigns an authorial mode of production to the camera in ways that our contemporary 
mechanistic or industrialized conception of the camera’s automatism prohibits. Beyond 
this, as Lars Kiel Bertelsen observes, Talbot continually conflates the activities of 
depiction and impression; the description of an impression by way of nature’s hand 
relates it to a type of printmaking that involves direct mark making, such as engraving or 
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drypoint.293  These rhetorical choices make clear his difficulty in conceptually separating 
the practices. Indeed, he refers to the new practice of image production as “Photogenic 
Drawing.”  
Talbot’s claim that photography accomplishes reproductions that are free of 
interventions by the human hand becomes impractical to maintain, especially as it relates 
to the production of the book in which this claim appears. The Pencil of Nature is, as 
Talbot notes in his introduction, “the first attempt to publish a series of plates or pictures 
wholly executed by the new art of the Photogenic Drawing, without aid whatever from 
the artist’s pencil.”294 And while Talbot celebrates his calotype as not only “the first 
photograph per se” but also the “first photograph publishable in book form,” its 
reproduction process is far from free of human intervention.295 In contrast to the 
publication of a daguerreotype, which required an engraver to reproduce it as an 
engraving, publication of the calotype in book form required each calotype to be 
individually produced from the same negative and then laboriously glued into each book 
by hand. If print publication of calotypes required individual printing and gluing into 
pages, this proved impractical for large runs; inclusion, for example, in a successful 
magazine remained more easily accomplished by engravings of photographs—whether 
they were made from the unique image of the daguerreotype or the reproducible image of 
the calotype.  
That Peto paints both the Smith Brothers coal and Christian Faser office boards in 
the year 1881 is particularly significant, as it is the year in which the halftone begins to 
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reshape the reproduction of photographic images. The halftone process allows a 
photograph’s intermediate shades of gray to be reproduced by means of a printing press, 
so that image and text could be printed simultaneously. In this way, the halftone begins to 
obscure the difference between a photograph and its reproduction in mass media. Indeed, 
the halftone involves its own trick of the eye, insofar as its effectiveness relies on the 
limited power of the eye to see the variously sized dots of which it is materially 
comprised. At a distance, the eye resolves these dots as a continuous tone. It was not only 
in 1881, but also in Philadelphia, the city in which Peto was then residing, that Frederick 
Ives developed the most commercially viable form of halftone reproduction.296  
Having obtained the patent for his process in 1881, Ives published notice of its 
commercial viability in 1884. In a letter to the editors of the English weekly periodical, 
The Photographic News, Ives aims to establish his process as the “first patented or 
published process which was introduced into truly successful commercial operation.”297 
He does this in response to similar claims by George Meisenbach of Munich. He asserts 
his own publication in 1883 in a southern trade journal of “the first series of photo-
typographic portraits which ever appeared in a regular periodical publication, printed in a 
page of type matter.”298 As Ives reveals by way of his comparison to Meisenbach, he was 
not alone in his efforts to develop an automatic process for the reproduction of 
photographs; indeed, Talbot’s own efforts, beginning in the 1850s are chronicled in this 
same issue of The Photographic News. Alphonse-Louis Poitevin, it is also noted, was 
engaged as early as 1842 toward this end relative to daguerreotypes, although he had 
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better luck with photolithography. Beyond this, the notice of patents in this same issue 
includes one by Alexander Borland for “Improvements in and apparatus for the 
production of photographic negatives to be used in the processes of photo-lithography, 
photo-zincography, photo-engraving, photo-etching, or photo-type productions.”299 The 
stakes for Ives’ claims are made clear elsewhere within this same issue of The 
Photographic News, in an account of “Photo-typography” under the heading of “French 
correspondence:” “The question relating to the transformation of a negative or positive 
print, having soft gradations of shadow, into a typographic negative with hatched or 
stipped shading, is becoming more important every day; yet it is surprising to see how 
little used are the processes producing this transformation.”300 While not widely applied 
quite yet, the development of techniques of photographic reproduction preoccupied the 
experiments of aspiring inventors in the early years of the 1880s.  
We hear an echo of Talbot’s desire for an image reproduced without the 
intervention of the human hand in the same issue of The Photographic News that 
announces Ives’ success with the halftone. Of the seven illustrations in this issue, four are 
diagrams or an engraved illustration of photography equipment and two are sketches 
engraved from photographs, only one, a photograph of lightning by Robert Haensel 
(Figure 3.22), is described as a “photo-etching from a photo-gravure made from the 
original plate by M. Gillot of Paris, so that the result is in all respects a pure photograph, 
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and has not been touched by hand.”301 The exceptional nature of this reproduction is 
noted in detail. It, in contrast to the other illustrations, remains “in all respects” as pure a 
photograph as the original plate to the extent that it is made without the intervention of 
the artist’s hand. The original plate by Haensel remains, despite the intervening steps, a 
“pure photograph” because the content of its image has not been re-translated by an artist. 
Accordingly, we might observe that the photographic reproduction accomplishes that 
which was merely the effect of trompe l’oeil illusion: the reproduction of the thing itself 
(as if) without the artist’s intervention. To do this, photography had to remove the 
engraver’s hand from the process of reproduction and trompe l’oeil painters had to 
disguise the handedness of their painterly intervention—their brushstrokes, for example.  
It was the “disappearance” of the trompe l’oeil painter “behind his work” which 
caused the genre to be “so despised within the hierarchic schemes established by the 
academy.”302 As Ebert-Schifferer summarizes 18th-century reception of the genre, 
“Trompe l’oeil seemed to be pure technique, mere handicraft, and even sought to conceal 
the presence of the artist’s hand through meticulously smooth, fine brushwork.”303 In 
1759 (and thus prior to the invention of photography) Joshua Reynolds complained, if to 
imitate nature means to represent objects as if they have “such relief that they seem real” 
then  
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painting must lose its rank and be no longer considered as a liberal art, and sister 
to poetry, this imitation being merely mechanical, in which the slowest intellect is 
always sure to succeed best: for the painter of genius cannot stoop to drudgery, in 
which the understanding has no part; and what pretence has the art to claim 
kindred with poetry, but by its powers over the imagination?304  
 
The “mechanistic” imitation of trompe l’oeil pictures, however, achieved such relief that 
the objects represented therein could “seem real.” While Reynolds found this an 
insufficient criterion for art, Daguerre—who painted trompe l’oeil dioramas—or Talbot 
seems to have found something worthwhile in a “merely mechanical” pictorial imitation 
that represents objects so that they seem real or seem really present. If trompe l’oeil 
artists accomplished their seemingly true copies of the world by disguising the materiality 
of their representational technique, by disappearing behind the work, then this criterion 
seems to persist in the evaluation of other mechanistic means of copying the world.  
If the terms used by Reynolds to disqualify trompe l’oeil as art might re-emerge 
as those that describe the successes of photographic reproduction, late 19th-century 
painters might turn to the new medium to re-assert their legitimacy. That photography 
and photographic reproduction could chemically accomplish the disappearance of the 
artist’s hand—the domain, heretofore, of trompe l’oeil painting—might, if not threaten, 
then, at least, compel a renewed contest with painting. Into this revised paragone, strides 
Peto, who efforts if not to outdo the effect of photography’s handless-ness, then to expose 
the fraudulence of its claim.  
Knowing all too well how to disguise the labor involved in the meticulous copy 
and translation of objects in the world into two dimensions, Peto would have recognized 
another such disguise in the rhetoric of photography’s lack of hand. The description in 
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The Photographic News, for example, asserts that the published image has not been 
“touched by hand,” only after listing the laborious interventions required in its execution: 
first the development of the original plate, then the exposure of the resulting photographic 
positive, which etches, according to the process of photogravure, a photosensitive plate 
that is subsequently printed to produce a photogravure or photo-etching. While many 
hands are involved in the various development and printing processes, it is the image 
itself that seems able to be reproduced without the intervention of the human hand. But 
Peto incorporates the photograph in the iconography of his painting to remind us of 
unseen hands in the making of this type of image. He represents the photograph as if 
materially present but unable to be touched—and, in this way, verified—by hand. Our 
recognition, then, of his intervention upsets its image’s seemingly photographic 
correspondence to the world in ways that remind us of the situation of that image’s 
production. And at the same time, they remind us of the delight we have in that image’s 
visual illusion of presence.  
It is in his 1880 painting The Rack (Figure 3.23) that Peto first represents a 
photograph. But he paints the gray-toned look of an albumen print as if it is largely 
obscured by a brightly colored greeting card, which appears to be stacked atop it. This 
placement, however, entices our spectatorial desire to pull the photograph out from 
underneath the card to see its image. He repeats this representational strategy in Office 
Board for Christian Faser the following year, insofar as he obscures the photographic 
image—much like he obscures the representation of the bee on the postcard of the flower 
in this same painting—by placing it as if tucked behind another object. In this painting, 
he further obscures the photograph of a bowtie-wearing man by turning it upside-down so 
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that most of his face is hidden from view. Again, he courts our desire to see the image of 
the photograph—the face of its represented subject; we want to pull it out from under the 
envelope to discover him. Instead of seeing through the photograph to its subject, we see 
only the materiality of the object—an envelope, which insofar as it is addressed to Mr. C. 
Faser, further teases our interest in identifying the photographic subject.  
Cabinet cards, which became popular in the early 1870s, even replacing cartes de 
visite in the 1880s, are albumen and, in the 1890s collodion, prints mounted to cardboard 
backs measuring about 4.5 x 6.5 inches. Peto represents the photographic image of this 
cabinet card as if mounted slightly higher than center, as was conventionally done to 
accommodate the name of the photography studio that produced the image. But he does 
not reproduce the name of a studio on his painted version, as for example Thomas H. 
Hope later does in his The Artist’s Letter Rack (1886) (Figure 3.24). Typically, the name 
and address of the photography studio also would have been printed across the reverse 
side of a cabinet card’s cardboard mount. By representing this card as if tucked into a 
letter board, Peto entices the habitual instinct of contemporary viewers to pull out or turn 
over the card to learn its maker from the bottom or the back of the card. But as painted 
image, its representation forecloses upon this discovery; instead, its maker remains as 
obscured as its subject.  
Peto continues to represent cabinet cards amongst the other objects included in his 
office boards and rack pictures in Old Souvenirs (1881/1900) (Figure 3.25), Rack Picture 
for William Malcolm Bunn (1882) (Figure 3.26), Office Board (1885) (Figure 3.27), 
Office Board for Eli Keen’s Sons (1888) (Figure 3.28), Ocean County Democrat (1889) 
(Figure 3.29). They also show up in his studio door or wall paintings of the 1880s, 
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including Stag Saloon Commission (1885) (Figure 3.30), Objects in the Artist’s Creative 
Mind (1887) (Figure 3.31), Old Time Letter Rack (1894) (Figure 3.32), Card Rack with 
Jack of Hearts (c. 1900) (Figure 3.33), Portrait of the Artist’s Daughter (1901) (Figure 
3.34), Lincoln and the Star of David (1904) (Figure 3.35), and Toms River (1905) (Figure 
3.36). His Patch Self Portrait with Small Pictures (c. 1900) (Figure 3.37) includes several 
small, unstretched paintings as if tacked to a door, but also (at least) two empty 
photograph mounts as if tucked amongst them—a small carte de visite mount with an 
oval cut-out and a board with rounded corners about the size of a cabinet card. 
Wilmerding compares another of Peto’s “patch paintings” Still Life (Patch 
Painting) (c. 1890) (Figure 3.38) to Walker Evans’ later photograph of photographs 
Family Snapshots in Frank Tengle’s Home, Hale County, Alabama (1936) (Figure 3.39), 
calling it “a modern equivalent of Peto’s meditation on his medium.”305 Wilmerding 
however connects the two works according to the ways in which they document the 
“daily existence” and “humble conditions of rural America.” But beyond this, they share 
a compositional strategy. Evans photographs two family snapshots directly square with 
the wall of the Hale County home on which they hang. The photograph’s shallow 
compositional space, wood-grain backdrop, and the protruding nails by which the 
snapshots are affixed to the wall connect it visually to the flatness of Peto’s studio wall or 
door paintings, as well as to a larger tradition of trompe l’oeil painting. Indeed, the nails 
in the Evans photograph seem to emerge into the space of the viewer. 
Furthermore, they share an appropriative artistic strategy. Peto’s painting not only 
cites some earlier paintings of his own, but also a painting by Franklin D. Briscoe, which 
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Peto is known to have owned.306 Evans photographs two photographs that he did not take 
and he does so in the manner of trompe l’oeil paintings of images tacked to walls. When, 
for example in the Christian Faser office board, Peto paints another photography studio’s 
photograph and omits the name of that studio from his representation of the cabinet card, 
he makes visible the deletion of the human hand claimed in rhetoric surrounding 
photography’s accomplishment. But he also appropriates it, encouraging viewers to 
mistake it for his creation, as his painting. Without a photography studio’s name on the 
cabinet cards he represents, he is the image’s only identifiable maker. Peto’s re-painting 
of photographs returns the artist’s hand to a mechanized process imagined to be free of it. 
But of course, Peto’s identification as maker comes only after we realize that the painting 
itself is a representation and not an actual letter rack; that is, after we sort vision from 
object. Peto’s iconographical inclusion of reproducible image-objects courts additional 
layers of illusion that refuse to be settled as easily.  
In Peto’s Old Time Letter Rack (1894), for example, a carte de visite of Abraham 
Lincoln appears tucked beneath one of its represented straps. To the extent that we can 
sort the card’s status as painted image from its appearance as actual object, we come to 
recognize the painting’s trompe l’oeil trick. Our recognition of the materiality of his 
painterly technique halts its illusionistic transparency. But what we cannot learn from the 
materiality of the painting is the extent to which Peto intervenes into the image of the 
carte de visite that he represents. There is no identifying text reproduced, for example. If 
Peto means for this carte de visite to reproduce an already extant carte de visite, we can 
only recognize it and his interventions into its image through external comparison 
thereof. The three-quarter, right-side bust portrait of Lincoln is likely based on one that 
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Lloyd Ostendorf characterizes as “a widely-circulated carte-de-visite photo-copy [Figure 
3.40] of an engraved portrait based on Berger’s camera study [Figure 3.41], often 
mistaken for a print of the original photograph [Figure 3.42].”307 Or perhaps the source of 
Peto’s representation is its cabinet card version, as I earlier identified it, and which 
Ostendorf identifies, but does not illustrate, as the Brady cabinet card. It is on the verso of 
one of these Brady cabinet cards that he discovers a note by Frank B. Carpenter, another 
of Lincoln’s portraitists, which records the chain of this image’s production. He writes: 
From a negative made in 1864, by A. Berger, partner of M.B. Brady, at Brady’s 
gallery. This is the photograph engraved by J.C. Butre [sic] of New York, just 
after Mr. Lincoln’s re-nomination. It was the basis after Mr. Lincoln’s death of 
the portrait made by Marshall, and also the one made by Littlefield. In each 
engraving the parting of the hair was changed, to the left side, as Mr. Lincoln 
always wore it. His barber by mistake this day for some unaccountable reason, 
parted the hair on the President’s right side, instead of his left.308  
 
 In our efforts to pin down Peto’s manipulation of this “photograph” of Lincoln, 
we discover manipulation already therein. Not only is the carte de visite a photo-based 
reproduction of an engraving made by another otherwise hidden intervener (John Chester 
Buttre) from a photograph by another photographer (Berger)—operating under the name 
of another photographer (Brady)—but also Lincoln’s barber (allegedly) intervened before 
the photograph was taken to alter Lincoln’s appearance. It is in this way that we only 
begin to see the elusivity of pinning down the “original.” Later engravings by Marshall 
and by Littlefield, which restore the president’s hair part to the left side, alter the Berger 
photograph, but in order to restore the truth of Lincoln’s hair part. Which intervention is 
preferable? Beyond all of this, as was typical at the Brady studio, Berger would have 
used a multiple-lens camera to shoot Lincoln that day, producing simultaneously four 
                                                
307 Lloyd Ostendorf, Lincoln’s Photographs: A Complete Album (Dayton, OH: Rockywood Press, 1998) 
177; O-92. 
308 Carpenter qtd in Ibid. 
140 
 
stereoscopically-related, but ever so slightly differently-angled images at once. The 
‘original’ photograph was thus always already multiple. 
My effort here is not to track down the identity of the object “actually” 
represented in Peto’s painting, instead it is meant to illustrate something of the material 
history of this type of object at this time and to suggest its subsequent iconographical 
appeal for a trompe l’oeil painter. When Peto was born in 1854, the technologies 
necessary for the photo-mechanical reproduction of photographic images were as yet in 
development. Peto, among the rest of his generation of 19th-century American trompe 
l’oeil painters, would live through the cultural changes wrought by both the Civil War 
and photomechanical reproduction. He repeatedly represents mass-produced image-
objects of Abraham Lincoln in at least eight paintings from 1894 through 1904. The oval 
shaped portrait appears most often, including in two identically titled paintings, 
Reminiscences of 1865 (1897; after 1900) (Figures 3.43, 3.44). Wilmerding directs our 
attention to “the Lincoln photograph” in the first of these paintings, but this is apparently 
a slip because elsewhere he identifies it as an engraving: “the source of this likeness, an 
engraving, was a commonly reproduced and available print, and Peto owned a copy” 
(Figure 3.45).309 While such a slip was most certainly an innocent error, I want to 
underline the ease with which it can be made. Indeed, I want to suggest that this 
confusion of an engraving for a photograph or vice versa was part of Peto’s project. It 
was the indeterminacy of this object’s identity, especially once represented in paint, 
which heightened its iconographical appeal for the trompe l’oeil artist. 
In both versions of Reminiscences of 1865, Peto paints an engraving of Abraham 
Lincoln, an engraving that is already a reproduction of a photograph. He adds to the 
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number of hands in the chain of reproduction. Perhaps Peto paints Buttre’s engraving of 
Berger’s photograph of Lincoln. Beyond this, I want to point out that both the oval 
engraving of Lincoln and the carte de visite of Lincoln that appear in Peto’s paintings 
would have shared the same source photograph taken on February 9, 1864 by Anthony 
Berger. Indeed, the carte de visite of Lincoln and Buttre’s engraving of Lincoln would 
have served the same purpose: the mass-distribution of Berger’s photograph of the 
president.  
To mistake an engraving for a photograph, one must overlook the intervening 
hand of the engraver, just as to mistake Peto’s representation of an image-object for the 
actual image-object is to overlook the materiality of his technique. John Ruskin observed 
that in print reproductions of paintings, most changes made between versions were 
motivated by the engraver’s interest in clarifying the truth of the image. Depending on 
one’s definition of truth, clarifying it might also be the claimed motivation for the 
alteration made, for example, by Marshall or by Littlefield when they reverse Lincoln’s 
hair part. Or, for example, this may be Thomas Doney’s intention when he adds 
Lincoln’s beard to a mezzotint (Figure 3.47) of a photograph of Lincoln by his campaign 
photographer Alexander Hessler (Figure 3.48). Ostendorf writes, “When Lincoln took 
office as the first bearded President, people wanted pictures of him with whiskers. 
Several photographers and artists met this demand simply by painting beards on earlier 
photographs.”310 The transparency of Doney’s intervention does not seem to trouble the 
image’s relationship to the real; instead his correction, the addition of a beard, can be 
understood to actually enhance the photograph’s likeness, especially insofar as it more 
accurately reflects the President’s newly bearded visage. Doney’s print then benefits from 
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the truth it inherits from the photograph, but can improve upon or correct for the failings 
of this truth through the artist’s intervention.311 This may seem surprising to 21st-century 
viewers who, by all accounts of the anxiety of the digital era, worry about being duped by 
the invisible interventions into photographs made possible by Photoshop; and yet, most 
Photoshop interventions have a similar aim: to clarify the image.312  
Beyond adding a beard in the reproduction of photographs of Lincoln, artists also 
added elements to the mise-en-scène. These included redesigning a chair in which 
Lincoln sits, adding a curtained window to the background, redrawing the album he holds 
so that it appears to be a Bible, or even adding family members. Ostendorf lists the 
various media in which these revisions occurred—retouched photography, painting, 
lithography, and woodcut—and observes that many of these would have been “published 
as photographs.”313  
Michael Leja notes that various collections currently housing Doney’s mezzotints 
done from daguerreotypes classify the images as photographs; this is for Leja “another 
sign of the transparency of Doney’s work.”314 So transparent was the work of Doney’s 
hand that the subject himself is unable to identify the medium through which it was 
accomplished. In response to Doney’s having sent him a copy of the bearded mezzotint, 
Lincoln thanks him for “the picture (I know not the artistic designation).”315 Frederick 
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Hill Meserve, an early collector of photographs of Lincoln, thought the mezzotint to have 
been a second pose from Alexander Hessler’s photography session of 1857.316  
Ostendorf describes the selling of engravings and lithographs as if authentic 
photographs as an “accepted practice.” He continues, “All photographers did it. Their 
purpose was not to deceive but to provide ‘photographs’ which would meet the public 
demand for interesting or unusual scenes and portraits.”317 Unfortunately, Ostendorf 
offers no citation for the motives of these makers; instead he editorializes, perhaps too 
freely, about an observed historical practice. To answer public demand for images of the 
President, Marshall’s and Littlefield’s engravings or Doney’s mezzotint reversed a hair 
part or added a beard, so that they conformed to an already extant imaginary public image 
of a bearded and left-side-part-wearing Lincoln. These artists altered the photographic 
images they reproduced, but most of us would agree with Ostendorf in saying that by 
doing so they did not mean to deceive their public about Lincoln’s appearance. Or 
perhaps they did mean to deceive them, but only to accommodate their expectations 
about the subject; in doing so they enhance or clarify the original to compensate for its 
translation between media.  
If engravings could be sold in the guise of photographs, this required the 
materiality of their production technique to remain invisible or at least unrecognizable. 
The success of reproductive technologies is directly correlated to their seeming 
invisibility. The halftone process engraving, like the photogravure of Haensel’s lightning 
photograph or the mezzotint of Doney’s Lincoln portrait, has invisibility as its goal. 
William Ivins insists that the halftone, in contrast to the linear syntax of an engraving and 
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its visual reminder of the intermediary presence of a maker, remains undetectable to 
human vision. His logic mirrors that used in The Photographic News to maintain that 
Haensel’s lightning photograph, despite its translation into photogravure, remains a “pure 
photograph.” As such, both the photogravure and the halftone can be understood as an 
immediate and factual form of reproduction.  
These translations are not so much invisible as they are unseen or unrecognized. 
In contrast to these reproductions, trompe l’oeil representations of other images halt their 
seeming transparency by insisting that we recognize the materiality of the means of their 
representation. Gerry Beegan rejects Ivins’ assessment of the invisibility of the halftone. 
He describes the “regular row of dots” that constitutes the halftone as being “in 
themselves a visible and meaningful aesthetic element.”318 These regularized dots might 
be understood as “the hand” of the halftone, the code according to which its reproductive 
intervention is accomplished. Beyond recognition of its constitutive dots, Beegan 
observes that the intervention of the halftone was also made apparent by way of the 
caption, which at least in the 1890s identified halftone reproductions as being “from a 
photograph.”319  
The caption served to reinforce the truthfulness or factual form of the halftone 
reproduction, at the same time that it called attention to its intervention. In turn, the 
halftone could also be retouched to correct for the limitations of the photograph—to 
clarify its truth. Beegan writes, “The introduction of photomechanical technologies 
destabilized reproduction and representation so that the discrete categories of photograph, 
wood engraving, and drawing took on a new fluidity. Imaging practices dissolved the 
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boundaries of the image, melding wood engraving with process and photography with 
drawing.”320 The retouched halftone was one among numerous blurrings of media 
specificity listed by Beegan; he also notes photographs of wood engravings printed by 
process, the engraved backgrounds of otherwise photographic portraits, the ink tracings 
of photographs then bleached to look like drawings. He writes, “In some cases these 
mixtures were concealed, but many syncretic illustrations openly fused different systems 
of photographic and hand-drawn representation and reproduction.”321 “Indeed,” as Parr 
and Badger note, “‘photographs’ appeared in books, newspapers and journals throughout 
the nineteenth century—and into the twentieth—in the guise of engravings, until the 
development of the halftone block and the rotogravure press made the cheap and 
seamless reproduction of actual photographs in ink a daily reality.”322 
Peto likely would have been familiar with photographs “in the guise of 
engravings” through his uncle (by marriage), the Philadelphia photographer William Bell 
(1830-1910).323 It was likely Bell who facilitated Peto’s own limited practice of 
photography in the 1870s. Bell was active in Philadelphia at this time, primarily 
producing stereo views of local streets and buildings. But he also worked on a series of 
photographs of wounded Civil War veterans commissioned in 1867 by the Army Medical 
Museum. The photograph by Bell in the collection of the Philadelphia Museum of Art 
comes from this series and shows a seated man with lower legs exposed to reveal the 
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aftermath of a gunshot wound to his knee (Figure 3.49).324 Bell’s photographs were 
models for engravers illustrating medical books.325 Such books would have been 
produced before development and widespread use of the halftone; thus, their 
photographic illustrations would have required translation into engraving. The series of 
medical books that included several engravings based on photographs by Bell was 
formally published in 1871 as Photographs of Surgical Cases and Specimens Taken at 
the Army Medical Museum. Peto’s relationship with the photographer might even have 
allowed for his direct comparison of Bell’s original photographs with their engraved 
reproductions.   
Reviving something of that which Talbot imagined to be photography’s hands-
free image production, Carol Armstrong stresses this difference between “the original 
photograph” and “the photographic-looking reproduction after it.”326 She admits that this 
“may seem like an odd regress, in its following the criteria of first- and second-hand 
reproductions laid out by pre-mass media thinkers about photography such as Talbot.” 
But, she continues, “what was significantly different about the image regime of the 
photograph…was its indexical relation to the referent.”327 We should also recall that 
Armstrong already qualifies the 19th-century understanding of the indexical relation to the 
referent according to its authorship by nature. The photograph reco(r)ded nature as a 
tonal look; in turn, the tonal look functioned as the indexical trace of its nature-authored 
mode of production.  
                                                
324 At the risk of insensitivity, I wonder if Peto would have recognized a kind of visual pun in such an 
image. The currency bills that frequently populate his and other trompe l’oeil paintings of the 19th century 
are typically described as “shinplasters.” The term derives from privately printed and essentially valueless 
notes of currency mainly used to bandage a bruised shin.  
325 “William H. Bell.” Accessed Nov 29, 2012. http://www.luminous-
lint.com/app/photographer/William_H__Bell/A/.  
326 Armstrong 424. 
327 Ibid. 
147 
 
Photography’s tonal look is for Armstrong as significant a change in the regime of 
the image as its indexical relationship to a referent. She writes, “The tonal look of the 
photograph was as different from other graphic codes as its indexical mode of production, 
the splitting of the image into a nonlinear, gradated tonal register of blacks, grays, and 
whites (or sepia-browns, buffs, and off-whites) guaranteeing the difference of its light-
authorized mode of production and of its light-traced relation to the referent.”328 
Accordingly, to the extent that reproductions could replicate “the tonal look of the 
photograph they also retained the effect of its indexicality.”329 It was the tonal look of 
Doney’s mezzotints that helped them inherit the veracity of their daguerreotype sources. 
By “giving stable and material form to the elusive figure floating in the reflective 
daguerreotype plate,” Leja observes that Doney’s mezzotints were  
anticipating the look photographic prints would come to have in a decade or two, 
once collodion wet plate and gelatin dry plate processes made possible paper 
prints with distinct forms and a broad value range. By translating the 
daguerreotype’s rich detail and subtle handling of modeling, and expanding its 
tonal spectrum, Doney was devising a compelling way to merge the strengths of a 
paper print with those of a daguerreotype. The photographic look of his prints is 
all the more remarkable when we recognize that he was inventing that look as he 
copied. He pioneered a printmaking language in which the source daguerreotype 
hovered within his mezzotints the way the image of the sitter hovered in the 
daguerreotype plate.330 
 
Here again we see the complicated inextricability of engraving and photography that 
Beegan observes as characteristic of photography’s first 50 years. He describes the way 
that the style of wood engraved illustrations changed to more closely resemble the look of 
photographs, “in order to compete with the detail of the photograph, wood engraving had 
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become increasingly fine and increasingly tonal in its aesthetic.”331 They had to become 
photo-realistic. 
To the extent that these other media—the halftone, wood engraving, mezzotint, 
etc.—could replicate the tonal and hands-free look of photography, they could inherit its 
truth effect.  Armstrong describes the way the halftone maintains a tonal structure, so that 
it “looked like a photograph rather than like an engraving or an etching.”332 Its success 
thus belongs to its mimetic effect, rather than to its being “technically any closer to the 
original photograph than photographic reproductions printed by other photomechanical 
means.”333 It is not as though the halftone process was indexically any truer or closer to 
the original than the heliotype, autotype, Woodburytype, photogravure, or wood-
engraved photograph. That is, following Estelle Jussim, the halftone process could be 
understood to be yet another “recoding” of what is already a photographic coding of 
reality.334 In this Armstrong finds resonance with contemporary concerns about digital 
photography’s complex recodings of both nature and photography, which gives rise in 
her estimation “to the vexed question of how to consider images that look like 
photographs, but either have no photographic—which is to say, indexical—point of 
inception in the referent, or alter the original photographic ‘transmission,’ therefore 
constituting photographic simulacra that nonetheless partake of the mythology of the 
photograph and of its authenticity effect.”335  
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If the 19th-century understanding of photography’s index already accommodated 
an author—the pencil of nature—then the tonal look of the resulting image was 
understood to be the iconic expression of that author—one which seemed without 
intervention of the human hand, and instead drawn by light. The photograph’s author—
light or nature—concealed its representational activity in this tonal look, just as the 
trompe l’oeil painter concealed his representational labor in his meticulously smooth, fine 
brushwork. If it was the disappearance of the trompe l’oeil painter behind his work which 
caused the genre to be so critically despised in the 18th-century academy, this was 
because the artist prefigures the role of the camera—his painterly achievement, its having 
“such relief that [the represented objects] seem real,” is an “imitation [that was] merely 
mechanical,” in the words of Reynolds. Its effect was the result of concealing the 
presence of the artist’s hand, which remained invisibly present—concealed as 
meticulously smooth, fine brushwork. Its effect was thus the result of concealing the 
indexical signs of its production. Today, Armstrong claims, it is indexicality that 
“disappears behind the understanding of the photograph as the product of a machine, the 
camera.”336 Instead, “the photographic criterion of indexicality—the photograph’s status 
as a direct trace of the referent—is both forgotten and assumed.”337 
If the tonal look works to reinforce the indexical relationship of the photograph to 
its referent, its lack of line also seems to promise its record of the transmission of light, 
rather than the hand of the artist. With this in mind, let us return to Peto’s representation 
of the engraving of Lincoln in Reminiscences of 1865. In both versions from 1897 and 
circa 1900, he paints the engraving so that it looks like a photograph, according to its 
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tonal look. This is in direct contrast to earlier trompe l’oeil representations of engravings, 
such as Sebastian Stoskopff’s An Engraving of Galatea (1644-57) (Figure 2.8), an 
example to which I will return in Chapter 4, which represents the look of its engraved 
line-quality in paint. Indeed, it is the tonal look of Peto’s oval portrait of Lincoln, painted 
in gradations of sepia and cream, which allows Wilmerding’s slippage when he refers to 
the represented object as a photograph. By translating the linear look of the engraving 
into the tonal look of the photograph, Peto intervenes in a way that is closer to the look of 
the ‘original’ image—Berger’s photograph of Lincoln. He re-enacts manually and in 
paint Buttre’s reproduction of the photograph but without the linear look of his 
engraving; instead he surpasses both this and the halftone’s efforts toward invisibility, 
accomplishing in paint a photographic-looking reproduction.  
Michael Leja describes engravings done from daguerreotypes as “double images, 
having the identity of both photograph and print, each fortified by the other.”338 Their 
hybridity of media, he observes, allows for a mutually beneficial relationship: the 
daguerreotypes gain reproducibility from their translation into print, at the same time that 
the prints gain veracity from their photographic source. In this way, however, these 
images “refuse to settle” into either the category of print or of photograph, “instead 
vacillating between mechanical and autographic image, which can produce a sense of 
uncanniness or an unsettling cognitive uncertainty.”339 And the uncanniness of these 
doubled images, I contend, makes them appealing subjects for trompe l’oeil artists. To 
represent them again in paint only heightens further the indeterminacy of their status as 
engraving or photograph.  
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Leja borrows this idea of images that “refuse to settle” from Sherrie Levine, who 
describes her own appropriative photographs as “put[ting] a picture on top of a picture so 
that there are times when both pictures disappear and other times when they’re both 
manifest; that vibration is basically what the work’s about for me…”340 Levine redeploys 
the re-photography practice we already observed in Walker Evans’ Family Snapshots in 
Frank Tengle’s Home, Hale County, Alabama and re-directs it back toward Evans’ own 
oeuvre. In her photographic series Untitled (after Walker Evans) (1981) (Figure 3.50), 
she re-photographs the photographs of Walker Evans, in ways that allow hers to be 
mistaken for his. However, the photographs by Evans that become her subjects are 
already not his photographs; they are reproductions of his photographs. That is, she 
photographs mass reproductions of his works readily available in published catalogs, 
such as Walker Evans: First and Last (New York: Harper & Row, 1978). Because 
Levine’s photographs are taken from photographic reproductions of a print or plate in a 
book, the resulting photograph indexes a loss, especially of the rich tonality or clarity of 
Evans’ ‘original’ photographs. Molly Nesbit describes this loss as a “shift” and describes 
the ways in which the poor production quality of these prints marks their distance from 
the source.341 But recognizing this difference is more likely to happen only when direct 
comparison of both works is made possible. Instead, Levine exploits the unlikelihood of 
our recognizing the difference between Evans’ original and her reproduction; but even if 
we fail to notice the difference between Evans’ original and its mass-reproduction—the 
object she actually photographs—she imagines that something of its layered presence 
remains visible. “Knowing that a picture has other pictures under or over it,” Leja 
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observes, “complicates our response to it, even in cases where we cannot see the 
layers…. The characteristics of the underlying or overlaid pictures may accrue to what is 
visible or be offset.”342 I find this pictorial layering at work in trompe l’oeil 
representations of mass produced images, and I think Peto understood something of this 
effect.  
In Peto’s painting Daniel Webster Patch Picture (c. 1900) (Figure 3.51), he re-
paints a portrait of Daniel Webster. The oval portrait of Webster, unlike that of Lincoln, 
is represented as if part of a page, rather than as if an oval-shaped object. Like the oval 
object in Reminiscences of 1865, this object appears to cast a shadow, indeed its creases 
and tears suggest that this page has been similarly well handled. Perhaps it has been torn 
from the pages of Webster’s famous dictionary, where it might have served as a 
frontispiece featuring a portrait of the author. Every other aspect of the painting affirms 
the tactile presence of this page: the folds of a yellow envelope ripped open, the remnants 
of a card still clinging to the nails by which it was once attached, as well as the weathered 
and defaced wood of the painted green planks to which these items appear tacked. 
Trompe l’oeil’s trickery is comprised of these illusions of seeming presence, which we 
discover in the course of our looking. While the page with the portrait of Webster is not 
actually present, not physically affixed to what we thought were painted boards, but is 
instead painted to seem present, its represented image remains present. Learning that this 
image, which seemed materially present, is (only) a painted representation does not 
interrupt its representation of Webster. Webster still appears to us by way of a chain of 
reproduction; our discovery via trompe l’oeil that his representation, his appearance, is 
“merely” painted image does not resolve it for us. Peto makes use of the changing nature 
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of this type of image-object at this time: its simultaneous and increasingly indeterminate 
status as photograph, engraving, or photo-mechanical reproduction.343 The tonal 
representation, rather than the replication of engraved lines or halftone dots, allows its 
image to look photographic, but its placement on the page should conjure the chain of 
reproduction to which this image was submitted—the actual history of which cannot be 
known from this tonally-painted (mimetic) version. Webster’s painted image vibrates 
with the pictorial layers that have brought it into existence. Those layers show themselves 
to us if we know (how) to look for them.  
Levine’s project of picturing pictures has the simultaneous effect of making the 
act of picturing visible and invisible. It is invisible to the extent that we see through the 
acts of picturing that bring an image into being. If we as viewers overlook the degraded 
status of Evans’s image—the result of Levine’s re-photography of its mass 
reproduction—we demonstrate the effectiveness of mass reproductions’ tendency toward 
invisibility. The act of picturing is visible to the extent that we let it accrue to the 
resulting image and to the extent that we look for it. Perhaps it becomes visible as a 
loss—a loss in the tonality and clarity of Evans’ image. In Peto’s painting, it is his use of 
trompe l’oeil that obscures the transparency of his artistic intervention, making its 
vibration materially visible as paint.  
Wilmerding helpfully identifies the image of Webster in Peto’s painting as based 
upon an engraving by John Sartain made from the well-known daguerreotype by John A. 
Whipple (1847-48). But instead of considering its inclusion in Peto’s painting relative to 
mass reproduction, Wilmerding reads the Webster portrait as Peto’s “nostalgia for well-
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known statesmen who lived on powerfully after death in the collective imagination.”344 
That is, Wilmerding interprets the reproductions represented in Peto’s paintings 
according to the subject matter of the represented image-object, rather than according to 
the image-objects that are the subject matter, nor according to the mode in which those 
subjects are painted. The materiality of the image of Webster vibrates between visibility 
and invisibility within Wilmerding’s account of the painting; he sees the pictorial layers 
of its material sources only to see through them to the ways in which this image continues 
to make Webster present to us despite his physical death. 
As trompe l’oeil the representation of Webster’s image upon a page, which seems 
physically present, compels the hands of viewers who want to touch it to sort its illusion 
of presence from its status as representation. This compulsion would have been further 
supported by the material history of image reproductions in books. Tipped engravings or 
photographs glued into the pages of books could be physically discovered by readers, 
who while holding the book in their hands might casually drag a finger across the edge of 
the picture, even lifting it from the page. By the date of this painting circa 1900 the 
gluing of images into books would have been replaced by photo-mechanical means of 
reproduction, such as the halftone. The representation of an oval image—which in other 
paintings by Peto exists as an independent object—on a page might unconsciously 
remind viewers of their prior tactile explorations, further compelling the urge to touch the 
trompe l’oeil painting.  
Another trompe l’oeil painter Jefferson David Chalfant makes the comparison of 
actual versus painted objects the subject of his painting. In Which is Which? (1890-93), 
Chalfant adheres an actual four-cent Lincoln stamp alongside his painting thereof. He 
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then makes this deception explicit by painting in the mode of trompe l’oeil a newspaper 
clipping, as if materially pasted to its surface. The legible text of this clipping declares 
the stakes of the painting as a challenge to the viewer. It reads: “[-]uine. Mr. Chalfant 
pasted a real stamp beside his paint-ing and asks, ‘Which is which?’” The painting lays 
bare one level of illusion by way of another. The legibility of the newspaper 
accommodates its illusionism, encouraging us to see through the simulation of its 
materiality to instead read its message—a message which seems fully disclosive of the 
terms of its illusion. That one of the stamps is painted has already been disclosed; indeed 
it was revealed by the text of the newspaper clipping.  
The trickery of this painting capitalizes upon a viewership that is trained to view 
illustrations and text together. As Brian Maidment writes, “The most profound revolution 
brought about by the massive use of wood engraved illustration was the way in which 
wood engraving presupposed an intense relationship between an image and a written 
text.”345 Written text could change—clarify, modify, or contradict—the meaning of the 
image. Readers of illustrated magazines were trained to glance and scan rapidly until 
something caught their particular attention. Chalfant delimits the amount of text available 
to scan, but uses the legibility of this text to redirect the viewer’s attention to the stamps. 
Doing so has viewers look past the status of the newspaper clipping itself, so that its 
painted materiality remains concealed perhaps even longer than that of the painted stamp. 
The directive content of Chalfant’s pictorially-rendered text turns viewers’ 
attention to the imagery of the stamps. There, they look for signs of its material 
realization—brushstrokes, paper grain, water marks, among other things. As Ebert-
Schifferer describes this, viewers assess the difference between the stamps by reaching 
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out to touch, even to rub or pick at the stamps. She describes the panel’s surface as 
having “suffered considerable abrasion from attempts to rub it and thereby test its 
authenticity.”346 Beyond the indexical marks of these touch tests visible in the condition 
of the painting itself, Chalfant already incorporates the look of its having been touched at 
the level of representation. The irregularity of the painted stamps’ perforated edges and 
the unevenness of the background-fills surrounding Lincoln’s head both suggest the 
tearing or rubbing of curious fingers. 
But insofar as we understand this painting as yet another incarnation of the 
optical-tactile game of trompe l’oeil painting, we, as historians, limit our iconological 
consideration of this painting. We must not look past the material history of the objects 
represented—the stamps themselves—to see only their representation as image. The 
modern adhesive stamp and envelope came into existence nearly contemporaneously with 
photography.347 England’s Sir Rowland Hill published a pamphlet on post office reform 
in 1837, advocating the creation of a notation “using a bit of paper just large enough to 
bear the stamp, and covered at the back with a glutinous wash….”348 His idea that 
postage be charged according to weight helped establish the use of envelopes; and his 
brother Edwin Hill invented a prototype for an envelope-making machine, which was 
exhibited at Queen Victoria’s Crystal Palace Exposition of 1851—where the stereoscope 
was also debuted. It was in that same year that adhesive postage stamps came into use in 
the United States. The stamp featured in Chalfant’s painting, a 4-cent stamp depicting 
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Abraham Lincoln, is the third stamp issued of the president. The first was valued at 15-
cents and was issued a year from the date of the President’s assassination; the second, 
issued in 1869, was valued at 90-cents. The 4-cent stamp featured in Chalfant’s painting 
was issued between 1890 and 1893; this correspondence to the painting’s date suggests to 
me that the (tricky) image of the stamp may have been used to date the painting. While 
the dating of the stamp helps us to know that the work couldn’t have been painted before 
1890-93, it does not help us know how long afterward he might have painted it.  
The existence of correspondence from a second owner of Which is Which? helps 
us date the work as having been made prior to Februrary 20, 1901, but this letter concerns 
another painting of the same name, one featuring 2-cent stamps of George Washington 
(Figure 3.53).349 As in his painting with the Lincoln stamps, Chalfant includes the 
representation of a newspaper clipping that reads “uine. Mr. Chalfant proposes to paste a 
real stamp on the canvas beside his painting, and the puzzling question will be “Which is 
which?” The letter from its owner charmingly participates in Chalfant’s game, as its 
writer inquires the answer to the painting’s title: “I have forgotten which is the real stamp 
and which is the painted one and would feel obliged if you will kindly inform me which 
is the painted one.”350 Especially remarkable about this request is its disclosure that the 
problem staged by the painting’s title had once been solved, but has since, once again, 
become unresolved. The short-lived effect of tension or oscillation between image and 
object is thus restored and revisited with each encounter of the work, even by the same 
viewer. In the act of forgetting, the oscillation of the stamp between image and object is 
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renewed. Even as the title pretends to solicit resolution—a solution to its probem—Which 
is Which? remains an unanswered question. 
Identification of the stamp included in the Washington version of the painting 
requires both external context and close looking. Of the 184 United States postage stamps 
with a denomination of two cents, eighy-four feature portrait busts of George Washington 
in varieties of nine basic designs. Visual comparison of the bust itself disqualifies all but 
three of the designs; they are according to V.F. Thomas’s design catalog: A57, A61, and 
A88. There are three colors of design A57 (Figure 3.54) (red-brown, pale red-brown, and 
green) and two colors of design A61 (Figure 3.55) (carmine or lake). There are four types 
of design A88 (Figure 3.56); each type involves slight differentiations in the two 
decorative triangles in the upper corners of the stamp (Figure 3.56a-d), and each of these 
has between one and four variations of color or watermarking.351  
Looking closely at the painting, however, is made difficult because it likely 
remains in a private collection (last known to be that of Ernest Jarvis of Ft. Lauderdale) 
and reproductions of the work are in black and white. Although design A57 (Scott 210, 
211B, 211Bc, 213, 213b) dates between 1883 and 1887, the inclusion of only a single 
number two in the bottom-center of the stamp design, as well as the lettering of the words 
“TWO CENTS” differs from the stamp represented in the painting. The two decorative 
triangles in the upper corners of the A88 design do not appear in the stamps on the 
painting; this version dates to 1895. Based on the appearance of its design, the painting 
likely features the A61 design (Scott number 219 or 220, dependent on color), which 
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dates to 1890-92.352 Joan Gorman dates the Washington version of Which is Which? to 
circa 1889, but analysis of the stamp’s material history helps us learn that it could not 
have been painted prior to the stamp’s issue in 1890.  
The same designer Thomas F. Morris, vignette artist Alfred Jones, and frame and 
lettering artist Douglas S. Ronaldson revise the 1883-87 versions of the Washington 
stamp for the 1890-92 version. The image reprises the same left-side view of a sculpted 
plaster bust of Washington by Jean-Antoine Houdon circa 1786. Houdon made this bust 
from a life mask of the subject, but in preparation for a life-sized statue in marble. Before 
the final version, Houdon revised the bust; nonetheless, the sculpture’s relation to the life 
mask facilitates reception of Houdon’s representation of the president as the most 
accurate. Since the 1850s, the marble sculpture has been cast in bronze and plaster 
multiple times over. Chalfant’s painted copy of a second version of a mass-produced 
engraving of a multiply reproduced portrait bust taken from a life mask becomes yet 
another iteration of these reproductions in the effort to represent Washington. His image 
enters a chain of makers. Despite the second owner’s claims, we might more easily settle 
the question, “Which is which?,” insofar as we understand it to be asking which is the 
actual stamp and which is the painted representation thereof, than we might satisfactorily 
answer the question of its representation: which is the real Washington? Or, does one of 
the representations in this chain of reproductions have better claim to representing 
Washington? Instead it seems each allows Washington to appear—to show himself—to 
us according to the particular material terms of its representation. 
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This representational dilemma is also the subject of the version of the painting 
with the Lincoln stamps. While the stamps in Chalfant’s version appear to be or to 
represent the stamp issued in 1890-93, like the Washington version they are re-issued in 
1894 and again in 1896 with the addition of two decorative triangles in the upper corners. 
The Lincoln stamp shares the same team of designers as the Washington stamp, including 
Alfred Jones, then head of the American Bank Note Company. The American Bank Note 
Company was responsible for the printing of stamps until 1894 when it was taken over by 
the Bureau of Engraving and Printing, which then re-issued both stamps under 
discussion.353 For the Lincoln stamp, as with other stamps commemorating heroes of the 
Civil War, Jones used a photograph of the president taken by the Brady studio as the 
source for his engraving. This engraved photograph, like the engraved portrait bust and 
the engraved photograph painted by Peto, is thus a reproduction of a reproduction, many 
times over, even before Chalfant reproduces it in paint. The photographer, like the 
sculptor, is among the unseen makers of the stamp’s image. Chalfant inserts himself as 
yet another maker in the list, but one whose intervention adheres to his painting.  
Although Gorman describes Chalfant’s later genre paintings as a move away from 
his earlier trompe l’oeil work, she observes some examples of continuity, especially 
relative to the small size of the paintings. But their size, she suggests, might also have to 
do with his having painted them from photographs. And while Gorman insists, “the 
resulting genre pieces did not copy the photographs in every detail,” she admits that 
Chalfant used photographs as models for his genre pieces beginning in the mid-1890s; 
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indeed, she supplies the photographs from which his scenes were painted.354 While his 
genre paintings may not exactly copy their subjects in the way that his painted stamps do, 
the representational activity of painting from photographs restages the engraving of 
photographs required for the production of the Lincoln stamps—stamps, which he then 
reproduced in paint (according to the linear look of the engraving rather than the tonal 
look of the photograph).  
Gorman compares one of Chalfant’s genre paintings, A Difficult Problem (c.1903-
05) (Figure 3.57), to his Which is Which? paintings, insofar as they all directly solicit the 
viewer’s participation. In A Difficult Problem, two elderly men are seated at a table and 
engaged in a game of chess. On its verso (Figure 3.58), Chalfant lists the placement of 
the game pieces on the chessboard depicted in the painting and the anticipated outcome: 
“white to play and mate in three moves.” The viewer can thus, as Gorman notes, 
“actually participate in ‘the difficult problem’ portrayed. This curious addition,” she 
continues, “recalls the informative and inviting notation on Which is Which?. The artist’s 
involvement with the storytelling quality of painting is clear.”355 But to gain access to this 
information, the viewer would have to turn around the painting to see its verso. In the 
1890s it was already customary to discover information about at least some images on 
their versos, most notably, photographs. To turn Chalfant’s painting over as if it were a 
photograph re-imagines the spectatorial desire to reach into Peto’s trompe l’oeil letter 
rack to grasp the physical cabinet card—even turning it over to learn something about the 
object. That Chalfant paints this genre scene from a photograph (Figure 3.59) in a way 
that compels viewers to treat it like a photographic object anticipates something of the 
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trompe l’oeil effect of 20th-century photorealist chantournés with which I began this 
chapter.  
Chalfant’s viewer must physically interact with the work in order to imaginatively 
participate in the genre scene it depicts. S/he must treat it as an object in the world—one 
which, like a cabinet card, can be handled, even turned over. The materiality of a 
painting—its objecthood—is typically that which we, as viewers, disavow in the course 
of our looking; as Amelia Jones observes, “Art’s materiality is, depending on context, 
both accepted in art history and perennially disavowed.”356 Having learned the ways in 
which his trompe l’oeil paintings could compel the hands of viewers to discover the 
materiality of a representation instead of the materiality of the object represented, 
Chalfant applies this lesson to his genre scene in A Difficult Problem. That which he 
represents is not only the genre scene of two men playing chess, but also the photograph 
depicting that scene; it is to the extent that we might treat the small painting as if it were 
another type of image delivery system—one, which, like a photograph, we already would 
have been accustomed to holding and turning over in our hands. 
Contemporary artist, Vik Muniz, revisits the trompe l’oeil verso in his series 
Verso (2008-2009) (Figure 3.60) for the ways in which it asks us to observe the 
materiality of paintings as physical objects in the world. When exhibited, each of his 
Versos sits atop two planks of plywood, presumably to protect the edge of its frame, but 
also to replicate conventions of exhibition preparation and storage; consider, for example, 
the way Gerhard Richter’s Nude is propped up on two planks and leaning against the wall 
in Louise Lawler’s photograph of a gallery amidst installation, Nude (1984) (Figure 
3.61). Similarly, each Verso leans against the gallery wall, as if not yet hung, much like 
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Gijsbrechts’ The Back of a Picture (Figure 3.15). An exhibition of these works has the 
appearance of not yet being completely installed. In this way, its effect is similar to that 
of Peter Fischli and David Weiss’s installation Empty Room (1995-96) (Figure 3.62), a 
work also included in the Lifelike exhibition described at the beginning of this chapter. 
That installation displays carefully carved and painted polyurethane replicas of everyday 
objects and tools, such as paint trays, drop cloths, stretched canvases, wooden boards, 
plastic buckets, etc, isolated to a single small room within the museum’s galleries. 
Museum-goers who encounter Empty Room amidst other perfectly installed galleries 
likely assume that installation work is in progress, and as such they risk passing it by with 
barely a glance. In accompanying wall text, curators at the Walker Art Center align this 
illusion in Fischli and Weiss’s Empty Room with “the long artistic tradition of trompe 
l’oeil—a French expression that literally means to ‘deceive the eye’—in which objects 
are depicted in highly realistic detail.”357  
Given the banality of the scene produced, it is perhaps surprising that when 
Fischli and Weiss describe its effect they skip past the possibility of its being overlooked 
by visitors. Instead of duped spectators, their imagined audience already knows better 
about the status of their objects as representation. In an interview, Weiss narrates the 
viewer’s experience as one in which “you ‘see something’ that you also know is not 
there. Of course, it is there, but the chair is not a chair, the table is not a table.”358 I want 
to amend this to say, relative to Fischli and Weiss as well as Muniz, the viewer sees 
something that is and is not there; whether or not s/he “knows” this becomes something 
of what is at stake in trompe l’oeil. Trompe l’oeil requires that viewers are empowered, 
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or at least compelled to discover that the physical object is not actually there but is 
instead there as representation. The reproduced objects by Fischli and Weiss “are no 
more interesting than the things they mimic, but what is really fascinating is that they are 
no less interesting either… Their copies return attention to the things they resemble, so 
the things they resemble in turn return attention to the things themselves, that is, the work 
of Fischli and Weiss.”359 This generous reading again presumes that the represented 
objects are in themselves sufficiently engaging as to attract any attention at all, let alone a 
reciprocal set of exchanges. As another curator reminds us, Fischli and Weiss “knowingly 
ru[n] the risk that viewers might mistake [their sculpted and painted objects which at first 
appear randomly scattered and forgotten] for the cast-off objects they painstakingly 
replicate.”360 Their work is not an opportunity to experience a moment of discovery 
amidst looking, as I think is central to—or at least seemingly available in—the 
experience of trompe l’oeil. Gallery-goers are not compelled to handle the banal objects 
represented, which would allow the trompe l’oeil discovery. Instead they enter already 
knowing better or not; the former might linger to marvel about their achievement of 
verisimilitude or to join in on their joke, and the latter might walk past the doorway of the 
piece.361  
The display context for Muniz’s Versos reinforces the ordinariness of their 
objecthood. In an art museum or gallery, the Versos conform to everyday objects in need 
of hanging, transport, or storage. Beyond this, the information displayed by each verso is 
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of limited interest to a general public and is incredibly ordinary to the inner workings of 
the institution. Unless one is a professional who deals with artworks as material objects 
on an almost daily basis, one might not otherwise think about iconic images, such as 
Starry Night or American Gothic, as having back sides—one does not think of them 
materially. Conventions of installation or rhetoric negate the existence of a reverse side to 
paintings; hanging them so that they are unable to be seen, reinforces the colloquial 
account that there’s nothing there. 
And yet, one remains compelled by that which remains undisclosed on the other 
side of the Verso, even if the image is well-known enough to be easily conjured 
imaginarily. Instead of wholly banal objects situated so as to seem uninstalled, Muniz’s 
objects are (representations of) objects of interest. The labels populating their surfaces 
legibly display well-known names, places, and titles. The words “PICASSO,” hand-
written in black permanent marker across the surface of Verso (Woman Ironing) (2008) 
(Figure 3.63) or “GUGGENHEIM” in similarly sized font on a label just below it, attract 
our attention, whether or not we already know this object’s status as a replica.  
As in Fischli and Weiss’s installation, the objects represented cannot be sorted 
from that which they represent through close looking alone. Muniz’s Versos reproduce 
the backs of some of the world’s most famous paintings in such exacting detail as to be 
“capable of really fooling someone.”362 According to Muniz, he hired: 
a great number of experts, each doing a specific but fundamental job. To 
coordinate the innumerable tasks that ranged from photo enlargement, to 
carpentry, to hardware reconstruction, to ‘antiquing’ and label making, I called 
Barry Frier, one of the most detail-oriented brains I’ve ever met. He worked with 
a team of carpenters and craftsmen on the basic structure of the pieces before he 
enlisted Tony Pinotti and Rebecca Graves who did things absolutely beyond my 
expectations. When I first saw my version of Starry Night completed, the level of 
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faithfulness to the original was so photo-realistic that I thought it was too sick. I 
had to deal with an object capable of really fooling someone.363 
 
Muniz’s team of craftsmen reproduces to exacting detail the physical materiality of the 
painting versos upon which they are modeled. These craftsmen stretch canvas on wooden 
stretcher bars and rebuild the wooden frames to the complex specifications of the 
original. They physically adhere copies of labels; they remake rubber stamps which they 
then ink and apply. Luc Sante describes this “forging of stickers, stamps, seals, 
markings” as “simulated almost millimeter by millimeter.”364 If, instead, he had 
represented the backsides of the paintings in the medium of photography, as Muniz had 
originally conceived the project, he would have allowed us to discover in the course of 
our looking only image where labels, stamps, and seals had seemed actually present.  
Rather than accommodating a trompe l’oeil discovery at the level of the image, 
however, Muniz gives us a counterfeit version, a forgery, “capable of really fooling 
someone.” Sante describes “the decision to counterfeit these objects” as producing “a sort 
of inverse trompe l’oeil (and here we recall that backs of frames were an occasional 
subject for the trompe l’oeil painters of the nineteenth century)—you may expect a flat 
surface but instead are confronted with depth, not to mention variegated texture.”365 But 
this description is not quite right; our expectation is not of a flat surface, such as that of a 
photograph. Instead, the replica conforms to our expectation about how these things 
ought to look; its variegated texture helps it look like the actual backside of an actual 
painting. It is perhaps “a sort of inverse trompe l’oeil” inasmuch as it a forgery; it 
accommodates the illusionism of trompe l’oeil but without allowing us to discover that it 
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is not actually the object it (merely) represents, unless we turn it over and find no 
painting there.  
While the Verso project began as a photographic one, Muniz decided that 
photography’s ready accomplishment of trompe l’oeil—he describes the medium as “the 
ultimate trompe l’oeil”—was not the point.366 He acknowledges the long history of 
trompe l’oeil representations of the backs of paintings “since the mid 1600s in Holland. 
They resurfaced in North America in the 1800s and briefly in the 1970s, profiting from 
the invention of the airbrush.”367 And he links these practices according to their 
“indexical approach to realism,” by which I think he means their “sick artisanship that 
replicates reality.”368 It is photography’s indexical replication of reality, which establishes 
it, for Muniz, as “the ultimate trompe l’oeil.” And although photography is the medium 
most often employed across Muniz’s oeuvre, he is wary of making a photograph of the 
back of a painting—or, in his words, “a trompe l’oeil of a trompe l’oeil,” which, he 
decides, “would not really make any sense.”369  
Nonetheless, photography does enter into Muniz’s process, embedded as a single 
step in the making of the Versos. Indeed, having earned access to the actual paintings at 
the museums where they are housed, his first step is to photograph the backs of each 
painting using high-resolution digital cameras. He took many of these photographs for a 
series of works he made in 2002; he writes in 2005 about his desire to blow up this series 
to life size in order to exhibit them thus. Instead of exhibiting them as photographs—as 
trompe l’oeils of trompe l’oeils—he blows them up to life size so they can serve as 
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models for the elaborately constructed replicas. For Muniz, photography’s scalar 
distortion did not interfere with its status as “the ultimate trompe l’oeil.” Having 
described it as such, Muniz goes on to say, “I love Edgar Allen Poe’s account of his first 
experience in front of a daguerreotype. He describes it as an illusionistic scale 
distortion.”370 Interestingly, Muniz moves from photography’s trompe l’oeil effect—its 
“wow factor” or “its ability to record the world in exquisite detail”—to Poe’s observation 
of its scalar distortion.371  
Relative to a recent revival of the “three-dimensional trompe l’oeil” or “photo-
realistic sculpture” of Duane Hanson and John DeAndrea,” however, Muniz observes that 
Ron Mueck, Robert Lazzarini, and a few others introduce “distortion and scale shifts as a 
novel element.”372 These distortions of scale bring “subjectivity” to what was otherwise 
just “sickening artisanship.”373 Mueck’s Crouching Boy in Mirror (1999-2000) (Figure 
3.64), a diminutive but naturalistically rendered silicone rubber sculpture of a boy 
crouched down upon the floor, his hands over his head, gazing at himself in a mirror 
propped against the gallery wall, was among the works included in the Lifelike exhibition 
with which I began this chapter. Measuring only 18” from the ground, Mueck alters the 
boy’s scale, as Seliger did with the milk carton or Hays did with the brown paper bag, to 
interfere with his otherwise seeming reality. But the tilt of the mirror into which Mueck’s 
boy looks re-distorts his scale; as image, he appears once again convincingly real. In this 
particular piece, Mueck stages the trompe l’oeil oscillation between image and object. As 
miniature object on the floor in front of us, we marvel at the technical accomplishment of 
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its making; as image in a mirror, we enjoy the illusion of the boy’s seeming presence. 
That is, until we see our own image as well; “when we view his reflection,” curator 
Engberg observes, “he appears all the more ‘real’ to us, yet we who share his space in the 
picture plane feel disconcertingly out of place.”374 
Rather than distorting the scale of the Versos by exhibiting them, for example, as 
miniatures, which he did with photographs of the rectos of famous paintings for the 
exhibition Model Pictures (Menil Collection 2002) (Figure 3.65), Muniz restores the 
scale of the image to a 1:1 ratio with the object photographed. In doing so, he effaces the 
scalar distortion of photography that Poe had observed. Its scalar distortion is inherent to 
the medium insofar as it has no given size—is its scale set through the viewfinder, by the 
negative or contact sheet, the digital read-out screen, the conventions of printing-out 
paper, among others? Muniz’s representation (his photograph) necessarily manipulates 
the scale of the represented object (the back of the painting), much like Mueck’s 
miniaturized sculpture does; but just as Mueck tilts the mirror, Muniz then enlarges his 
original photograph to accommodate the appropriate or conventional scale, not of the 
mirror or photograph—which can be any size—but of the image subject—the boy or 
painting verso. Doing so enables our (eventual, in the case of Muniz,) enjoyment of that 
subject’s seeming reality.  
When Muniz uses the enlarged photograph as a model for the three-dimensionally 
realized material version of this image-object, he maintains its 1:1 scale. The realized 
Verso, like the enlarged photograph of the original painting, then corresponds to the scale 
of the actual painting; this is the strategy of the chantourné: the shape/scale/outline of the 
representation is congruent with the shape/scale/conventional format of the thing 
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represented. Unlike the scalar distortion of Mueck’s object in front of the mirror image 
and unlike the flatness of Gijsbrecht’s verso, there is nothing to disrupt the illusion that 
Muniz’s Verso is not the thing itself. This erasure of his (photographic) intervention is 
further reinforced by his (or, I should say, his team’s) meticulous reproduction of it as a 
three-dimensionally realized material object— “as objects, faithful down to the last 
scratch.”375 There are no signs to indicate that this is a replica and not the actual painting; 
in this way, it seems not to qualify as trompe l’oeil.  
But, insofar as Muniz’s Versos address the spectatorial impulse to relate to this 
representation as if it were the actual object, they employ the trompe l’oeil strategy that 
Chalfant associated with trompe l’oeil. The label’s legible disclosure of that which should 
be on the other side compels the hand of the visitor to turn the object around, that is, to 
relate to it as an object. But if we treat the painting like an object—as the artist 
Christopher D’Arcangelo did in 1978 at the Louvre, when he surreptitiously removed 
Thomas Gainsborough’s Conversation in a Park from the wall and placed it on the 
floor—we risk punishment, because we know better the institutional mandate not to 
touch. Nonetheless, the lean of the Versos against the wall offers a gap that incites and 
supports our desire to see the other side. If we don’t turn the painting around, we feel 
deprived of its imaginary realization, which paradoxically feels like its actuality. 
Although the specific paintings reproduced as Versos are familiar enough that we can 
likely call their pictures to mind in our imaginations, we remain unable to see the material 
facture or indexical objecthood of the paint itself. Instead, if we could satisfy the impulse 
to turn around this object, we would find not paint, but ordinary inventory information 
about this art object—Muniz’s Verso—rather than the one it represents. We would likely 
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find the actual marks and labels that “revea[l] where [this object] has been, how old it is 
and how many times it has changed hands.”376 But this remains invisible to us if we treat 
it like an image, observing it, as its lean against the wall dictates, only from the front. The 
Verso oscillates between image and object, and we are caught in its scenario of imaginary 
desire and fear of symbolic punishment.  
Notably, it is not that Muniz’s Versos allow us to discover their status as 
representation, but that they incite our desire to have it revealed. We want to interact with 
the object physically, reaching out with our hands or craning our necks to discover that 
this is not the object itself but a representation thereof. It is insofar as Verso is a 
representation—a highly detailed reproduction—that I think Muniz presents it as an 
image. When Respini suggests to Muniz that his versos “stress the painting as an object, 
rather than an image” and that “in some ways this seems to be the opposite of your 
photographic work, which is so much about the image,” Muniz responds by resisting 
such categories to instead embrace a more holistic category of “image.” He says, “I think 
we’ve got to the point that the use of technical terminologies no longer adds to the 
discourse on ways to preserve the relevance of representation and the continuity of visual 
symbolic exchange in our society. When the common denominator is simply ‘the image’ 
then we can approach it from a multitude of perspectives and really come up with a 
holistic sense of our visual world. I’d like to think of Verso as a collection of physically 
and conceptually ‘thick images,’ and that’s completely in line with what I have been 
doing for the past twenty years.”377 
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His description of Verso (Starry Night)’s faithfulness to the original as “photo-
realistic” rhetorically reinforces the way that he treats these objects as images. And 
photography’s standard of realism is embedded into the process of making the Versos. I 
began this chapter by suggesting that photorealist paintings were trompe l’oeil according 
to the degree to which they could be mistaken for actual photographs at 1:1 scale. I 
characterized photorealism as a particular style, determined by the visual characteristics 
of the photographic-model, in which the subsequently painted image was rendered. By 
saying that the effect of his Verso is “photo-realistic,” Muniz describes its style, which is 
similarly based on a photographic model and successfully articulated by its material 
representation. In contrast to some photorealistic paintings, however, this object is not 
trompe l’oeil insofar as one might mistake it for the photograph of the verso. Instead it is 
trompe l’oeil to the extent that one mistakes it for the object it represents—the subject of 
the intervening photographs. Whereas one might (temporarily or conceivably) be able to 
mistake Robert Bechtle’s photorealist painting ’73 Malibu (Figure 3.66) for a 
photograph, one won’t mistake it for the car itself; the opposite is true of Muniz’s 
Versos—at least his Versos of paintings.  
As with photorealist paintings that are also trompe l’oeils, it is possible to mistake 
Muniz’s Versos of photographs, for example, Verso (The New President) (2008) (Figure 
3.67) for both a photograph and the photograph (of Johnson sworn in on Air Force One 
after Kennedy’s assassination), when in reality it is neither. But as with the Versos of 
paintings, these objects don’t give us an opportunity to discover their artifice; instead 
they replicate so closely the look of the original object and by way of the same materials 
that they are more like forgeries than trompe l’oeils. In contrast, if the backs of these 
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paintings or photographs had been photographed and then framed, we might have noticed 
the object’s lack of relief or texture; this would have been the opportunity to discover its 
status as a representation in the manner more conventionally ascribed to trompe l’oeil.  
Although, as objects framed behind glass, they deny our physical discovery that 
there is no image on the other side, these photographic Versos compel our desire to see 
the photographic image we imagine exists there. By prohibiting us from seeing that 
which we want to see, that which may or may not affirm the status of this object as the 
thing itself, our experience oscillates between one of belief and one of doubt. Compelling 
belief, even belief mixed with doubt, requires a credible object: as Muniz team member 
Rebecca Graves remarks “it’s not exact…It’s more about that it’s a credible object, 
right?”378 But credibility alone, like exactitude, is not always enough to compel viewers 
to closely consider the materiality of something; this we learn from the example of 
Fischli and Weiss. Instead of the credibility of an object alone, its photorealist style, for 
example, it is the particular sociability of the object represented—the way it addresses or 
engages me, the way it seems to desire my reciprocal exchange with it—that compels my 
belief.  
Like Parrhasios, Muniz compels our belief that a representation could be the thing 
itself by withholding something from our view. By representing the thing itself as if 
behind a curtain or as if on the other side of something, viewers feel compelled to see for 
themselves. They are prompted to enter into an exchange with the representation, treating 
it as if it were an actual object by trying to pull it back or wanting to turn it around. In 
both cases, something unseen, something of value, something (that seems to be) auratic, 
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lets us look through the represented nature of the curtain or verso: the promised, but 
undisclosed thing itself—a painting. Each of these representations promises to make 
present a unique object and even if it cannot, it nonetheless seems as if it could.  
When Zeuxis treats the representation as if it were a curtain, the object it 
represents, he discovers its status as image. Whether or not its status settles so as now to 
be regarded only as image has to do with the extent to which Zeuxis continues to interact 
with it, searching the materiality of the representation to discern how it was that 
previously he might have seen through it, or by imaginatively reliving the moment in 
which he was fooled. By denying us the opportunity to discover their status as 
representation, Muniz does not allow for a moment of revelation. We do not actually turn 
around Muniz’s often very large and heavy-looking Versos, nor de-frame the photographs 
to view the image that ought to be hidden there. But their placement in the gallery, 
propped against or hung on walls, seems to promise that someone authorized will do just 
this. Because they hold out the promise of making visible the painted or photographed 
image on the other side, these images seem to be made present by these Versos; in this 
way, they are “as if presences.”  
Because our experience of these “as if presences” vacillates between one of belief 
and one of doubt, they refuse to settle into either category of representation or original 
(the thing itself). That Muniz’s Verso refuses to disclose its recto image literalizes 
another hidden image internal to its chain of production. These “thickened images,” as 
Muniz describes them, vibrate in a way not unlike Sherrie Levine’s appropriative 
photographs. Just as Levine’s photograph of a Walker Evans photograph already covers 
over another hidden image—the photo-mechanical reproduction of Evans’s photograph—
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Muniz’s reconstruction of an already extant painting verso covers over the hidden image 
of his intervening photographic model. Similarly, Peto’s painting of a photograph of 
Lincoln already covers over the engraved reproduction of that image, or vice versa, his 
painting of an engraving of Lincoln already covers over the unseen photograph, which 
served as its model. These hidden pictures “accrue,” as Michael Leja says, “to be visible 
or be offset” as a loss, or as Molly Nesbit has it, as “a shift.” These accretions are signs 
that can visibly halt the transparency of an artist’s material interventions.  
Trompe l’oeil representations of image-objects refuse to settle into either category 
of image or object; the trompe l’oeil revelation that what seemed to be materially present 
is instead “merely representation” or “just an image” does not halt its visual vibration. 
Instead, they continue to oscillate between image and object, as a kind of “as if” 
presence. They have a different kind of ontology, existing in the material world by way 
of this qualified presence. Our recognition of these “as if” presences in trompe l’oeil 
painterly representations of image-objects, which seem present (as if objects) but are 
discoverable as representation (as image), makes room to discover presence in the realm 
of appearance. And this has important implications for the digital era, which I consider in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4. Auratic Disclosures  
 
While the past twenty years in the history of photography have been indelibly 
marked by innovations in digital technology, the medium is not somehow newly capable 
of tricking us. Although digital cameras may institute practical changes in image 
capture—from mechanical cameras and film to electronic sensors and microchips—and 
in image viewing—from prints in albums or piles to computer or mobile phone screens—
these changes have not inherently ruptured what was heretofore the medium’s capacity 
for truth. Similarly, just because image-processing software, such as Photoshop, has 
come to replace darkroom development techniques, photography is not suddenly more 
prone to manipulation than ever before. And yet, such claims continue to be made about 
the cultural shift in photography and its reception. Mia Fineman writes in her introduction 
to Faking It: Manipulated Photography Before Photoshop,  
Among the most profound cultural effects of these new technologies has been a 
heightened awareness of the malleability of the photographic image and a 
corresponding loss of faith in photography as an accurate, trustworthy means of 
representing the visible world. As viewers, we have become increasingly savvy, 
even habitually skeptical, about photography’s claims to truth. Our creeping 
suspicion about the credibility of photographs has been fueled by periodic 
revelations of digital fakery in news images.379  
 
One recent example of a digitally “faked” news image, which supposedly sparked 
renewed concern about photographic objectivity, was the 2013 winner of the World Press 
Photo of the Year. The winning photograph, taken by Swedish photojournalist Paul 
Hansen, shows two dead Palestinian children wrapped in cloth, carried by their uncles, 
who are leading a large group of men down a narrow street (Figure 4.1). Of the 
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photograph, Dr. Neal Krawetz, a forensic image analyst with a doctorate in computer 
science, wrote on his blog, “I cannot tell you about the original picture(s), but I can tell 
you that the controversial picture is definitely not original.”380 Krawetz alleges that the 
photograph is a composite of three separate images, and this post-processing of digital 
imagery, as Der Spiegel points out, stokes “fear that the boundaries are becoming blurred 
between journalistic photography…and artistic commercial image design.”381 
Another digital photography expert Eduard de Kam compares the raw file with 
the prize-winning version of the photograph and attests that he “can indeed see that there 
has been a fair amount of post-production, in the sense that some areas have been made 
lighter and others darker.” “But,” he continues, “regarding the positions of each pixel, all 
of them are exactly in the same place in the JPEG—the prize-winning image—as they are 
in the raw file. I would therefore rule out any question of a composite image.”382 The 
image, as we may or may not be able to see, exhibits overall image toning; indeed, there 
is almost a cool, metallic bronze cast over the image, which has a de-saturating effect, 
and the bottom-left area beneath the arms of the two men carrying the younger victim 
seems darkened to be almost entirely black, so that it falls away into shadow, offsetting 
the whiteness of the victims’ shrouds in a way that puts visual emphasis on them. But 
does this tonal intervention disqualify its journalistic integrity, or moreover, interfere 
with our belief that these children were killed and mourned?  
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Santiago Lyon, director of photography at the Associated Press and chair of the 
2013 World Press Photo jury points out that alterations of tonality have always been a 
part of photo-journalism. These occurred in analog photography almost automatically, 
according to choice of film stock or filter, for example. He claims, “Whether it’s black-
and-white, different colour temperatures, different kinds of film, with people preferring a 
Kodachrome look over an Ektachrome look or a colour negative. I don’t think that’s 
anything new.”383 Indeed, these different photo temperatures often co-existed in news 
publications without disrupting their truth claims. “Twenty years ago, the public trusted 
the blueish images they saw in Newsweek, the warm images in Time, the black-and-white 
images in The New York Times, and the straight images in Life magazine,” according to 
photographer Ashley Gilbertson.384  
Responding to the criticism that Hansen’s tonality is unnatural, photographer 
Francesco Zizola asks, “when was the representation of reality ever natural? Certainly not 
when one photographs in black-and white; in that representation, all colour data 
disappears. Today, when a photojournalist photographs an event in black-and-white, no 
one contests it and no one asks for his or her exclusion from a competition for having 
falsified reality.”385 Black-and-white marks a particular style of photographic re-coding; 
it translates the physical world into this code and thereby discloses its intervention, but 
only if we recognize it as such. Often, we fail to notice the codes of photography, instead 
imagining that we can see through its materiality as if it were transparent. Arguably, it is 
this illusion of dematerialization, which was once the domain of photography, that is now 
characteristic of digitization. “Analogue photography,” writes Robin Kelsey, “which 
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once, in comparison with older pictorial media, seemed de-skilled and dematerializing, 
now appears difficult, tactile, and dense. Anything fashioned by an individual without 
keyboard or mouse has an aura of lost artistry and reminds us, however briefly, of the 
real. Photographs might as well be paintings.”386  
Analog photography’s divorce of form from matter, à la Oliver Wendell Holmes 
(see Chapter 2), seems an especially hyperbolic claim in the face of digitization. It is 
digitization, rather than photography, at least as Joanna Sassoon claims, which now 
reduces the materiality of the photograph to an image. This is a special concern relative to 
archival efforts to digitize photography collections. She writes:  
Fundamentally, what were once three-dimensional physical objects become one-
dimensional and intangible digital surrogates, with the tactility and materiality of 
the original object being reduced to both an ephemeral and ethereal state. 
Likewise, those important and diverse material and visual cues embedded in 
original photographs, such as original technologies and social uses…are 
transformed by the nature of the viewing technology into a unity of a 
predetermined size, quality and tonal range of the digital image. Thus 
photographic sizes that lend meaning to the original object may be cropped to the 
proportions of standard computer screens.387  
 
As a result, she continues, “the fidelity and authenticity of digital images are open to 
question.”388 Sassoon’s worry is that the custodial institution of the photographic object 
can alter the image content in ways that are “unbeknownst to the viewer and without 
leaving visible trace.”389 Beyond this, digitization:  
reduces the complexity of the photographic object to a single dimension, with the 
backs of the photographs, where additional information lends further meaning to 
the image content, rarely being digitized. This encourages a focus purely on 
subject content, and the production of a digital image database whose 
                                                
386 Robin Kelsey, “Notes from the Field: Materiality,” The Art Bulletin XCV.1 (March 2013) 22. 
387 Johanna Sassoon, “Photographic Materiality in the Age of Digital Reproduction,” in Photographs, 
Objects, Histories: On the Materiality of Images, eds. Elizabth Edwards and Janice Hart (New York: 
Routledge, 2004) 190. 
388 Ibid. 
389 Ibid. 
180 
 
‘philosophical basis lies in an aggressive empiricism, bent on achieving a 
universal inventory of appearances.’ This concentration on the visual nature of the 
digital image at the expense of other material features of the photograph is further 
emphasized in the viewing of images through an intermediate and universalizing 
technology.390 
 
Sassoon describes a supposed anxiety about being fooled by digitally manipulated 
photographs, which also seems to be at stake relative to Hansen’s World Press Photo. In 
response to Hansen’s photograph, another photographer remarks, “I think the level of 
trust in the media from a public standpoint has dropped so dramatically that everything 
that’s presented now is questioned.”391 This lack of trust seems to stem from a suspicion 
that we are always vulnerable to the trickery of digital photography because it remains 
invisible to anyone but experts. One way to regain a sense of control in this scenario of 
diminished trust is to declare all photography to be a lie. Photographer Christopher 
Anderson argues, “It is beside the point to argue about the degree to which facts have 
been altered, because all photography does that…. I am more interested in the truth in 
what they have to say, even though I know it is subjective.”392 Anderson distinguishes 
between facts, which “do not exist,” and truth, which “does,” at least in the sense of “my 
own personal subjective truth.” He continues, “I think journalism and the public will be 
better served when we acknowledge that photography is subjective, but it can also be 
‘true’—and that truth is a personal truth.”393  
Another strategy about what can be done, by “World Press Photo in particular, 
and the photojournalism community as a whole, [to] regain the public’s trust,” is to 
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require photographers to be transparent about their interventions.394 As Lyon suggests, 
“they should request the raw file from all entrants…it would make photographers aware 
that their images are going to be compared and contrasted to the original files. That level 
of transparency would be very useful and powerful, and would serve to encourage 
photographers to attempt to display their work as closely as possible to what they saw in 
the first place.”395 But this is to assume that what the photographer saw and what the raw 
file captures are equivalent images. When a photographer sees the raw file, “it may be at 
odds with his memory of it... Memory plays into it. And sometimes your memory plays 
tricks on you.”396 
Moreover, this kind of transparency establishes the raw file as “authentic,” as 
“original,” as if it has not already translated the material world into the codes of (digital) 
photography. While these codes may be literal and less visible—as binary—they are also 
rendered visually and thus visible, necessarily disclosed by the photograph, if we, like the 
digital photography experts, know how to recognize them. “I think that we have to learn 
to understand the context,” adds Zizola, “draw barriers, ask questions, look carefully, 
think consequently. This is the only healthy attitude with respect to the truthfulness of 
images, avoiding such excesses as believing that all is fake and nothing is true, or the 
opposite—that photography is nothing but the exact representation of reality.”397 
When Lyon recommends comparison of the raw file with the submitted 
photograph, he reinvests in a “sense of uniqueness gained from inspection of surface 
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marks left on an object by its manufacture.”398 He advocates a connoisseurial inspection 
of the type used to guarantee the authenticity of the art object. Of Michelangelo’s Atlas 
Slave (c.1530) (Figure 4.2), for example, Anthony Hughes describes the way “the marks 
of those processes by which it was brought to [a] stage of semi-completion” are typically 
interpreted as “guarantee[ing] its authenticity as a historical survival. Like the facture of a 
painting, they are signs that the shaped stone is an issue from Michelangelo’s hands. In 
[Walter] Benjamin’s terms, those traces of the chisel constitute part of its ‘aura.’”399  
But to understand these signs as the trace of Michelangelo’s hands requires 
interpretation. Of “similar marks of manufacture” in Auguste Rodin’s La Pensée (Figure 
4.3), Hughes notes that they are not those of Rodin; instead, they index the intervention 
of the stone carver hired to reproduce Rodin’s clay or plaster sculpture.400 In contrast to 
Michelangelo’s sculpture, which is “without a doubt an ‘original,’” Rodin’s marble “is a 
fiction…. the marks here do not show how excavation of the block was broken off…, but 
deliberately concoct the unearned appearance of an image half-discovered in rock.”401 
Following this logic, La Pensée is not a unique work of art, but “a version of a work 
originally conceived in a different medium (clay or plaster), translated into stone, not by 
Rodin but by a professional carver.”402 Without Hughes’ clarification, this imitation of 
aura may have passed as an authentic aura; this is the threat according to which 
“aesthetics seem to become a branch of ethics.”403  
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Navigating this “threat” is especially difficult because the stone carver’s marks so 
closely resemble those of Michelangelo. If we are unable to discern the difference, we 
might mistake the reproduction for the original, just as a credulous spectator mistakes the 
trompe l’oeil painting for the object represented. Trompe l’oeil paintings must disguise 
the marks of their manufacture, at least initially, in order to promote our conflicting belief 
in the presence of the objects represented. Their meticulous representation of the marks 
of use and age supposedly acquired by these represented objects further assists in this 
illusion. It is, in Michael Leja’s estimation, the trompe l’oeil painting’s accurate depiction 
of and emphasis on surface texture, which compels viewers to touch the painting. He 
relates the experience of having seen someone reach out in an attempt to remove a 
newspaper clipping from William Harnett’s trompe l’oeil painting The Old Violin (1886) 
(Figure 0.2); he “watched in stunned amazement as a viewer walked over to the painting 
and scratched its surface with a fingernail in an effort to peel off the newspaper 
clipping.”404 
This viewer, in Leja’s estimation, is not deceived, rather he is compelled by the 
rendered texture to feel its surface. Harnett describes the selection of the objects he paints 
in an interview: “As a rule, new things do not paint well. I want my models to have the 
mellowing effect of age…. [From older] pieces I can get the rich effect that age and 
usage gives to it—a soft tint that harmonizes well with the tone of the painting.”405 In 
seeking out “the aged and worn quality of the objects depicted,” Harnett selects objects 
that have, in Leja’s account, “an index of sustained tactile contact—touching, holding, 
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using—wear [that] implies a residual human presence, which Harnett’s paintings 
maximize and highlight.”406  
By imitating the look of the particular marks of use acquired by each of the 
objects represented, Harnett paints these objects according their unique existence. While 
this imitation aids the trompe l’oeil illusion of the represented object’s actual presence, it 
also preserves “the history to which it was subject.”407 In this way, Harnett represents the 
aura of these objects. Walter Benjamin articulates the concept of the aura in terms of the 
work of art and “its presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it 
happens to be. This unique existence of the work of art….,” he continues, “includes the 
changes which it may have suffered in physical condition over the years as well as the 
various changes in its ownership.”408 But, of course, the changes in the physical condition 
of Harnett’s objects are representations; their index of tactile contact is merely the 
appearance thereof. These cannot be revealed through “chemical or physical analyses” of 
the painting because, as Benjamin writes, these are “impossible to perform on a 
reproduction.”409 Harnett imitates the index of past contact, which now exists according 
to the iconic look of wear and tear. Rather than an index of the use of these objects, we 
find only indices of the painting’s manufacture. Still, this iconic representation of the 
lustre of usage, rendered “so substantially and palpably,” is that which Leja argues, 
“enhances their tactile sensuousness for viewers,” and ultimately provokes a spectatorial 
“desire for tactile gratification.”410 
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In Chapter 2, I discussed Sebastian Stoskopff’s An Engraving of Galatea, 
Attached to a Board (1644-1657) (Figure 2.8) according to Joachim von Sandrart’s report 
that its trompe l’oeil illusion had fooled Emperor Ferdinand III into reaching out with his 
hand to remove the print. But perhaps here too it was Stoskopff’s careful rendering of the 
particular texture of the engraving’s rippled edge, which prompted his hand. Or perhaps, 
as Sandrart insinuates, it was Ferdinand’s desire to possess the engraving which 
compelled him to reach out. The bent corners of the engraving also suggest its having 
been roughly handled, perhaps in its exchange between owners, and this compels 
Ferdinand to grab hold of it for himself—indeed, even after it is revealed to have been 
only a representation, Ferdinand, according to Sandrart, “decided to hang the work in his 
art gallery in Prague.”411  
By painting an engraving as if auratically present, Stoskopff stages what is for 
Benjamin an ironic impossibility. That is, the engraving represented in Stoskopff’s 
painting is an engraving of Galatea by Michel Dorigny (1616-1665) (Figure 4.4), which 
in turn is already a reproduction of a painting by Simon Vouet (1590-1649).412 The 
seemingly auratic object represented in Stoskopff’s painting is thus already a 
reproduction, and as reproduction, aura is anathema to it; according to Benjamin, 
reproduction was that which caused the aura of the work of art to wither. “Aura is,” for 
Benjamin, “tied to presence; there can be no replica of it.”413  
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By representing the signs of age and usage suffered by this object, Stoskopff like 
Harnett paints what seems to be the specific instance of this engraving and its particular 
material history. The engraving, which is represented as if actually present, thus seems to 
possess an aura, and it is this seeming auratic presence that compels Ferdinand’s hand in 
his desire to touch and possess it. That is, Ferdinand imagines that he can ‘get hold of’ 
Dorigny’s print of Vouet’s painting by physically prying it off of the wooden surface 
upon which it seems to be attached; but, in reaching out for it, he discovers that he cannot 
because the engraving is a painted representation—(only) an image. Ferdinand can 
nonetheless ‘get hold of’ Dorigny’s print by way of Stoskopff’s painted representation, 
just not physically as an object. He can, however, ‘get hold of’ it as an image according 
to its likeness.  
It is our willingness to accept this image in place of the object that pries the aura 
of the work of art from its shell.414 And this destruction of the aura, according to 
Benjamin, is motivated by our desire to possess the auratic object.  He describes “the 
desire of contemporary masses to bring things ‘closer’ spatially and humanly,” as that 
“which is just as ardent as their bent toward overcoming the uniqueness of every reality 
by accepting its reproduction. Every day the urge grows stronger to get hold of an object 
at very close range by way of its likeness, its reproduction.”415 Even art historians 
demonstrate how willingly we look past the materiality of the reproduction of a work of 
art to access its image content. That is, we use photographic reproductions of the works 
of art we discuss not only to illustrate our points, but also to research and formulate them. 
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This willingness to look past the materiality of reproductions is demonstrated in 
iconographical analysis of Stoskopff’s painting. That is, instead of looking at Stoskopff’s 
representation of an engraving, in itself, some art historians look through it to the 
iconography of the engraving’s represented imagery; we thereby attend to the 
representation of Galatea, rather than to the representation of an engraving. In this way, 
we continue to mistake the painting of an engraving for the engraving it represents, and 
thus, like Ferdinand, remain credulous to its trompe l’oeil illusion of actual presence.  
Iconographical consideration of the particular subject of Galatea may certainly 
open onto additional meanings relative to trompe l’oeil’s illusionism. As Anna Tummers 
observes of Stoskopff, “Perhaps he saw the sea nymph Galatea as a metaphor for painting 
itself. Her beauty famously enamored the Cyclops Polyphemus, whom she frustrated by 
disappearing into the waves every time he tried to approach her. Not unlike the print in 
this painting, she appeared to be merely a seductive illusion.”416 Although her account 
acknowledges that the painting’s illusion turns on mistaking a painting for a print, it 
locates the metaphor for painting’s seductive illusion in the subject matter of the 
represented print, overlooking the way that the print’s effort at reproduction is itself 
already an effort of seductive illusion. Doing so accounts for the trompe l’oeil illusionism 
of the print, insofar as it is represented as if materially present, but looks past the 
imaginary function of a print reproduction, which is to represent the work of art as if it 
were actually present. The metaphor Tummers locates in Galatea is similarly available 
through an interpretation of prints in and of themselves. While the illusion of Galatea’s 
beauty eludes Polyphemus’s possession, a print accommodates the illusion of possessing, 
or at least of having access to the painting it represents; moreover, Stoskopff’s painting of 
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this print gives Ferdinand the illusion of possessing not only the print, but also of 
encountering Vouet’s painting—twice removed. But as trompe l’oeil, the illusions do not 
entirely hold, proving to be as elusive to Ferdinand’s possession as Galatea’s beauty is to 
Polyphemus. 
Benjamin locates the decay of auratic experience in the contemporary desire to 
bring things closer to us, to possess it as an object in close-up, in the form of a picture, a 
copy—that is, especially, by means of reproduction. For Jonathan Crary, it was this urge 
to “take possession of the object—from the closest proximity—in an image and the 
reproduction of an image” that was fulfilled in the viewing scenario of the stereoscope 
and its visual priority of foreground objects.417 As in Polyphemus’s dream of Galatea, it 
is the desire for possession that is also at the heart of art reproduction. Nearly three-
hundred years earlier than Benjamin’s essay, Stoskopff’s painting stages this desire to 
bring things closer or to possess them via reproduction, not only insofar as its subject, 
Dorigny’s print, accommodates the illusion of knowing Vouet’s painting, but also insofar 
as the trompe l’oeil mode in which Stoskopff paints Dorigny’s print accommodates, at 
least initially, the illusion that the print is actually there, available for him to ‘get hold of.’ 
If, as Benjamin writes, “reproduction extracts the aura from even a unique object, 
destroying its aura as if an object pried from its shell,” Stoskopff’s painting enacts this 
destruction at least twice over.418  
Like Stoskopff’s Engraving of Galatea, Harnett’s trompe l’oeil also stages our 
willingness to accept an image in place of the object itself. Leja cites a response to one of 
Harnett’s paintings that appeared in an 1887 edition of the Springfield Daily Republican: 
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“The artist shows his highest skill in the representation of textures. The wood is wood, 
the iron is iron, the brass is brass, the leather is leather. The fur of the rabbit and the 
feathers of the birds tempt the hand to feel their delicate softness.”419 What is elided in 
these remarks is an acknowledgement of his act of representation: Harnett’s painted 
wood is wood, his painted iron is iron, etc. The way he paints these things allows the 
existence of these materials to be sufficiently replaced by images. A viewer’s willing 
acceptance of images as if they were the actual, material things they represent also 
describes the trick of trompe l’oeil.  
But by reaching out with a desire to touch and ascertain the specificity of that 
material texture, Leja’s 20th-century viewer reveals his resistance to fully accepting this 
likeness. Indeed, insofar as the painting must disclose its status as representation, the 
mode of trompe l’oeil ultimately resists the destruction of the aura. It admonishes us for 
our willing acceptance of a likeness for the material object itself. It mourns the 
destruction of the aura, even at the same time that it demonstrates how easily it can occur. 
Insofar as the viewer discovers that the trompe l’oeil object is just as absent as the human 
presence, which in Leja’s account, always seems to be “just out of sight,” (s)he 
encounters the “sense of melancholy” often attributed to Harnett’s paintings.420 This 
melancholy “probably stems from the frustrated desire for gratifying, physical contact, 
especially the human contact that the personal belongings seem able to mediate.”421 Leja 
continues, 
Melancholy also issues from an unconscious awareness that the alluring fantasies 
held out in the painting—of a comfortable world of aestheticized leisure and 
culture, of material fullness that absorbs and emanates human presence, of 
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wordless interpersonal contact through material things—are illusions ultimately as 
phantasmagorical as the conjured still-life objects.422 
 
Like the aura of Harnett’s objects, the aura of the engraving in Stoskopff’s 
painting is revealed to have been only an illusion—a mimetic representation of an auratic 
look—by way of its trompe l’oeil mode of representation. It is Ferdinand’s reaching out, 
or tactile approach to the painting, that reveals the engraving to have been not actually 
present, but instead present as trompe l’oeil representation, thereby exposing the illusory 
status of its auratic effect. Stoskopff may caution, or at least playfully indicate, the 
possibility of falling for a phony aura—mistaking a reproduction for a work of art or an 
image for the actual object—but his use of trompe l’oeil, which hinges on our recognition 
of the representational status of its depicted aura, does not allow us to remain fooled by it.  
Harnett represents the auratic signifiers of these objects in the mode of trompe 
l’oeil, which ultimately admonishes us for our acceptance of a likeness for the object 
itself. Whereas initially I may have looked through the painted signifiers of wear and tear 
to see only their tactile allure, my compulsion to touch, to approach, or to possess the 
objects represented in the painting insists that I come to see those signifiers as such and 
recognize their capacity to trick me. As Leja observes, Harnett paints the highlights of 
these objects with “thick impasto, much thicker and more textured than necessary to 
secure the opacity of the light colour.”423 This auratic signifier of reflective light, which 
seemed caused by an actual source of light upon the shiny surface of the violin, for 
example, asserts its origin as paint.  Such impasto disrupts the illusion of transparency; it 
“actually undermines the illusionism of the image; the medium erupts into materiality at 
                                                
422 Ibid. 
423 Ibid. 
191 
 
these sites.”424 While at first the painting may have seemed as smooth and transparent as 
a photograph, and equally able to dematerialize the reality of the objects represented, 
suddenly its materiality resurfaces to look back at the viewer. The destabilizing effect of 
this look back catches us at a moment in which we may have been vulnerable to the 
painting’s illusion; the conflict of this illusion with the impasto’s literal tactility further 
compels our hand. 
This disclosure of the painting’s materiality reminds us that transparency is not 
the (entire) goal of trompe l’oeil. Stoskopff uses trompe l’oeil to make visible the less 
visible layers of illusion within his painting—its reproduction of a Dorigny engraving 
after a Vouet painting. These disclosures ought to compel us to look for the acts of 
translation that intervene, but insofar as they require external comparison and are not 
readily disclosed by the painting itself, these disclosures remind us of our vulnerability to 
their illusions. By representing an already reproduced object that is also an image in a 
mode of painting that presents images as if they are objects, Stoskopff intends for us to 
know something, even if not everything, of this otherwise undisclosed context.  
Benjamin pursues the ethics of an analogous kind of disclosure in his essay, “The 
Task of the Translator” (1923). Concerned that we might be tricked into mistaking a 
translation of a text for the original, Benjamin recommends that translators disclose their 
interventions into the original. Because, as he observes, it is impossible to reproduce an 
original faithfully, he dissuades the translator’s pursuit of invisibility or perfect 
reproduction. He writes, “No translation would be possible if in its ultimate essence it 
strove for likeness to the original. For in its afterlife—which could not be called that if it 
were not a transformation and a renewal of something living—the original undergoes a 
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change.”425 Guarding against the destruction of the original intention means maintaining 
something of its remoteness alongside its revelation; something of the foreignness of the 
original language must remain part of the translation.  
Translation exceeds the reproduction of meaning, for Benjamin. Fidelity can in no 
way guarantee the preservation of meaning in the original; “for sense in its poetic 
significance is not limited to meaning, but derives from the connotations conveyed by the 
word chosen to express it.”426 “It is not,” he writes, “the highest praise of a translation, 
particularly in the age of its origin, to say that it reads as if it had originally been written 
in that language.”427 The translation should not attempt to pass as an/the original; its task 
is not communication or comprehension. Instead “a real translation is transparent.”428 But 
by “transparent,” Benjamin means something quite different than the seeming 
transparency of a photograph or the initial transparency of a trompe l’oeil painting. A 
transparent translation is possible, for Benjamin, paradoxically when its intervention 
opacifies our comprehension of its meaning; transparency, for Benjamin, is transparency 
of intention rather than transparency of effect. For if communication of information 
becomes the goal of translation, some essential aspect of the original is overlooked. For 
example, a word may have many connotations; to preserve these in the translation, 
Benjamin recommends that the translator not choose among them but instead translate the 
word as literally as possible, even if the same connotations are not maintained by the new 
word. It is because that word is not quite right that it will remind the reader of the losses 
suffered in translation. Better to forego comprehension and retain its “true” or “pure 
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language” “in all its literalness,” even at the loss of meaning, so that it remains open to 
revelation rather than having been already interpreted in a most singular way by a 
particular translator at a particular time.429 While transparency may be the goal, this is a 
transparency that makes visible—like the cracks of a repaired vessel—the intervention of 
the translator. “Fragments of a vessel which are to be glued together must match one 
another in the smallest details, although they need not be like one another. In the same 
way a translation, instead of resembling the meaning of the original, must lovingly and in 
detail incorporate the original’s mode of signification, thus making both the original and 
the translation recognizable as fragments of a greater language, just as fragments are part 
of a vessel.”430  
Of a good translation, he writes, “it does not cover the original, does not block its 
light, but allows the pure language, as though reinforced by its own medium, to shine 
upon the original all the more fully. This may be achieved, above all, by a literal 
rendering of the syntax which proves words rather than sentences to be the primary 
element of the translator.”431 A translation, inasmuch as its transparency lets the light 
through, is like a pane of glass, through which light enters a room—as through the lens of 
a camera. It captures not only the content, but also the form of the original language—as 
a photographic exposure captures the material world or a work of art. In this way, it 
allows transparent access to the original source. At the same time, however, a good 
translation cracks the glass of its seeming transparency to signify its intervention. In 
Thomas Demand’s diptych of cracked pieces of glass, Glass I and II (2002) (Figures 
4.5a-b), he insists that we see a signifier of his photographic translation. Neither the 
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camera’s lens, nor the resulting photograph, is a window onto the world, which Demand 
literalizes by showing us a piece of glass through which we can see nothing but flat 
grayish-blue. Instead of looking through this pane, we look at the glass itself; the crack, 
in this way, further opacifies its transparent effect. It interrupts what ought to be a view 
through, transforming it into a look at the piece of glass, and this makes clear Demand’s 
intervention. Because Demand does not photograph an actual piece of glass, but instead 
photographs a pane he has built out of opaque pieces of paper, his model literally re-
codes the material world into a flattened array of tonalities and shapes. His translation of 
glass into paper reminds viewers of the way that all photographs translate the world into 
flat tonalities and shapes on paper. These codes of photography are similarly visible, even 
if not as readily as those of a lens flare or blur, for example, to remind viewers of the act 
of translation or reproduction. 
Inasmuch as a good translation maintains something of the remoteness of the 
original alongside its revelation, it preserves its aura. To the extent that we accept a 
likeness, or reproduction, for the original, reproduction becomes a bad translation—one 
that does not preserve the aura of the original’s distance. But this acceptance of a likeness 
requires that we look through all the signifiers of that reproduction’s manufacture, which 
otherwise would assert themselves to maintain something of their remoteness alongside 
their representation. It is in this way that Benjamin’s notion of a disinterested camera 
interferes with his recognition of the persistence of its aura. The presumption of a 
disinterested camera overlooks the foreignness of the form of its translation—those 
signifiers of photography’s re-coding which adhere to its translation. To overlook these 
signs of the photograph’s manufacture is to overlook the aura of the photographic 
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object—the signs specific to its persistent materiality, even as its materiality exists in 
multiple unique instances of the same image. It is to imagine the photograph as if without 
materiality.  
The use of trompe l’oeil to reproduce image-objects, such as engravings or 
photographs, resembles the type of translation Benjamin advocates. Its goal is not to pass 
as a perfect substitute for the original; instead it aims to be transparent about its 
intervention upon the original by making visible the cracks in its reconstruction. The 
trompe l’oeil mode discloses, or is transparent about, its intention to deceive, at least 
eventually, insofar as its trickery hinges on the viewer’s discovery of the artist’s 
accomplishment. But at the same time that the manner of its manufacture is discoverable, 
it must also be disguised. That is, the materiality of the trompe l’oeil representation must 
also seem transparent. It is this transparency of effect that initially lets Ferdinand see 
through the material circumstances of Stoskopff’s painting to imagine his access to its 
referent. His eventual recognition of its status as representation makes clear the painting’s 
intention to deceive. Over the course of his looking the painting’s transparency of effect 
is transformed into a transparency of intention.  
The genre of trompe l’oeil plays with these simultaneous and seemingly 
paradoxical takes on transparency. Insofar as one can “see through” the materiality of the 
painted surface to mistake the representation for the thing itself, a trompe l’oeil must 
initially seem transparent in its effect; but insofar, as we also discover its status as 
representation, it makes clear the intention of its intervention. A particular type of trompe 
l’oeil manifests this doubly meant “transparency” in the representation of the 
“transparent” surface of broken glass. Most notably, Louis-Léopold Boilly (1761-1845) 
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depicts this broken glass as if pressed atop layers of drawings and engravings. Marie-
Louise d’Otrange Mastai writes that Boilly was “said to have created ‘transparent 
paintings,’” but notes, “no one knows just what these were.”432 That is, we remain unsure 
about which paintings in his oeuvre earned this description, but they may be his paintings 
of glass. He paints what seems to be a collection of drawings, prints, and other 
reproductions as if behind broken glass. By representing glass—a material we quite 
conventionally look through without notice of its material intervention—as if it were 
cracked, he, like Demand, opacifies its presumed transparency. By way of the crack, the 
otherwise unnoticed glass takes on a surface texture that compels the viewer’s hand. But 
at the same time, as Ebert-Schifferer describes it, “any attempt to verify with touch is 
countered by the frustratingly ironic threat posed by the jagged edges.” 433 Unlike the 
representations that compelled Ferdinand or Zeuxis to reach out toward them, this one 
threatens such a touch. Instead, the spell of this painting’s illusion may remain unbroken 
by the viewer’s approach or touch test. Ebert-Schifferer relates the way that modern 
viewers informed guards on duty in the galleries of the National Gallery of Art, where 
Boilly’s A Collection of Drawings [with Boilly and Elleviou] (1800) (Figure 2.7) was 
exhibited in 2002, that the glass was broken.434  
But the broken glass is so compellingly rendered that its surface texture, like that 
of Harnett’s The Old Violin, prompts the viewer to touch it, even at the risk of injury. As 
if once protected behind this (now broken) glass, there are painted representations of 
drawings and prints. The lower left corner of the central engraving seems to be exposed 
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by the break, as if almost available for our (once forbidden) tactile gratification. This 
engraving is itself already a reproduction of another painting by Boilly, The Actor 
Elleviou in his Role as ‘The Prisoner,’ which had been exhibited at the Salon of 1798 to 
mixed critical review.435 It perhaps thus makes its own claims to transparency of effect or 
of intention relative to its now painted translation of (or as if it were) the engraved 
reproduction of a painting. Beyond that, at the level of the image, the represented actor 
makes his own claim to transparently perform the role of a prisoner, but this effort may 
be particularly difficult for Elleviou, whose notoriety as a “leading member of the right-
wing jeunesse dorée” became especially controversial “when he tried to dodge the draft,” 
notes Susan Siegfried.436 While this past controversy may have reinforced the 
controversy of the 1798 painting’s reception, as Siegfried suggests, I am not sure that this 
accounts entirely for its inclusion in Boilly’s trompe l’oeil with broken glass.  
Amidst the French Revolution, Boilly pursued social satire, most notably perhaps 
in his Follies of the Day series of caricatures ridiculing the mores of the period. One of 
his four episodes, The Credibles by the Stairway (1797) (Figure 4.6) depicts “two 
speculators conning a young man selling mandats territoriaux.”437 This caricature revises 
Carle Vernet’s caricature The Incredibles (1796) (Figure 4.7), adding a third figure and 
complicating the symbolism. Whereas Vernet pairs type against type, culprit against 
victim, according to unmistakeable identifiers, Boilly blurs these identifiers. For example, 
one of Boilly’s speculators wears both the tricolor plume of the patriots and carries the 
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baton démocratique of their opponents, the jeunesse dorée. In Vernet, we find a 
“‘conservative sensibility,’” one that lends “‘reassuring evidence that social differences 
are clearly discernible and enforceable.’”438 Siegfried argues that Boilly, in contrast, 
undoes that clarity, or at the very least plays with it, “by confusing the boundaries 
between social stereotype and eschewing much of the emphatic, exaggerated rhetoric of 
caricature.”439   
From the point of their inception, Boilly’s paintings were meant to serve as 
models for engravings, which then circulated in publications in the 1790s. The caricatures 
from Boilly’s The Credibles by the Stairway were appropriated into broadsheets, such as 
those known alternatively as The Ridiculous Ones of the Day or Portraits of Credible 
Men (Figure 4.8), which then used text to fix their meaning. In this broadsheet, the 
caricatures are used to advocate a restoration of order, which the corrupting figures—the 
speculator and high-fashion fop—disrupted. These types were problematic because they 
could pass as actual members of the bourgeoisie, thus extending the implications of their 
corruption to all holders of money. “These marginal types were not only getting confused 
with the wealthy bourgeoisie and messing up the boundaries between the middle class 
and the lower orders, they were also exacerbating social tensions,” writes Siegfried.440 
While the possibility of confusing these types with actual members of the 
bourgeoisie fed class anxieties, it was the representational fluidity of Boilly’s caricatures 
that allowed them to be differently deployed. That is, the translation of Boilly’s 
caricatures into print material fixed their meaning, in ways they otherwise resisted. In 
another example from his Follies of the Day series, No Agreement (Figure 4.9), an 
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elegant man shows a coin to a woman dressed à la Grecque—a fashionable, but revealing 
sleeveless dress—indicating perhaps that he has mistaken her for a prostitute. She crosses 
her fingers in refusal, but does she say, “no,” or does she indicate that the coin is an 
insufficient amount of money to pay her.441  
In addition to their fluidity of meaning, Siegfried notes the way Boilly’s 
caricatures could be seamlessly relocated into entirely different settings, even between 
media. That is, he could relocate figures intended for the print trade into paintings, as he 
did most notably in The Incredible Parade (1797) (Figure 4.10). Beyond this, when 
engravings made after his small caricature paintings were “hand-colored, the distinction 
between paintings and prints was further blurred. This blurring, we shall see, was 
distinctive to Boilly,” Siegfried argues.442 Although she observes Boilly’s fluid transfer 
of characters between paintings and prints, Siegfried does not connect this blurring of 
media to his representation of prints in paint, as in his trompe l’oeil work just three years 
later.   
When Boilly paints his painting of Elleviou as if it were a print, he reenacts the 
translation of his caricature paintings into prints for the trade. The ambiguity of his 
painting of Elleviou, like his painted caricatures, was hard to read, which made it 
disturbing and controversial. Would his translation of it into print, especially into a 
trompe l’oeil print, fix its meaning as the broadsheets tried to do? As trompe l’oeil, the 
painting’s disclosure that this is merely a representation of an engraving and not an actual 
engraving would have reassuredly fixed its otherwise ambiguous status, just as the text of 
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the broadsheet clearly discloses the fixed identities of its otherwise ambiguously rendered 
caricatures. 
But this restoration of order is destabilized by the illusions internal to Boilly’s 
image, which cannot be as easily resolved. Boilly does not represent Elleviou with the 
baton démocratique of the jeunesse dorée, instead he appears in his role as “the 
prisoner.”443 Whether Boilly condemns Elleviou’s politics by portraying him as a 
prisoner, or celebrates his convincing performance, or both, remains obscured rather than 
revealed by the trompe l’oeil mode of this representation. The trompe l’oeil painting’s 
effort to pass as an actual engraving thus re-doubles both Elleviou’s theatrical effort to 
pass as someone else, as well as the engraving’s effort to pass as a painting. This effort to 
pass as an engraving is central to Boilly’s Grissaille paintings, such as Monsieur 
Oberkampf (c. 1810-1815) (Figure 4.11), which is also represented as if under broken 
glass.   
This relationship of the painted representation of a print, such as Stoskopff’s or 
Boilly’s, to the print itself, Dorigny’s or Boilly’s, or to the source painting, Vouet’s or 
Boilly’s, remains obscured whether painted as if adhered by wax seals or as if behind 
glass—even broken glass. Reaching out to touch these paintings cannot test the fidelity of 
their reproduction. It is at the level of the image that these paintings acknowledge and 
participate in the historical practice of altering subject matter, something already long 
practiced by print artists. While the representation of prints in the self-conscious mode of 
trompe l’oeil may have worked to alert viewers to the possibility of manipulation within 
the image content of the painted prints, it could not disclose the nature of this intervention 
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without external comparison. Beyond this, changes within the image may not have 
disrupted its capacity to represent the original; often alterations were made in the name of 
clarifying the truth of the source image for its translation into a different medium.  
In her study of the history of printed reproductions of works of art, Susan Lambert 
observes that faithful copies were not always the goal of reproductions in print. “Even 
reproductions which acknowledge the source of the image through inscription often show 
unexpected changes when compared with the so-called original,” she writes.444 Dorigny’s 
engraving of Galatea includes a Latin inscription, as well as an attribution to Simon 
Vouet, the date of the engraving, and his signature.445 Without opportunity to compare 
Dorigny’s engraving with Vouet’s painting, we do not know the extent to which this print 
reproduces or reinvents its source. But comparison of Dorigny’s engraving with 
Stoskopff’s painting allows us to see that Stoskopff elects to omit these, among other 
details from the print, in his painted representation of it.  
Hand-formed reproductions, of which both Stoskopff’s painting and Dorigny’s 
engraving are, have for Lambert an essentially “interpretative nature.”446 If “two minds 
and fours hands,” according to Alvin L. Clark, can collaboratively realize a masterpiece, 
Stoskopff shows us the result of three minds and six hands.447  The handedness of 
Stoskopff’s intervention, however, intends a sleight. This is clear insofar as he employs 
the mode of trompe l’oeil. Direct comparison of his painting and Dorigny’s print most 
readily reveals his omission of two putti that hover above Galatea. His erasure enacts 
what is typically an invisible and tacitly accepted practice among printmakers, who alter 
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or interpret the works of art they claim to reproduce. Stoskopff chooses to amend 
Dorigny’s engraving in perhaps further imitation of what was already the engraver’s 
discretion. That he does this within the mode of trompe l’oeil heightens the self-
consciousness of his deception. 
Such changes in the printed image from its source image, Lambert observes, 
affect public knowledge about the original work of art. She writes, “The process of 
reproduction has the effect of removing the image from its ‘original’ context, usually 
reducing its size, and providing it with unforeseen juxtapositions. The result for the 
onlooker is not only a different experience from that undergone in the presence of the 
original but an irreversibly changed relationship with the original.”448 In taking for his 
subject a printed engraving, Stoskopff takes the deceptions that he observes within the act 
of reproduction as the subject of his trompe l’oeil. He discloses by way of trompe l’oeil’s 
discoverable deception another deceptive practice occurring at the level of the image. 
It is at the level of the image that a printmaker can and regularly did reinterpret a 
source in a way that deceives his audience about that source. These ‘deceptions,’ 
however, were intended to enhance understanding of the painting’s meaning; of print 
reproductions of paintings, John Ruskin observes that most changes made between 
versions were motivated by the engraver’s interest in clarifying the truth of the image, 
which for him was its imaginative power. To best represent a work’s imaginative power, 
a copy has to submit its source to changes—both insofar as it converts it into a different 
medium and insofar as it might alter the image to accommodate this conversion. 
Stoskopff recognizes and exploits something of this paradox by representing this 
particular object at the same time that he makes further alterations to Vouet’s painting, 
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even omitting some of the changes already made in Dorigny’s reproduction. Insofar as 
his changes to Dorigny’s reproduction are not as easily discoverable as his trompe l’oeil 
representation of the engraved object, he participates in the printmaker’s enterprise, 
further isolating the figure of Galatea as the source of the imaginative power of Vouet’s 
painting. But by representing such changes to the image in the manner of trompe l’oeil, 
he cues us to look for additional layers of illusion within the image, and thus helps to 
make visible this interpretive printmaking practice.  
Hughes relates another imitative practice for which exact mimicry was not 
necessarily the goal in the sculptural example of Nanni di Baccio Bigio’s emulative 
version (Figure 4.12a) of Michelangelo’s Pietà (Figure 4.12b). Nanni declares his 
“imitation” of Michelangelo by way of an inscription on a sash worn by Madonna, where 
Michelangelo’s signature had otherwise been placed; it states that Nanni “made the work 
‘EX IMITATIONE’ (in imitation) of the original group.”449 To understand Nanni’s 
funerary monument to Michelangelo’s friend Luigi del Riccio as “a copy,” in the modern 
sense, is inaccurate; better, he writes, to think of it as “a variant,” for all of the ways in 
which it diverges from Michelangelo’s model.450 This divergence was understood to be 
part of the 16th-century meaning of imitatione, which “implied not mimicry but 
emulation, an enterprise whose aim embraced both humility and ambition.”451 He 
observes the way this ‘inaccurate’ representation extends to poetry written in response to 
the sculpture; of Gian Battista Strozzi’s poetic homage to Nanni’s Pietà variant, Hughes 
observes that it “seems almost willfully inattentive to the actual appearance of the 
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work.”452 In his verse, the virgin weeps, for example, despite not being represented as 
such in either Michelangelo’s or Nanni’s representation. For Strozzi, however, Nanni’s 
version is “transparent,” letting Michelangelo’s Pietà show itself through it; and both 
equally allow for “imaginative access to the mysteries of the Virgin’s nature,” reminding 
“believers of the saving grace of Christ and of the Virgin’s role as chief intercessor for 
the souls of the dead.”453 
In contrast to this emulative type of reproduction, Hughes offers Gregorio de’ 
Rossi’s bronze version of the Pietà (Figure 4.13), which he surrounds with two other 
versions of sculptures by Michelangelo, Rachel and Leah (Figure 4.14a-b), originally 
made for the tomb of Julius II (Figure 4.14c), where they flank the figure of Moses rather 
than the Pietà. Just as Nanni declared his act of emulative imitation on the Madonna’s 
sash, so too de’ Rossi includes an inscription, ‘EX AERE FUDIT,’ on the altar of his 
monument. But this inscription, Hughes claims, “functions more as a founder’s mark…, 
and it is possible that the three figures were manufactured directly from casts of the 
marble originals.”454 It is tempting, Hughes notes, to treat this almost mechanical form of 
reproduction “as though they were reproductions of a sort much despised by twentieth-
century art historians.”455 Doing so, in his account, is to treat them as if vulgar 
perversions of Michelangelo’s original intention, to understand reproduction only as 
travesty or loss.  
For de’ Rossi’s Pietà, such losses would have included: the “translation of marble 
into bronze [which] has profoundly affected the legibility of the figures…; [and] the 
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relative positions of Rachel and Leah [which] have become unnecessarily reversed.”456 
But these may have been overlooked or seen through in the 16th century, according to 
one’s endowment of aura to that object—that is to say, according to one’s belief in the 
object, perhaps even one’s belief in the transparency of its reproduction. Cast 
reproductions, for example, would have been perfectly acceptable for the French 
monarch Francis I, who wrote to Michelangelo in 1546, requesting that he allow 
Francesco Primaticcio “‘to take casts from the Christ of the Minerva and from Our Lady 
della Febbre [the Roman Pietà] so that I may adorn one of my chapels with them, as 
things which I am assured are the most exquisite and excellent in your art.’”457 These 
casts would have allowed the monarch access to the excellent artistic achievements of 
which he has been “assured,” but has not himself seen in the specific instance of their 
time and place. And this access to the artist’s excellence is possible even through signs of 
Primaticcio’s reproductive intervention, which by 20th century standards are revised to 
indicate only its lost aura. 
And yet, this destruction of the object’s protective auratic shell also frees the 
object, making it increasingly available to democratic appreciation. Benjamin observes, 
“for the first time in world history, mechanical reproduction emancipates the work of art 
from its parasitical dependence on ritual.”458 He continues, “With the emancipation of the 
various art practices from ritual go increasing opportunities for the exhibition of their 
products.”459 Just as Nanni’s image allows increased imaginative access to 
Michelangelo’s Pietà, so too do de’ Rossi’s reproductions for the Strozzi chapel or 
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Primaticcio’s casts for King Francis. As Hughes argues contra Benjamin, “multiplication 
of an icon, far from diluting its cultic power, rather increased its fame, and each image, 
however imperfect, conventionally partook of some portion of the properties of the 
original.”460 
Stoskopff’s painting is, I think, similarly ambivalent about the destruction of the 
auratic qualities of the unique work of art wrought by reproduction. On the one hand, by 
reproducing the engraving as a painting, he playfully restores to it the experience of an 
aura—not only does his trompe l’oeil illusion allow one to believe that the printed 
engraving could be physically present in its particular individual existence, but also his 
painting of Dorigny’s engraving exists as a unique object in Ferdinand’s Prague gallery. 
And on the other hand, by reproducing an engraving of Vouet’s painting, he extends 
Dorigny’s democratizing distribution of the otherwise unique instance of this work of art. 
Because it is indexically tied to the original, a cast lets Francis I imagine that he 
can see through its intervening materiality to Michelangelo’s original. Inasmuch as the 
cast indexes another object, it “points beyond itself to the original, advertises itself as a 
trace, exhibiting in extreme degree…transparency.”461 So at the same time that it 
provides seemingly transparent access to the original, “it is precisely because it is an 
indexical sign that [it] can never be regarded as satisfying in itself.”462 It discloses its 
inability to substitute for the original, at least not completely, unless we look past these 
disclosures to instead believe, as King Francis does, that through the reproduction we 
have the work itself. 
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When we conceive of photography according to its “standard of informational 
accuracy,” we fill in the gaps of these losses by seeing through them as if they were 
transparent. This is what Benjamin does when he looks at photographs; he looks through 
them as if they themselves were transparent. Relative to photographic reproductions of 
art objects, he no longer looks for the auratic potential in the representing object but 
instead in the object represented, as such he sees through the materiality of the 
photograph. He writes, “Everyone will have noticed how much easier it is to get hold of a 
painting, more particularly a sculpture, and especially architecture, in a photograph than 
in reality…. Mechanical reproduction is a technique of diminution that helps people to 
achieve control over works of art—a control without whose aid they could no longer be 
used.”463 In this way, photographic reproductions of works of art accommodate a (false) 
illusion of the artwork’s presence, indeed the illusion that through the photograph we 
possess (‘get hold of’) and even control the work of art. 
It is in “the presence of the subject, of what is photographed,” rather than the 
presence of the artist’s “unmistakeable hand” that Benjamin finds the possibility of aura 
in some photography. It is photography’s access to reality, its “tiny spark of contingency, 
of the here and now, with which reality has (so to speak) seared the subject” of the 
picture, which causes him to look through the materiality of the photograph itself and its 
act of translation.464 Of an early photograph of Franz Kafka as a boy, for example, taken 
in a studio “thick with palm fronds” “in a sort of greenhouse landscape,” he observes that 
it has an “infinite sadness,” which “forms a pendant to the early photographs in which 
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people did not yet look out at the world in so excluded and godforsaken a manner as this 
boy. There was an aura about them, a medium which lent fullness and security to their 
gaze even as it penetrated that medium.”465 It was the subject of the portrait photograph, 
that “member of a rising class equipped with an aura that seeped into the very folds of the 
man’s frock coat or floppy cravat,” whose aura could be made visible for us by way of 
early photography.466  
But later developments in photography eradicate this auratic possibility by 
simulating its effect as if it were a painting. Benjamin writes,  
After 1880, though, photographers made it their business to simulate the aura 
which had been banished from the picture with the suppression of darkness 
through faster lenses, exactly as it was being banished from reality by the 
deepening degeneration of the imperialist bourgeoisie. They saw it as their task to 
simulate this aura using all the arts of retouching, and especially the so-called 
gum print.467 
  
The gum bichromate process used in pictorial photography not only endowed the medium 
with a painterly effect, but also incorporated a brush into the development process. 
Edward Steichen, a painter turned photographer, plays with the intersections of these 
media in both the subject matter and technique of his pictorial gum bichromate 
photograph Self Portrait (1901) (Figure 4.15). He incorporates the brush in his realization 
of the photograph at both the level of the image and the level of the object. In the image, 
he holds a paintbrush and palette; and in development of the prints, he uses “a brush…to 
give them the look of gesturally painted pictures.”468 By imitating the look of painting, 
these photographs don “the fraudulent mask of art. It is artiness that erodes…the aura” of 
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humanity in the subjects portrayed, according to Rosalind Krauss’s reading of 
Benjamin.469 The brushy aesthetic of the gum print, as a signifier of the photographer’s 
intention, seems to interfere with the subject’s aura. Beyond this, writes Benjamin, “a 
pose was more and more clearly in evidence, whose rigidity betrayed the impotence of 
that generation in the face of technical progress.”470 The brushiness of the gum 
bichromate joins the artifice of the pose, and both of these rob the photographic subject of 
its aura. 
 But couldn’t this brushiness have been the mark of a literal translation from one 
medium into another, and as such, at least in Benjamin’s terms, a good translation? When 
Steichen represents Rodin’s plaster cast of Honoré de Balzac Monument to Balzac (1898, 
cast 1954) (Figure 4.16) in his 1908 series Balzac, the Open Sky—11P.M., Balzac, 
towards the Light—Midnight, and Balzac, the Silhouette—4 A.M. (Figures 4.17a-c), his 
photographic intervention is anything but transparent. His use of soft focus blurs each 
image, and his decision to photograph at night shrouds its subject in darkness. Beyond 
this, he applies a bluish-green tone during the printing process.  
In all of these ways, Steichen plays with expectations of photographic 
transparency relative to art reproduction. At the time Rodin’s sculpture was a rejected 
commission that remained a plaster cast in the artist’s studio. By photographing the 
sculpture outside, on the terrace adjacent to Rodin’s studio, Steichen cast the yet uncast 
sculpture as a monumental fixture set against a changing nighttime sky. Insofar as the 
photographs obscure the legibility of the sculpture, it is perhaps surprising that, as 
Steichen later recalled, Rodin found them appropriately representative of his work, 
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remarking, “‘You will make the world understand my Balzac through these pictures.’”471 
By obscuring the sculpture, Steichen’s images disclose his photographic intervention—
his hand, as it were—in a way that refuses photography’s effect of transparency. In doing 
so, he also helps us understand something of Rodin’s intention: that he did not mean his 
portrait to be an exact likeness of the French novelist. Beyond this, insofar as Rodin’s 
sculpture remained uncast and singularly housed in his studio, it would be through the 
democratic distribution of Steichen’s reproductions, which were produced as 
photogravures for Camera Work magazine, that the world would first come to know 
anything of Rodin’s rejected commission. 
But for Benjamin, as Douglas Crimp notes, “the connoisseurship of photography 
is an activity diametrically opposed to the connoisseurship of a painting: it means looking 
not for the hand of the artist but for the uncontrolled and uncontrollable intrusion of 
reality, the absolutely unique and even magical quality not of the artist but of his 
subject.”472 It means seeing through the materiality of photography as if its codes were 
transparent in effect. This dematerialization was the hallmark of modernity for Benjamin; 
the reduction of objects to images became a principal function of commodification. 
Accordingly, he attends more closely to the way photography compels us to see through 
its mode of (re)production, thereby overlooking (or condemning) the signs of its 
persistent materiality. 
But as we learned from an ironic Holmes in Chapter 1, form is not ‘henceforth 
divorced from matter.’ The most persistent sign of photography’s materiality is perhaps 
its edge, which reminds us of the absent context of this image, reminds us that it is only a 
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fragment. Oliver Wendell Holmes demonstrates the way photography encourages us to 
see past this edge, filling in the gaps of its representation, when he describes the 
fragments of a sign that are caught in a photograph of Temple Bar, but cut off by the 
image’s edge: “22/ PAT / / CO/ BR/ PR / What can this be but 229, Patent Combs and 
Brushes, PROUT? At any rate, we were looking after Prout’s good old establishment, 
(229, Strand,) which we remembered was close to Temple Bar, when we discovered these 
fragments, the rest being cut off by the limits of the picture.”473  
Elsewhere, Holmes reminds us of the materiality of the developing process. To do 
so, he playfully revises Dante’s warning at the mouth of Hell—Abandon all hope, ye who 
enter here!—“Leave all linen behind you, ye who enter here, or at least protect it at every 
exposed point.”474 For nitrate of silver will blacken not only the photograph, but 
everything else; “every form of spot, of streak, of splash, of spatter, of stain, is to be seen 
upon the floor, the walls, the shelves, the vessels.”475  
Holmes describes the elaborate process of developing a photographic plate over 
the course of nearly five double-columned pages of The Atlantic Monthly. He notes the 
care required, “Let us brush [the square of crown glass] carefully, that its surface may be 
free of dust. Now we take hold of it by the upper left-hand corner and pour some of this 
thin syrup-like fluid upon it, inclining the plate gently from side to side, so that it may 
spread evenly over the surface, and let the superfluous fluid drain back from the right 
hand upper corner into the bottle.”476 Should we fail to rock the plate in just the right 
                                                
473 Oliver Wendell Holmes, “Sun-Painting and Sun-Sculpture,” The Atlantic Monthly (July 1861) 13-29: 
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474 Oliver Wendell Holmes, “Doings of the Sunbeam,” The Atlantic Monthly (July 1863) 1-15: 4; 
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way, “the neglect of this precaution is evident [even] in some otherwise excellent 
photographs; we notice it, for instance, in Frith’s Abou Simbel, No. 1, the magnificent 
temple façade.”477 Here, Holmes observes a disclosure of the developer’s intervention, 
materially apparent in the photographic print. But it is the developer’s job to avoid such 
disclosures, so that the photograph can seem, as the essay’s title ironically indicates, as if 
it is the product of nothing but the sunbeam.  
It seems to me worth noting that the photographic production process detailed by 
Holmes is actually an effort of reproduction; indeed, it is the photographic reproduction 
of an engraving, perhaps even an engraved reproduction. The sentence used to establish 
the subject of this photograph could also describe the process of setting up the model for 
Stoskopff’s painting: “We will fasten this picture, which we are going to copy, against 
the wall.”478 Despite the pages devoted to preparing the glass plate negative and then 
developing it, Holmes forgets this effort and looks through the glass to the represented 
picture: “we see that every line of the original and the artist’s name are reproduced as 
sharply as if the fairies had engraved them for us.”479 But, he continues, “the picture is 
perfect of its kind, only it seems to want a little more force. That we can easily get by the 
simple process called ‘intensifying’ or ‘redeveloping.’”480 He describes pouring another 
solution on the “pictured film” and repeating this several times until “the fluid grows 
brownish, and at the same time, the whole picture gains the depth of shadow in the darker 
parts we desire.”481  
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It is at this point that the development of the plate is complete; but “this is a 
negative,—not a true picture, but a reversed picture, which puts darkness for light and 
light for darkness.”482 Holmes then goes on to elaborate the process of printing and fixing 
the positive. He recommends producing a number of trial exposures for the ways in 
which these “will teach the eye to recognize the appearances of under- and over-
exposure.”483 That is, exposure has an appearance, a code, and the printer must learn to 
recognize the differences between these appearances, so that he can opt for the one in 
which these codes seem most transparent. In the series of trials Holmes describes, it is 
“No. 3,” which was exposed for “about the proper time. It is the best of the series, but the 
negative ought to have been intensified. It looks as if Miss E. V. had washed her face 
since the five-seconds [trial] picture was taken.”484 After subjecting the print to some 
“toning in the gold bath,” Holmes declares the process to be finished.485 “We have copied 
a picture, but we can take a portrait from Nature just as easily, except for a little more 
trouble in adjusting the position and managing the light,” he writes.486  
Even if Holmes had not accommodated the necessary reversal of its negative in 
the printing of the positive, the photographic code of this negative image would have 
interrupted its otherwise seeming transparency. Whereas this accommodation is always 
made for photography, it is not necessarily done relative to printmaking, even though 
reversals of left and right occur in that process as well. Although sometimes, as with their 
signatures, printmakers correct for this reversal, to let it stand would be to translate the 
painting into the medium of printmaking in a way that discloses the ‘pure language’ of 
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this intervention. While court painter to Archduke Leopold Wilhelm of the Netherlands, 
David Teniers the Younger engraved some plates for and coordinated an illustrated 
catalog of the Royal Collection in Brussels. Les Théâtre des Peintures was one of the 
earliest illustrated catalogs of Europe’s great art collections.487 Each of the catalog’s 247 
plates includes the name of the painter as well as the dimensions of the painting, but not 
the name of the engraver. In 1696 when Charles Patin visited the Royal Collections in 
Brussels, he observed,  
There are also engrav’d prints of the best pieces of this inestimable collection; 
indeed the project was well contriv’d, and the reputation of Teniers, who is the 
graver, would have been much more considerable if he had taken care to put his 
design in execution with greater success. But these sorry copies only serve to 
disguise the originals and to disfigure the finest draughts in the world.488  
 
The fact that Teniers’s prints were reproduced in reverse of their originals was perhaps 
most regrettable for Patin. As such, they altered the originals in ways that “disguised and 
disfigured them.” We rely on the further intervention of Patin’s judgment—which 
declares this the wrong kind of copy—because Teniers’ intervention cannot be assessed 
by sight alone, at least not without direct comparison to its claimed source. Patin wants a 
more transparent reproduction, something more easily realized later by photography. But 
this portrayal of their reversal, for Benjamin, would have been akin to letting the cracks 
of its reconstruction show themselves; as the artifact of the printmaker’s intervention, the 
reversal is the “pure language” of that medium into which the painted originals were 
translated. It thus appropriately ruptures the illusion of faithful representation with its 
disclosure of the means of its translation. 
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Teniers the Younger’s pursuit of such a vast reproductive enterprise and the 
recognizable deception of the reversed character of his copies may have enhanced the 
appeal of his art as a subject for trompe l’oeil painting. Susan Siegfried notes Boilly’s 
inclusion of a “rumpled Teniers print of two drinkers” in his Various Objects (1785) 
(Figure 4.18) at the Clark Institute.489 As was the case with Dorigny’s Galatea, I am as 
yet unable to locate the claimed source of this print.490 Boilly represents the print of two 
drinkers as if it is signed, but the signature is not legible in the reproductions I have seen. 
Siegfried does not source her identification of the print as being by Teniers, though a 
curator also identifies it as such in a more recent catalog from its 2011 exhibition in Lille: 
“a crumpled engraving represents two drinkers, signed ‘D[avid] Teniers.”491 In any case, 
this identification remains obscured by the genealogical reproduction of Teniers—both 
father David Teniers the Elder (1582-1649) and son David Teniers the Younger (1610-
1690) were artists whose paintings are commonly confused for one another’s. In any 
case, if it is a print, as Siegfried suggests, the signature’s presence, no matter to whom it 
belongs, may imply an intervening author in the chain of reproductions from Teniers’s 
source painting to Boilly’s trompe l’oeil painting—the printmaker. As in Les Théâtre des 
Peintures, the signature on the print does not necessarily identify the printmaker, but 
rather the painter of the painting of which this is a reproduction. Even if the signature 
legibly reads Teniers, whether Teniers made this print or the painting on which this print 
is based, or both, remains obscured.  
                                                
489 Siegfried 185. 
490 It is similar, but not identical, to a painting by Teniers the Younger at the National Gallery in 
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Reproductions, whether of or by Teniers, populate other trompe l’oeil paintings 
beyond this example by Boilly; indeed, Boilly’s painting may cite an earlier trompe l’oeil 
painting that also does so. Gaspard Grésely (1712-1756) represents an etching of a 
different painting by Teniers, but also of two drinkers, in his trompe l’oeil letter rack A 
trompe l’oeil of an engraving of David Teniers II’s Surprised Lovers, letters, a bill, two 
scrolls, a feather, a pipe and a pair of calipers attached to a partition, with a fly and a 
butterfly (Figure 4.19). Grésely also painted (or at least is linked to an 18th-century 
French school of painters who represented) several trompe l’oeil engravings as if behind 
broken glass. These include Trompe l’oeil after Les Enfants de Sylène engraved by 
Pierre Dupin after Watteau (Figure 4.20), Head study of a young girl with trompe l’oeil 
of broken glass (Figure 4.21), and Trompe l’oeil of a print with broken glass (Figure 
4.22).  
Beyond these, Lambert includes another 18th-century French example whose 
authorship is unknown, but which, as she indicates, might be by Grésely. This painting of 
an engraving under broken glass, she titles Trompe l’oeil after St. John engraved by 
Nicolas Dorigny after Domenichino (Figure 4.23). The subject of this painting is thus a 
print by Dorigny’s son, Nicolas Dorigny (1658-1746). Like his father, N. Dorigny is also 
known to have made a print of a painting, one that is then re-represented in the mode of 
trompe l’oeil by Stoskopff and Grésely, respectively. Like his father, N. Dorigny is 
known to have made a print based on a painting of Galatea, Galatea with Nereids and 
Tritons (1693) (Figure 4.24)—this time after Raphael’s painting (Figure 4.25) as opposed 
to Vouet’s. Both Stoskopff and Grésely, in taking up the subject of the elder and younger 
Dorignys’ prints respectively, represented print reproductions of roughly contemporary 
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paintings in the manner of trompe l’oeil.492 Although these observations may seem to be 
coincidences, I want to propose instead that they are productive iconographical choices—
if not of Galatea, then of prints by Dorigny or of prints after paintings by (the printmaker) 
Teniers—and that the trompe l’oeil reduplication of objects by these individuals 
redoubles the duplication already at work in the specific function of these objects, in their 
particular artistic activity, as well as, perhaps, in their personhood as sons.493 
 As discussed in Chapter 3, when John Frederick Peto elects to represent an 
engraving of Lincoln, as if it were a photograph—insofar as he obscures the linear line 
quality in paint, reproducing it instead according to a tonal look—his iconography 
exceeds the subject of Lincoln to include also the means of that image-object’s 
production. Peto translates the engraved lines of the object he represents according to the 
tonal look of the photograph upon which it is based, while disguising the strokes of his 
paintbrush. In his Lincoln and the Pfleger Stretcher (c. 1900) (Figure 3.16), the oval 
portrait of Lincoln is painted as if exhibiting additional wear and tear; as Johanna 
Drucker observes, “this particular reproduction has lost some of its earlier engraved 
clarity in his work, and its representation is muddied, blurred, incomplete, like a memory 
over time….”494 Drucker thus reads the way that Peto obscures the line quality of this 
engraving not in connection to the photographic roots of its reproduction history, but as 
literalizing the metaphorical effect of memory’s fading over time. There is a way, 
however, to understand these readings in tandem.  
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The loss of this portrait’s clarity metaphorizes memory much like the model of 
the mystic writing pad or palimpsest Sigmund Freud uses to illustrate memory’s function. 
If we think of the formation of memory as if it were written on the transparent celluloid 
sheet of the writing pad, its appearance is registered there until it is pulled up from the 
underlying layer of wax. The memory seems to disappear, but its trace is nonetheless 
preserved in the underlying wax impression. The original text or record of this palimpsest 
is effaced, partially erased, and then overwritten by another; it becomes a multi-layered 
record. I want to suggest that for Peto Lincoln’s portrait is a multi-layered record; there is 
no authentic or inviolable “Lincoln” identity. He represents this lack of referential 
coherency as a cumulative image that vibrates as a multiplicity of media, but one that 
cannot be untangled. Indeed, he may also be using an actual engraving as the model for 
an imaginary photograph, or vice versa. 
As I observed in Chapter 3, Sherrie Levine photographs other photographs, 
“‘put[ting] a picture on top of a picture so that there are times when both pictures 
disappear and other times when they’re both manifest,’” just as Peto paints an engraving 
of a photograph as yet another type of image that refuses to settle.495 The traces of the 
underlying layers of image-types accrue as now absent presences. Drucker describes 
Lincoln and the Pfleger Stretcher as a representation of the “marked absence” of the 
image—“there is no image as such.”496 By painting the verso of a canvas, he paints the 
absence of the painted image, making it present as an absence. Similarly, he paints an 
absent piece of paper, the one-time presence of which he implies with the representation 
of three nails in the lowermost stretcher bar to the left of the portrait. These nails seem to 
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secure three scraps of paper, indeed their squared orientation to one another and their 
correspondence with a slightly lighter square of the wooden stretcher bar suggest that 
they once held three corners of the same piece of paper. Of this motif in trompe l’oeil 
painter William Harnett’s practice, Drucker writes,  
The label itself has been removed, and is indicated merely by remnant corners and 
by the convincing phantom of its erstwhile presence—a lighter patch distinct from 
the surrounding panel of wood. In this device, Harnett presents the conceptual 
face of his practice, depicting an unrepresentable absence: this blank patch is not a 
surrogate, but a ghostly trace of something once present. This is a rendering of 
absence marked to be perceived as an absence.497  
 
By representing objects as literally absent—torn away, for example—trompe l’oeil artists 
represent the elusivity of the (lost) original.  
Beyond that, their representations of absence as presence tempt viewers to fill in 
the gaps of these represented losses, indeed to see through them or to look past them. 
Notably art historians often look past these traces of lost objects, covering over or filling 
in the gaps in their representation to arrive at coherent interpretations. When John 
Wilmerding describes the way that a bowie knife hangs in Peto’s Reminiscences of 1865 
(1897) (Figure 3.43) so that it obliterates the first word of a painted calling card, but 
nonetheless reads it as, “Head of the House,” he fills in the obscured text to imagine its 
legibility, as if its meaning were patently manifest. Doing so allows him to interpret the 
painting of Lincoln as a symbolic double of the artist’s father who had recently died; the 
bowie knife thus cuts off the “head” in “head of the house” in simultaneous reference to 
Lincoln and Peto’s father: “two lives cut down by death, individuals who were heads of 
national and personal families, respectively.”498 But already, his reading covers over 
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something not actually legible in the painting. The envelope represented in the painting 
does not read, “Head of the House,” but rather “of the House.” While Wilmerding 
accounts for this painterly obfuscation nicely by reading it as a visual severing of the 
head from its household, I think Peto’s painting purposefully obscures the kind of 
straightforward legibility that Wilmerding assumes it to have.  
Peto’s fellow trompe l’oeil painter, friend, and mentor, William Harnett, had 
painted a trompe l’oeil letter rack in 1879, The Artist’s Letter Rack (Figure 3.17), which 
featured an envelope addressed to the “lad[y] of the house.” I mention this, at the very 
least, to suggest that the phrase “of the house” is not necessarily begun with the word 
“head.” In Harnett’s painting, too, part of the phrase is obscured, here, by the pink strap 
behind which the envelope appears to be tucked. If we were to seek clues about the 
obscured letter from the information available on the other painted cards and envelopes in 
Harnett’s image, we would find no apparent “lady of the house.” We might assume that 
the “C.” of “C.C. Peir[son?] & Sons” on one envelope corresponds to the “Charles” of 
another, but neither of these suggests the presence of a lady. Perhaps the pink strap 
obscures not a “y,” but an “s,” addressing the “lads of the house.” My point is not to pin 
down an actual identification of the obscured information; instead it is to address the 
mode of its presentation. That is, to read the painting depends upon ignoring the gaps in 
its presentation by filling in the implied letters to arrive at an imaginary coherence of 
representation, as Holmes did relative to the photograph of the Temple Bar.  
That both Holmes and Wilmerding fill in these gaps demonstrates a shared 
spectatorial dynamic of both photography and trompe l’oeil. They coax viewers to look 
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past what is actually apparent in print, pixel, or paint, to instead imagine the reality of 
what is there as representation. Peto already understood this play between concealing and 
revealing from Harnett’s paintings and used it to similar effect in his own. The year after 
Harnett painted The Artist’s Letter Rack, Peto painted his own pink-strapped version, 
Rack Picture with Telegraph, Letter and Postcards (1880) (Figure 4.26). The pink straps 
of this painting similarly interrupt the name of an addressee on one envelope, in this case 
the first two letters of what otherwise appears to be the artist’s own name, “hn F. Peto.” 
Peto thus uses the pink strap of his painted letter rack to literally carry out the task of the 
trompe l’oeil painter: to eliminate, at least initially, the trace of the artist.  
Peto, however, does not wholly disappear behind the pink strap. This partial 
disappearance doubles Wilmerding’s observations about his technique: Peto “prefers to 
exploit, rather than suppress the mark of his brushwork.”499 Wilmerding continues, “In 
contrast to Harnett’s objectivity, Peto became increasingly subjective, if not 
autobiographical.”500 This puts a little too much argumentational pressure on Peto’s 
somewhat looser brushwork, I think, especially considering that he continues to employ 
centuries-old trompe l’oeil iconography and compositional strategies. Instead I think 
Peto’s decision to paint with a softer line quality demonstrates his application of another 
of Harnett’s lessons, as well as his continued investment in the visual vibrations between 
illusion and disclosure available in trompe l’oeil painting. Whereas Wilmerding assumes 
that looser brushwork only works to disrupt the illusionism of a trompe l’oeil image, we 
might instead consider the ways in which this disclosure fuels additional levels of illusion 
within the image. The looser brushwork, then, like the blurred or illegible appearance of 
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Harnett’s represented newspaper clippings, according to Leja, allows viewers to let down 
their guard about the status of the painting as such, making them newly vulnerable to the 
surprise of something that seems to surpass representation.  
In Lincoln and the Pfleger Stretcher, Peto represents both the image of the 
painting and a piece of paper—perhaps even the label identifying the painting—as 
absent—as either turned or torn away. In contrast, the portrait of Lincoln seems wholly 
present—intact and fully visible. The extent to which one might think it is physically 
present as an object constitutes its trompe l’oeil trick, but this trick prompts the disclosure 
of his painterly intervention, re-coding the syntax of its engraved lines in paint according 
to the tonal look of the photograph upon which it is based. The image-object vibrates 
between seeming presence and absence, as well as between presence as painting, 
engraving, or photograph. By painting the engraving of the photograph of Lincoln as if 
present and as if tattered or mishandled, Peto both ruptures and reasserts its auratic 
presence. While the material qualities of the object—the oval engraving—may 
deteriorate and disappear, the reproduction of the image—recoded into new 
materialities—will go on.  
Peto intervenes into the image of Lincoln most notably to efface the mouth of the 
great orator. Lincoln’s embodied voice can speak no more, but his words—as written 
images—can still be read. The material representative of an image may fade, but not the 
image or “icon,” as long as it continues to be reproduced. Thomas De Quincey’s 1845 
essay “The Palimpsest” describes its propensity to preserve over its intention to destroy; 
but rather than a utopian fantasy of eternal preservation, the palimpsest also demonstrates 
223 
 
the necessary disappearance and contamination of that which is preserved.501 These shifts 
or losses suffered by the image in its re-coding remain legible, if we know how to look 
for them. And rather than recuperating originality or authenticity, these losses remain 
present as aspects of the copy. 
It is striking to me that the losses suffered in the reproduction of the work of art—
the inaccuracies or imperfections—accrue to become visible signifiers of the object’s 
status as a reproduction. The translation of Leah or Rachel from marble to bronze, for 
example, is visible according to its loss of legibility. In Chapter 3, Sherrie Levine’s 
photograph of a mass reproduction of Walker Evans’s photograph was described by 
Molly Nesbit as “less a copy than a shift,” especially insofar as Levine made the finished 
print from an internegative, “a thinner, lighter, less intensely toned second generation.”502 
These visible losses function as the marks of manufacture, especially for those who deem 
the reproduction an inferior version of the auratic original. But in identifying these 
traces—these visible losses or present absences—they extend auratic possibility to the 
reproduction. Douglas Crimp observes this return of the aura in the work of Sherrie 
Levine; aura returns, but not as a recuperation, and is instead shown to be “only an aspect 
of the copy, not the original.”503 
Rather than recuperating the aura of the original, which reproduction destroys, 
this lost aura marks the reproduction as a loss, and this loss acquires its own aura, 
marking its presence at the place where it happens not to be. To describe the losses 
inherent to reproduction as aura seems precisely opposite Benjamin’s meaning, for in his 
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terms the aura insists on the presence of the original and its authenticity. But this aura is 
present as absence; this presence, which “is not there,” is, as Crimp describes it, a 
“ghostly aspect of presence that is its excess, its supplement.”504  
The aura of a reproduction discloses the unbridgeable distance from the (original) 
thing represented; its absence, as Crimp reminds us, is the condition for all 
representation. It is this condition, which we enjoyably disavow via fantasies of its 
material transparency which seem to make the subject present for us (it is this enjoyment 
which I pursue in the final chapter). That is, as Sherrie Levine articulates, “the desire of 
representation exists only insofar as it never be fulfilled, insofar as the original always be 
deferred. It is only in the absence of the original that representation may take place.”505 
When Levine showed her re-photography of Edward Weston’s young nude son (Figure 
4.27) to a friend, he reportedly remarked that “they only made him want to see the 
originals. ‘Of course, [Levine] replied, ‘and the originals make you want to see that little 
boy, but when you see the boy, the art is gone.’”506 This unrealizable desire of 
representation is perpetually thematized in the reception of trompe l’oeil paintings—
Zeuxis wants to see behind the curtain; Emperor Ferdinand wants to see the engraving, 
which in turn will make him want to see Vouet’s painting; Leja’s viewer wants to touch 
the textured surfaces, Boilly’s viewer wants to report the broken glass. 
Sherrie Levine’s work is exemplary of the kind of photographic activity Crimp 
identifies as postmodern, insofar as it questions the activity of representation through 
photographic modes, particularly those aspects of photography that have to do with 
reproduction, “with copies, and copies of copies. The extraordinary presence of their 
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work,” Crimp writes, “is effected through absence, through its unbridgeable distance 
from the original, from even the possibility of an original as a ‘ghostly aspect of presence 
that is its excess, its supplement.’”507 But Benjamin describes the aura’s presence 
according to its “unique phenomenon of a distance, however how close it may be.”508 
Hughes too summarizes the aura with similar emphasis on its imposition of distance: aura 
is “that nimbus of awe with which the cult surrounds the image and which establishes a 
psychological distance between the believing spectator and the statue itself.”509 It is this 
phenomenon of distance that reproduction destroys in its effort to bring things closer. 
But because Crimp associates Benjamin’s aura with “that aspect of the work that 
can be put to the test of chemical analysis or of connoisseurship, that aspect which the 
discipline of art history, at least in its guise as Kunstwissenschaft, is able to prove or 
disprove,” he finds the ghostly quality of presence in postmodern photography “to be just 
the opposite” of the aura.510 Because art historical attention to the auratic materiality of 
the work of art intends to prove its authenticity, and because photography made these 
tests irrelevant—“overturn[ing] the judgment-seat of art” which fetishistically sought out 
credentials for the photographer—Crimp finds no room in postmodern photography for 
the “hand” or “eye” of the artist. But signs of the work’s manufacture—whether linked to 
a particular authorial subject or not—adhere, and these are typically described as losses—
they are present as absence. Describing them as such actually helps us to hold on to 
Benjamin’s aura to account for the ghostly type of presence Crimp locates in the work of 
Sherrie Levine, for example, rather than to declare it “just the opposite.”  
                                                
507 Ibid., 94. 
508 Benjamin, WOA, 222. And as the “unique appearance or semblance of distance, no matter how close it 
may be” (Benjamin, LHP, 518). 
509 Hughes 41. 
510 Crimp 94. 
226 
 
Hughes helpfully summarizes aura, in its other meaning, as “that sense of 
uniqueness gained from inspection of surface marks left on an object by its manufacture 
and its subsequent passage through time.”511 This “manufacture” can imply an author, but 
it can also be used more generally to account for the historical circumstances of its 
production. Hughes continues, “Facture and damage are interpreted as respectively signs 
of authorship and of historical authenticity…. It is the beholder who must actively 
interpret these traces to invest the work with a reverential nimbus.”512 Authorship and 
authenticity are interpretations available from the inspection of the signs of manufacture, 
but they are not the only interpretations available. Indeed, to arrive at these 
interpretations requires the beholder’s belief in these values and her investment of them 
in a particular object. As a beholder of sculptural reproductions, Francis I apparently was 
prepared to activate the auratic traces of Michelangelo’s excellent original effort even at 
the same time that they inherited the (visible or invisible) (auratic) traces of Primaticcio’s 
casting. 
The interpretations of the aura—as authored and authentic—are precisely those 
that postmodern photographers seek to “displace,” rather than to “recuperate.”513 And as 
if following Benjamin’s recommendation, they use a strategy of emptying the object of 
its aura to do so. It was Eugène Atget who for Benjamin “initiated the liberation of the 
object from the aura;” he did so by emptying his photographs not only of mood, but also 
of people. It is according to this “emptying operation, the depletion of the aura, the 
contestation of the uniqueness of the work of art” that Crimp locates a shared strategy 
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with art of the late 20th century.514 But perhaps the evacuation of the aura could never be 
fully realized. Perhaps it is better to say that Atget empties the aura of its associations 
with authorship or authenticity, rather than that he destroys the aura itself. With 
mechanical reproduction, as Benjamin articulates, “the semblance of [art’s] autonomy 
disappeared forever.”515 It is not that the auratic signifier disappears, but that its 
signification of autonomy does. 
The emptiness of Atget’s photographs, for example of deserted Paris streets, 
causes Benjamin to describe them as “scenes of a crime;” he continues, “The scene of the 
crime, too, is deserted; it is photographed for the purpose of establishing evidence.”516 
This description reminds not only me, but also Tamara Trodd, of the photographs of 
Thomas Demand, who presents empty scenes that in many cases are modeled after scenes 
of a crime. Of Atget’s photographs, Benjamin describes the way they “suck the aura out 
of reality like water from a sinking ship.”517 Demand’s photographs “seem to have had 
something pumped out of them, leaving them airless and confined. Thus, in the work of 
both there is a simultaneous sense of the emptiness of non-art and of curiously intensified 
and uncomfortable effect, summed up in the way that, in Benjamin’s descriptions, 
Atget’s work appears emphatically de-auratic and uncanny.”518 
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It is by way of the uncanny effect of this emptiness that, as Trodd suggests, 
Benjamin leaves room in his text “to let the notion of ‘aura’ back in.”519 It was in the 
uncanny effect of early photographs that Benjamin located the possibility of a 
photographic aura. In David Octavius Hill’s photography, as opposed to his paintings—
which were sometimes based on photographs, as in his 1843 fresco of the Church of 
Scotland—, “we encounter something new and strange…there remains something that 
goes beyond testimony to the photographer’s art, something that cannot be silenced, that 
fills you with an unruly desire to know what her name was, the woman who was alive 
there, who even now is still real and will never consent to be wholly absorbed in ‘art.’”520 
Her distance from us—as someone who was alive there—seems presently available—
even now still real—in what seems to be “a strange weave of space and time;” this is how 
Benjamin transfers the aura to the subject of the photograph, rather than discovering it in 
the art or manufacture of photography.521 Because the aura of the female subject does not 
submit to becoming ‘art,’ this convinces him to look through the photograph to its image; 
in doing so, he overlooks, I want to say, the persistence of an aura signaled by the marks 
of that object’s manufacture—its codes.  
This uncanny effect returns in Benjamin’s description of Atget’s photographs, 
now as the result of his evacuation of both its auratic cult value and the human face and 
figure from the photograph. It is in the refusal to represent an (auratic) human subject, to 
instead represent the signs of their one-time presence—“the tables after people have 
finished eating and left, the dishes not yet cleared away”—, as in Harnett’s paintings of 
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well-used objects, that the human subject seems uncannily present. The aura thus returns 
in the effort to absent it—present as absence.522  
Benjamin does not make room for the possibility that the photographs of the 
Church of Scotland remain uncannily present as absence in Hill’s painted 1843 fresco, in 
the way that Weston’s photographs remain uncannily present as absence in Levine’s re-
photography. But he also overlooks the fact that he experiences the aura of early 
photographs by way of reproduction; he finds “the charm of old photographs, available in 
fine recent publications” ready to use “for real insights into their nature.”523 These auratic 
traces of the reproduction trigger an involuntary memory tied to our one-time 
unconscious perception thereof, and thus, they remain uncannily visible in their seeming 
invisibility.  
Even as the material traces of reproduction become increasingly invisible, we 
remain unconsciously aware of them. But critics such as Sassoon worry that we won’t see 
these interventions, that knowledge of what is lost won’t adhere to the digital 
reproduction. Digital archiving, she writes, “creates an image bank of auratic digital 
objects without reference to associated contexts or clues as to their previous physical 
embodiment.”524 These digitally reproduced “quasi-objects” obtain an illusory “aura of 
transcendence and independence.”525 She fears that we might be duped by these phony 
auras into supplanting our experience of the material (multiply reproduced, but unique) 
object with that of its digital reproduction. This can occur inasmuch as we accept a 
likeness for the object itself; digitization “empt[ies] the photograph of all visual clues 
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based on its materiality and leav[es] it to be judged solely on its image content.”526 But 
this understanding of digital reproduction reproduces a premature mourning of the loss of 
materiality, one which already occurred relative to photography’s dematerialization of 
that which it photographed, and now occurs relative to digitization’s dematerialization of 
the photograph; instead, we ought to remember the materiality that clings to digital 
reproduction as well. Consider this example:  
using a lupe [sic] to magnify detail in an original photograph, for instance, 
physically draws the viewer into the core materiality of the object to interact with 
the larger detail under view, while almost touching the object’s surface. Enlarging 
a digital image involves using a keyboard or mouse while maintaining physical 
distance from the screen image. Thus, an intermediate technology used to view a 
digital surrogate is unable to replicate the interactive nature and process of 
viewing experienced with a material object.”527  
 
The difference is not so clear, however. Both the physical and digital efforts to magnify, 
however, achieve the same goal: they allow observation at high magnification of an 
object—either the material photograph or the digital image of that photograph. Having 
taken great care to distinguish these relative to the photographic print, Sassoon 
mistakenly conflates the image and object when it comes to digital reproduction. 
Consider what would happen to her example if we said that the photographic print depicts 
Picasso’s Les Demoiselles d’Avignon; then looking through the loupe gets us no closer to 
the material presence of the paint on canvas photographically reproduced than the 
computer’s virtual enlargement does to the material presence of the photographic print 
digitally reproduced. Enlarging an image on a computer beyond its ideal resolution 
reveals, like the loupe held too closely to the photograph, not the image, but the material 
through which that image is constituted—whether pixels or paper fibers. Indeed, we 
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might think of this experience of limited resolution akin to the discovery that the 
photograph in Peto’s painting is a replication of the tonal look of photography; these are 
reminders about both the effort to reproduce the object as a convincingly accurate image 
and that image’s status as a material object. 
Revealing the persistent materiality of photographs—whether analog or digital, 
but almost always repeatedly reproduced and widely distributed—is a central concern of 
Thomas Demand’s trompe l’oeil photography. But just as digitization efforts are 
misunderstood as de-materializing or misleading, Demand’s project is often similarly 
misunderstood. His Window (1998) (Figure 1.17), which I discussed in Chapter 1, was 
included in an exhibition Supermodel at the Massachusetts Museum of Contemporary Art 
(MassMoCA), a show focused on photographs of architectural models and fake buildings 
by nine contemporary artists. As Richard Eoin Nash writes in a review of the exhibition, 
these works “[eschew] the conventional documentary tradition of representing the built 
environment, the exhibition takes for its subject the photographic dissolution of perceived 
reality.”528 Nash continues, in line with the predominating reception of this photographic 
strategy, by describing how the work troubles the apparently referential relationship 
between a photograph and its object. Extending the fear of photography’s irreality to 
architecture, Nash worries that “architecture appears not to require actual buildings 
anymore.”529 
Depending on our point of view, we either find something of an endorsement of 
or a rebuttal to Nash’s rather hyperbolic fear in Thomas Demand’s 2000 photograph 
Model (Figure 4.28). Here, we see a room with a window and a table, upon which there is 
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an architectural model. Looking through the darkened window, we learn that it is night 
and assume that the architects who normally populate this office would not have been 
there for the photograph because they had already gone home for the evening. But as we 
continue to look, our look through this darkened window becomes instead a look at it; its 
pane of glass has no sheen, no transparency, its surface, like every other surface in the 
space, has the same strange matte quality. We inspect more closely, perhaps spying an 
uneven edge or seam, until we realize that the architectural model on the table is not the 
only model in this photograph, rather the entire scene is a model, a paper construction. 
Demand constructs life-size, three-dimensional paper models that he photographs with a 
large format analog camera, and then destroys, exhibiting only the resulting image, which 
is roughly to scale, and thus a photograph of about five to nine feet in size. Here his 
represented content – the architectural model – self-reflexively doubles his process of 
building paper models. Just as Stoskopff paints a print in the manner of trompe l’oeil to 
prompt us to look for that which ‘lies behind’ it—Dorigny’s engraving and Vouet’s 
painting—Demand photographs a model in a modified trompe l’oeil, prompting us to 
look for that which ‘lies behind’ it.  
On the one hand, Demand’s photograph is the literal result of an elaborate 
construction process. By photographing the soon-to-be-destroyed paper models rather 
than displaying them, he disguises this construction and does so using a medium we have 
come to rely on for its objectivity and documentary capacity.  His photograph can thus 
trick us in a way that resonates with our growing fears of photography’s truth-telling 
capacity, in the face of increasingly invisible digital interventions via programs like 
Photoshop. Indeed this worry is only heightened when critics realize that Demand’s 
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images are not just extemporaneous constructions—the brainchildren of a creative artist, 
much like the models produced by architects—but instead are modeled after mass media 
photographs. Thus, Demand’s constructions are actually re-constructions that erase any 
signs of the historical specificity of the site documented by the “original” images.  That 
the photographs he chooses to reconstruct are typically of sites where something 
historically tragic or infamous has occurred further dramatizes the vulnerability we might 
experience when faced with his manipulated versions of these places. In this way, his 
photographs seem to undermine “photography’s capacity as witness to the Real,” forcing 
us to relinquish any capacity for the photograph to bear witness and perhaps, like Nash, 
to lose faith in the reality of the built world itself. 530 
Such a suspicion about a one-to-one correspondence of document and reality 
structures at least part of this artistic strategy.  But if we understand Demand’s strategy 
only in terms of how it empties the image, as for example Camille Morineau claims in 
her article “The Empty Image,” then we repeat postmodernism’s evacuation of any 
adherence of the real from photography, reformulating our understanding of photography 
according to a binary logic in which it is either objective documentation or fictive 
construction. But as Morineau herself writes, “For the generation [of artists] that emerged 
in the 1990s, the image is not only photographic but hybrid, a construction with no clear 
relation to the real.”531  But just as she describes the photograph as hybrid, she re-asserts 
its lack of clear relation to the real. As hybrid something of its relation to the real would 
be maintained at the same time that that relationship would be made unclear.  
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By emptying Demand’s image, Morineau can assert that the artistic strategy of 
photographing built architectural models produces a “wholly digital image.”532  Digital 
interventions to correct or alter photographic images have become standard, yet invisible 
practice. Morineau links the historical specificity of digitization’s impact on photography 
to photography’s impact on painting a century earlier.  “If the coexistence of painting and 
photography set artists thinking about the status of the pictorial image, then what are the 
questions raised by the coexistence of photography and digital technology?”533  Her 
question conflates painting with digital technology, suggesting that both do something to 
complicate photography’s status as a pictorial image. Implicitly for Morineau, whereas 
photography’s invention accomplished quite readily, even automatically, a quality of 
realism that was unrealizable for realist painters because of the necessarily subjective 
interventions of their hands, even diverting their pictorial efforts away from realism, now 
digital technology intervenes into photography’s documentary status.  If these digital 
efforts intervene invisibly, then Morineau worries that digital photography will be able to 
trick us into mistaking photography for what is actually closer to painting.  
As a tricky kind of painting, Demand’s photography becomes aligned with that of 
trompe l’oeil; I think that even this slippery sort of logic is worth further consideration. 
Nash actually describes his experience in front of another of Demand’s photographs as 
one of being tricked and even describes the work’s effect as trompe l’oeil. Nash’s attempt 
to look through the vertical blinds of Demand’s Window (2000), results in his discovery 
that he had been “fooled” by its “trompe l’oeil” effect.534 Rhetorically this critic not only 
turns Demand’s photograph into a painting—Parrhasius’s painted curtain—but beyond 
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that, he turns it into a painting capable of convincing a viewer that a representation is a 
reality. For many, this is the power and the threat of Demand’s work; “If we can be 
convinced by a photograph that a model is a real building, we might begin to doubt the 
reality of documents everywhere.”535 Both Parrhasius and Demand could “convince” 
viewers because their representations looked real. But the stakes of this trick seem 
different in the case of Demand because of photography’s documentary function. This 
documentary function has to do with the automated and chemical process of 
photography, which allows the photograph to be understood as causally related to its 
referent. In photography theory, this causal relationship has been characterized as 
indexical. 
But Demand’s photographs are often misunderstood as having no index or 
referent: Morineau describes the way that Demand empties his photographs of “any 
relation to the real;” she writes, “How is it possible to look at these uncertain images that 
have no unity, no index or referent, [no] history or origin?”536 I say that this is a 
misunderstanding because his photographs do still relate indexically to a referent; they 
are causally related to the paper models he has built and then photographed. Mistaking 
that referent for the real thing, rather than a construction thereof, does not rid the 
photograph of indexicality; the paper construction is the referent that adheres. If we 
mistook the photograph of the paper model for a photograph of a real room with a paper 
model, it was only because of how it looked. It is photography’s realism that contributes 
to our expectation of its truth or authenticity, so that when photography’s realism is 
disrupted, so too is its supposedly truthful and authentic relation to the real via its 
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indexical referentiality. Thus, when the realism of Demand’s photographs is undone by a 
stray pencil mark or an uneven edge, critics confuse this sign of the referent’s 
construction with a manipulation of the photograph’s indexical relationship and its 
presumed promise of truth.   
This uneven edge is not only a sign of the referent’s construction; it is another 
index – a trace record of Demand’s (translation) process, his meticulous wielding of 
scissors. It is our recognition of this index that disrupts the truthfulness we associated 
with the photograph’s index. As such, we begin to see how inappropriate it is to yoke 
truth claims to indexicality. Indeed, as film and new media theorist D.N. Rodowick 
writes, “a photograph can neither lie nor tell the truth; it only denotes (automatically 
registers space) and designates (is causally related to a past state of affairs).”537 Demand’s 
photograph might trick us about the constructed-ness of its subject, but it doesn’t lie; it 
denotes and designates the paper construction and its resemblance to the real world. In 
that Demand shows us the possibility of producing “misleading images that appear 
spatially consistent and perceptually real,” he stages the dominant fear about digital 
photography.538  Indeed this is what prompted Morineau to describe Demand’s 
construction within the image as rendering it a “wholly digital image.”539 For new media 
theorist Lev Manovich, it is digital intervention that disrupts photography’s status as a 
“recording medium by allowing manual construction within the image.” As a result, 
photography, he writes, “is no longer an indexical media technology but, rather, a 
subgenre of painting.”540  
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But, like Demand’s paper model, painting also has an index – a sign that exhibits 
its cause – in the brushwork or trace of the painter’s point of contact with the canvas. It is 
this index – the telltale sign of brushwork – that trompe l’oeil painting must disguise in 
order for the trick to succeed. That is, the trompe l’oeil work of art uses resemblance or 
perceptual realism to disguise the indexical trace of its painted process. When it succeeds, 
its illusionism is typically described as photographic. Here, we might think of Chuck 
Close’s photorealistic paintings (Figure 3.9), which aspire to spatial descriptions that are 
as exacting as those of photography and indeed that depend on photography as their 
models. But describing painting’s realism as photographic repeats the misunderstanding 
that a photograph is necessarily a likeness: it can be out-of-focus and over- or 
underexposed beyond recognition. Such photographs display their indexical relationship 
to, rather than their iconic resemblance of, the physical world. Trompe l’oeil paintings 
cannot display their indexical trace initially, but they have to eventually.  Otherwise, the 
trick that Parrhasius’ curtain is a painting and not a real curtain may never be discovered.   
By describing digital intervention in photography as a ‘subgenre of painting,’ 
Manovich looks to place digital image-making in a history of hand-painted animation 
practice. Cel animation, insofar as it is understood as the hand drawing of sequential 
images, is typically seen to undo film’s indexicality. But Rodowick finds that cel 
animation, insofar as it is understood as the photographing of hand-drawn images frame 
by frame to produce an illusion of movement, has “a strong indexical quality,” despite its 
imaginative use and malleability.541 For Rodowick, it is crucial that each animated cel is 
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photographed, not that it’s also drawn. He writes, “Here, as in all other cases, the camera 
records and documents a past process that took place in the physical world.”542   
This connects, I think, to Demand’s project.543 Like the hand drawings of cel 
animation, Demand’s handmade constructions are photographed. Here again, the camera 
records the results of Demand’s process all of which took place, painstakingly, in the 
physical world of paper, cardboard, and glue. But, what seems crucial is our ability to 
(eventually) perceive the index of this construction within the image: the drawn penguins 
in Mary Poppins, for example, are perceptually distinct from the human Dick van Dyke 
and this distinction is maintained in the film; they are understood to be existentially 
distinct (Figure 4.29).544   
But the constructed elements in Demand’s photographs are not as readily 
perceptually distinct, at least not initially; there is no ‘real-world’ point of contrast, no 
Dick van Dyke or other human subject, within the image. Indeed, the trompe l’oeil 
illusion that I described can occur because we don’t initially perceive the existential 
distinction in his photographs between his paper models and the real world.  The paper 
models look (at first) to be ‘ontologically equivalent’ to the real world, at least to the 
extent that it would be registered and represented by a photograph. 
Similarly and increasingly, digital image synthesis presents humans and 
animations together in ways that are perceptually indistinct. In The Social Network (dir. 
David Fincher, U.S., 2010), two unrelated and non-identical actors portray two identical 
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twins; the face of one actor, Josh Pence, was digitally replaced by the face of the other 
actor, Armie Hammer, producing the filmic illusion that the two actors are identical twins 
playing identical twins (Figure 4.30a-b). In the film, the digitally replaced twin can look 
ontologically equivalent to the filmed twin. The invisibility of this digital intervention is 
the commonly cited source of digital anxiety; if we are unable to perceive the difference 
between the real world elements and the digitally constructed elements within a 
photograph, then we are more apt to be tricked by photography. But insofar as 
cinematographer Jeff Cronenweth’s digital capture imported the image of both human 
actors, Hammer and Pence, into the world of digital synthesis, the actors and animations 
don’t just look “ontologically equivalent,” for Rodowick, they are “ontologically 
equivalent.”545 Whether captured by digital cameras or synthesized on computers, they 
are both numerical code. 
In digital photography, the moment of capture is immediately and automatically 
transcoded, that is, converted into code. This quantifiable and symbolic data can then take 
any form whatsoever (thus Manovich’s ‘subgenre of painting’), but it tends to take a form 
that looks perceptually indistinct from the real world. This is what Rodowick calls the 
“paradox of ‘perceptual realism.’”546 That is, the imagined painterly freedom of digital 
image production is paradoxically geared toward the “realist” conventions of 
photography.   
While Demand does not use a digital camera, I think his process of building paper 
models literalizes this digital transcoding process. By producing perceptually realistic 
images that structurally correspond to a viewer’s experience of photographic space, he 
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literalizes the realist conventions of digital image-makers. Both he and digital filmmakers 
build the content of their images to conform to our expectations of photographic 
realism.547 Demand’s constructions are built (and lit) to be photographed; they cheat for 
that purpose: tops or undersides of tables are built relative to the high or low camera 
angle; backsides of objects do not need to be built because of their frontal orientation to 
the camera.   
But this logic of photographic realism is not Demand’s only constraint. His paper 
models are not just constructions; they are reconstructions. They reference a source, a 
photographic source that he typically finds in mass media publications.  Thus, they are 
bound to the information established by this source image. In this way, he also literalizes 
the way that digitization transcodes the point of capture into another symbolic 
representation of that data.  His source photograph literalizes the digital camera’s point of 
capture, which he then manipulates in the form of his paper constructions; as such, his 
source photograph is like the “raw material” of “live-action footage” that digital 
filmmakers can, according to Manovich, manipulate “by hand.”548  
Instead of converting the source image into binary numeric symbols, he manifests 
the terms of the digital in entirely analogical ways. He literally ‘cuts and pastes’ the scene 
of the photograph back together, while literalizing another hallmark of the digital; its 
“inevitable loss of information.”549 Demand refuses to supply any potentially 
individuating sign that might help us link his photograph to its source photograph. 
Whereas in Model, this erasure was naturalized by our assumptions about architectural 
models – they show no marks of use or specific identifiers—elsewhere, as in Poll of 2001 
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(Figure 4.31), the post-it notes without reminders, the ballots without votes, the 
telephones without numbers refuse any (even analog) display of the symbolic coding 
central to digital transcoding.   
Demand’s literalized ‘digit’-alizations draw out the goal of perceptual realism at 
the heart of digital transcoding. As in The Social Network’s seamless digital replacement 
of one actor’s face with another, “[g]iven enough resolution, a digital[ly filmed image] 
can simulate the look of a[n] … analogical image.”550 While digital image-making thus 
aims toward the terms of photographic likeness, Demand’s image-making only aims for 
this as our initial impression. This not only helps us to see a crucial distinction between 
Demand’s project and the efforts of digital media, but it helps us to name that distinction 
as the former’s investment in the continuing tradition of trompe l’oeil practice. Spying a 
single pencil mark or seam is enough to let Demand’s viewer, like the one watching Mary 
Poppins’ penguins, perceive the construction within the image as ontologically and 
existentially distinct from the real world. In this way, his trompe l’oeil images allow the 
indices of their construction to become visible. Demand allows the goal of photographic 
realism to fail. Doing so reminds us that spatial semblance is not photography’s primary 
power. 
The logic of photography’s index, determined by its causal relations or ‘real 
connections,’ never had a necessary relationship of resemblance. A weathervane, for 
example, can index the wind’s direction without resembling the wind. Rodowick defines 
the index as “a present trace of a past action whose causal origins must be found through 
reasoned conjecture.”551 Photography’s index, in this way, implies two different kinds of 
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interactivity: the ‘touch’ of the trace through light and chemical interaction, as well as the 
viewer’s interaction through ‘reasoned conjecture’ to discover the cause of an image. I 
think Demand literalizes both versions of interactivity in his project. His touch literalizes 
the photographic trace, denoting the image’s cause, but insofar as this touch re-touches a 
source image, it also literalizes his ‘digital’ transcoding of that image. Digital 
interactivity, for Manovich, has to do with the user becoming co-author of the work, 
interacting (by touching) a media object to choose elements to display or paths to follow.  
Demand’s version of the source image is the only version we see; he physically 
chooses what to show and what to withhold. His withholdings eventually upset the 
perceptual realism of the final image; they become visibly absent traces of his past 
actions upon the paper construction, signs of his co-authorship. When we recognize the 
index of his intervention, we experience a trompe l’oeil rupture in our viewing experience 
of the photograph. He literally re-touches a source photograph and our discovery of this 
touches us; we have a bodily experience of confusion or surprise that prompts our own 
interaction with the image. Our confusion prompts our desire to know how Demand built 
his image to look this way, which we can discover through ‘reasoned conjecture.’ But the 
cause of Demand’s image exceeds his paper intervention. It includes his selection of the 
source image and the initial reason someone else took that photograph.   
But Demand intervenes here too, withholding this cause. His banal titles refuse 
any historical specificity. Instead, it is up to us to remember the source by imaginarily re-
constructing that which Demand has withheld from his paper reconstructions. Returning 
to Poll, we may recall a more populated version of this scene from newspapers or 
magazines reporting the vote recount of the 2000 U.S. presidential election. But its 
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identification as such is not just a name game, even though art historians and curators 
often treat it like one by suggesting explicit sources in wall or catalog text accompanying 
exhibitions of his work. In an interview, Demand regrets this one-to-one identification; 
“if you label [it,]” he says, “it becomes too much like Madame Tussaud’s—people 
compare before and after.” Instead, he says, “I just did something about the knowledge 
that you and I have about [it].” His refusal to supply the now-lost source image insists 
that something of the limitations of our knowledge remains; he resists letting the site of a 
historic or tragic event seem wholly communicable and contained. Instead, he employs a 
trompe l’oeil strategy, which unsettles our certainty about the reality of his photograph, to 
prolong our uncertainty about its identification and to insist that our re-membering and 
re-construction of the source remain active through our ‘reasoned conjecture.’   
Notably, Demand is discouraging comparison of the source image and his final 
photograph in terms of spatial correspondence or of resemblance. I think that he is 
warning against our reliance on the criterion of resemblance for understanding the 
indexical or causal logic of the photograph. Rodowick insists that photography’s primary 
power lies in its temporal and existential qualities: a photograph is not necessarily a 
likeness, but an assertion of existence in past space-time.552 Demand discourages 
comparison of his source photograph and final photograph in terms of resemblance, and 
notably he does so through language that situates them temporally: “before and after.” If 
we resist taking his discouragement to think of the works as “before” and “after” wholly 
at face value, we might recognize a kind of misdirection that works to remind us of the 
temporal situation and relation of his photograph to another, rather than (or in addition to) 
its resemblance-based and comparatively derived identity.  
                                                
552 Ibid., 58. 
244 
 
His use of a photographic model to construct a paper model, even when not 
literally doubled as in Model, becomes another opportunity to confuse the stakes of 
spatial correspondence with those of temporal indication. Inasmuch as the Platonic model 
has been central to a history of the mimetic tradition in the visual arts, Demand contends 
with its long-standing implications about originals and copies. But insofar as the concept 
of the model is temporally oriented toward a future realization and simultaneously toward 
a past prototype, Demand uses the model for these temporal implications. The temporal 
layers thicken when he retrospectively returns the already-realized building site to its 
‘before,’ in the form of the paper model, and to its ‘innocent before,’ by doing this after a 
tragic or historic event has occurred there.   
Beyond this, Demand’s particular invocation of Madame Tussaud is interesting 
for the ways in which her practice was a pre-photographic memorial portraiture; her first 
wax memorial portraits were death masks of Marat and Robespierre.553 Perhaps the 
difference that Demand asserts between his own practice and hers is that her effort is not 
one meant to unsettle the indexical relationship—and thus the reality claim—between her 
subject and her representation thereof; it intends to pass as a substitute for that referent. 
As has been observed at length, Demand’s project has primarily been thought of as one 
concerned with the meticulous evacuation of the index. But its understanding as such is a 
misunderstanding. He may evacuate the indices of use, the aura of its subject’s one-time 
presence in time and space, or of the crime that took place there, but his photographing of 
the “evacuated” site does not evacuate the photographic index nor the existence of its 
own aura. He absents one kind of index, to reclaim another; he undermines and affirms 
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the index and the aura. His citation of Madame Tussaud similarly undermines and affirms 
her use of the index inasmuch as it becomes a memorial site. 
Demand specifically asserts his project’s particular engagement with memory 
when he describes the ways he translates a two-dimensional representation into three 
dimensions and then back into two. He says:  
By doing this translation, I found the same thing you get with any other 
translation, you lose a few things and a few things come in.  I think the extra that 
comes in through that operation is probably memory, it has to do with my 
experience of things and your experience of things.554 
   
Demand puts forward his own re-tellings, translations of another photograph: versions 
that like our own stem from widely circulating images, but versions that cannot promise a 
trace of what happened there. Whether or not the room that Demand presents to us 
remains innocent is up to us as viewers. It is reliant upon our memory of what might have 
happened there. His works cannot bear witness for us; but they might do so with us, if we 
see, think, and remember.  
 In Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History, Cathy Caruth speaks 
of the ethical relation to the real as “an impossible demand at the heart of human 
consciousness.”555 While Caruth is thinking about the dream of the burning child that 
Freud relates in his The Interpretation of Dreams, she is also thinking about the ethical 
imperatives surrounding missed encounters with the traumatic. In the dream, the child 
tells the father, “Father, don’t you see I’m burning?” The father has missed seeing the 
traumatic event, but he awakens because the dreamed child commands him: “wake up, 
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leave me, survive; survive to tell the story of my burning.”556 For Caruth, the ethical 
imperative at the heart of this dream is to “tell what it means not to see.”557 Quoting the 
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan, she continues, “Is not the dream essentially, one might say, 
an act of homage to the missed reality—the reality that can no longer produce itself 
except by repeating itself endlessly, in some never attained awakening.”558 Demand 
begins his project with a missed encounter—on the one hand, the photographs from 
which he culls his images have been taken belatedly, after an historic or tragic encounter 
has occurred, and on the other hand, his culling of the image is similarly belated, he was 
not there to photograph the scene himself. He then repeats what he did not see by re-
constructing what was already an endlessly re-produced media object, not once by 
producing it in three-dimensions, but twice when he repeats the photographing of the re-
presented missed encounter. In doing so, he seems to be engaged in what Caruth would 
claim as an ethical imperative to “tell what it means not to see.” 
 In At Memory’s Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and 
Architecture, James Young engages what it means not to have seen the Holocaust but to 
live in relation to it for a generation of postwar artists.   
The problem for many of these artists, of course, is that they are unable to 
remember the Holocaust outside of the ways it has been passed down to them…. 
It is necessarily mediated experience, the afterlife of memory, represented in 
history’s after-images: the impressions retained in the mind’s eye of a vivid 
sensation long after the original, external cause has been removed.559 
 
This engagement of the “original,” inasmuch as it was already mediated, can only ever be 
known to him as mediated, and can only ever be re-mediated by him for others. This 
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represents a significant thrust of Demand’s project, but at the same time, his concerns 
about mediation would have implications for its reality claims, for its indexicality.  
Relative to a traumatic history such as the Holocaust, amid claims contesting the 
historical reality of that genocide, the existential stakes of indexicality, rather than its 
supposed truth claims, might be important for Demand.  It is in light of his project’s 
affinities to other postwar art strategies that a consideration of the specificity of 
Demand’s identity as a postwar German subject proves productive and worthwhile. 
Demand was born in Munich in 1964; his grandfather oversaw architectural 
reconstruction for the city of Munich after the Second World War.560 The belatedness of 
his birth means that Demand would not have witnessed the atrocities of the war directly, 
but indirectly through mediated experiences of their aftermath. Growing up amidst efforts 
toward reconstruction, Demand would have witnessed the lingering effects of that history 
at the same time that reconstruction marked an effort to cover it over. In Drafting Room 
(1996) (Figure 4.32), Demand reconstructed the architectural office where his grandfather 
worked to orchestrate the rebuilding of Munich. This reconstruction gestures toward a 
relationship not only to the site where his grandfather worked, but also to the project his 
grandfather pursued. Unlike the designs his grandfather would have produced, Demand’s 
reconstruction efforts will not result in physical buildings. But he will produce a model—
sometimes even literally as in Model.   
The paradox of the model means that it might gesture toward a future realization 
of its idea, or it might model another already realized idea of the past; the photograph 
persists for the future as the past. Demand’s photograph persists for the future as the 
future of the record of the past—the future that forgets, that fails to recuperate or 
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remember. At the very least, Demand’s photograph attends to our failings to remember 
anything outside of representation (appearance). At the same time, the model always 
already anticipates its realization; by returning to that moment in the realization of a 
physical building before it accumulates the notorious associations with what will have 
transpired, Demand is simultaneously remarking upon the impossibility of fully 
recuperating and remembering those accretions. He retrospectively casts the historical 
site back to its earliest and most idealistic incarnation—the model—at which point there 
already is an anachronistic assumption that the future event of its construction—and of its 
historical infamy—will take place. He does this in the aftermath of a historically 
significant event’s having taken place there. Returning this site to a moment before it had 
been realized removes any trace of the subsequent series of events. Doing so becomes a 
gesture about history’s limitations, about the forgetting and erasing that occurs if we do 
not allow something to adhere. Whereas his grandfather’s reconstructions would have 
been carried out in an effort to renew a city, even while simultaneously covering over that 
city’s history, Demand’s photographs of his reconstructions insist that something of 
existence in space-time be remembered. Demand’s reluctance to supply the traces of 
historical events fuels our desire to know them, at the same time his image instantiates 
the impossibility of that knowledge. He inspires our desire to remember, even as that 
memory fails. He ethically imposes our participation in bearing witness—his image will 
not stand in as a counter-memory, unless we allow it to do so. 
 Of course, the paper model from which Drafting Room was photographed, like all 
of Demand’s other works, displays an absence of any index particular to that historical 
site. The blueprint on the far left wall features no building plan; neither do the sheets of 
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paper laid out on the room’s drafting tables show any marks. There is no clock upon the 
wall, nor any indicator of historic time or place. It is this lack of particularity that allows 
so many to discuss Demand’s project in terms of its “assault on, or at least a reimagining 
of, the traditional link between photography and indexicality…the ‘that-has-been’ in 
which Barthes saw the ‘noeme’ of photography.”561 Demand tends to reject this; to see 
his work as such is to see it as a relativistic project that insists on the constructedness of 
everything. He notably links his project to the novel, saying, “You don’t read a novel to 
get a true story, you read it because you want to have your brain working on something.  
You make a distinction between truthfulness and truth.  It’s the same here.”562 Relative to 
this, we might consider the strategy employed by W.G. Sebald to include photographs 
throughout his novels. These photographs may or may not bear an indexical connection 
to Sebald’s biography or to the story he tells us. Indeed, they might inhibit our 
understanding in that they seem to promise at the same time that they do not promise 
historic specificity. As such, they help us to bear witness to the “truthfulness” of his 
project—a novelistic representation of everyday events even inasmuch as it is an effort to 
reconstitute the elusiveness of the past and of loss.   
Young might imagine this “truthfulness” in line with his prescription for the study 
of history as “a combined study of both what happened and how it is passed down to us;” 
it is a concern for the specific inasmuch as the specific gets constituted by mediations that 
translate it into the generic.563 Sebald’s specific stories and images open out onto the 
generic as much as Demand’s images do. This strategy is also employed in efforts of 
memorial making, perhaps especially relative to the logic of Holocaust memorials. A 
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trauma so massive defies specificity; instead specific accounts of what happened occlude 
at the same time that they open out onto the whole.   
 The novel does not require the index of a particular site from which to begin its 
project of “truthfulness.” Until this point, Demand’s project has required the index of a 
(albeit already mediated and mechanically reproduced) photographic press image. His 
series Yellowcake (2007) (Figure 4.33) makes clear his concerns about memory perhaps 
more than any other.  Yellowcake refers to the enriched form of uranium that the United 
States government accused Saddam Hussein of procuring for his supposed weapons of 
mass destruction. The only evidence for Hussein’s receipt of the yellowcake consisted of 
letters written on stationery of the Embassy of Niger. In his Yellowcake series, Demand 
reconstructs the Niger embassy in Rome; but because cameras would not have been 
allowed in the embassy, Demand had to reconstruct his models from memory. In this 
way, he simulated the initial index from which he had always begun. As a result the only 
indices that adhere in his most recent project are the indices of his construction and the 
photographic index that occurs when he finally photographs his model.   
Relative to works that simulate the architectural index as “works from memory,” 
Lisa Saltzman remarks that artists are “establish[ing] a sculptural relation not to actual 
architecture but to the architectural archive that is [(their)] memory, which may be, for its 
utter lack of trace in the realm of the real, just as easily, fiction, and certainly is, if 
process is any indication, fabrication.”564 At the same time that Demand’s final 
photograph might only index a fiction, it might also index his subjective experience of 
that situation—which, in the end, might have been all that we ever should have hoped for 
from a photograph. But to speak here of the subjectivity of the photograph is not to undo 
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its ability to document or to bear witness in the way that Morineau would have it do. 
Instead I do so to confront the ways that the real does and does not adhere to histories.  
Young calls for a study of history that allows historical fact to commingle with the 
subjective experiences through which we understand it; as such, he is dealing with the 
specific inasmuch as it opens out onto the generic. Understanding the limitations of 
history to represent the real is not the same as rendering it incapable of conveying the 
real. Demand’s photograph might be as historical or fictional as one of Sebald’s novels; 
but both artists are confronting the ways in which we come to know history. Both posit 
reality claims at the same time that they undermine them, and in this way bear witness to 
a “truthfulness” of some lost presence; one that in the end might be up to us to negotiate.    
It is especially in this way that I see Demand’s project as participating in the 
historical tradition of trompe l’oeil practice: in its activation of the role of the spectator 
via his or her negotiation of the field of representation and its seeming reality. Demand 
gives us a seemingly real photograph of a strangely ordinary site – and hopes that the 
signs of his interventions – his literal cuts with scissors or his cut content – will startle or 
confuse us enough to prompt interaction—our own reconstruction. Demand’s literal 
transcoding preys on our fears of being tricked by digitally transcoded photographs. But 
his photographs do trick us, and this trick unfolds in the duration of our viewing. His 
photograph may look real, but this seeming reality fails and in failing, it shows us the 
terms of its existence, the terms of its construction – a construction that was (his models 
are discarded) really there. As the visibility of digital intervention becomes increasingly 
invisible, we might not experience its trick and it may go unnoticed. But this should 
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remind us that any image can look innocent of its construction or manipulation; the onus 
of discovering causal origins through reasoned conjecture is (and always has been) on us. 
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Chapter 5. Transparent Envelopes 
“a photograph cannot be transformed (spoken) philosophically, it is wholly ballasted by 
the contingency of which it is the weightless, transparent envelope.”565 —Roland Barthes 
 
Since 1992 Andrew Bush has pursued a series of works entitled Envelopes 
(Figure 5.1), in which he isolates a single envelope, frames each one face down, and 
displays them in clusters along a picture rail against a gallery wall. Their flaps are 
frequently unsealed and partly opened, inviting our entry, while securely thwarting it 
behind glass. These envelopes are blank and may be empty; they have been opened, but 
they cannot be read. They deny our access to their contents but fuel our desire to see or 
read or know. 
Letter-writing had been the subject of many 17th-century Dutch paintings, and art 
historians perform this desire to read the contents of these depicted letters by way of 
iconographical interpretation. The ace of hearts on the floor of Gerard ter Borch’s 
painting Officer Writing a Letter, with a Trumpeter (c. 1658-59) (Figure 5.2) prompts 
curators at the Philadelphia Museum of Art to read the depicted letter as a love letter. But 
in Gabriel Metsu’s Woman Reading a Letter (c. 1665) (Figure 1.2), the letter functions 
within the painting as just another object to be looked at: the maid looks beneath the 
curtain at a painting, the dog looks at the maid, the woman looks at the letter, and even 
the mirror seems to look at the window it reflects.  By giving us letters as painted 
surfaces, these Dutch artists represent something that is meant to be read—a letter—as an 
image, and in doing so deny us insight into the letter’s contents.   
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While we might wish that we could read depicted letters as easily as actual letters, 
their representation only as surface interrupts their communicative work. This desire to 
read paintings as easily as the letters they depict is fueled, I think, by the lack at the 
center of each painting—a lack that is figured as a letter, as a blank white rectangle upon 
which we can project the content we think we see there. As such, the illegible letter 
figures our perennial art historical fantasy, insinuating a hidden iconographical content 
that can be disclosed. But, the letter as image also figures the interruption of this kind of 
art historical project, as any definitive claims about content constitute an illicit trespass 
into the undisclosed space of the work of art.   
In the aforementioned examples, the letter’s writing or reading is the activity 
depicted. Ter Borch’s soldier writes the letter; Metsu’s woman reads the letter. But the 
letter also interrupts the flow of daily activity; Ter Borch’s standing soldier waits as the 
letter is written; Metsu’s maid averts her eyes while the letter is read; both paintings have 
dogs that halt the attendants’ intrusions into the space of the letter. In both, the letter is 
the source of the interruption, but one that is internal to the implied narrative of the 
painting. But even to name the white shapes that absorb their attention as “letters” allows 
them to operate transparently as representation. It allows us to forget the reflexive opacity 
of their formal presentation. The interruptive presentation of opaque white forms and 
their resistance to being read is instead subsumed into an interruption that takes place as a 
moment in the painting’s narrative representation.  
We see another interruption of the painting’s narrative figured in Johannes 
Vermeer’s Girl Interrupted in Her Music (c. 1660) (Figure 5.3). In this painting, a young 
woman holds a piece of paper, but instead of reading music from it, she stares out at the 
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viewer. The imagined narrative content of this painting is a music lesson, but that content 
does not exist because we have interrupted it; the painting’s actual content, in this 
respect, is our interruption. We can never close the gap of our interruption to restore the 
imagined narrative coherence of the music lesson. This reading thematizes the structuring 
lack at the heart of the art historical project; the lack that most of us disavow in our 
efforts to get at something of what artworks mean. We, like the male instructor towering 
over the seated figure, try to peer into the imagined content that the blank surface refuses 
to disclose. But the young woman clings to this lack with both hands, refusing to 
relinquish it fully to his scrutiny and refusing to look away from our impossible intrusion 
into the painting and its meaning. In this figuration of the spectator’s interruption, art is 
made private from and by the spectator. The blank paper’s surface is obdurately there in 
its structuring lack; present and absent; cohering and incoherent; available to and closed 
off from the spectator. 
Elsewhere in his oeuvre, Vermeer joins ter Borch and Metsu in exploring the 
motif of letters. In A Girl Reading a Letter by an Open Window (Figure 1.1), his subject 
is absorbed in the reading of the letter she holds.  She seems to be alone, until we observe 
the quiet doubling of her reflection in the lower right corner of the open window’s leaded 
glass.  It is this reflected surface that confronts our presence in front of the canvas, almost 
as directly as the girl with her music, making us aware of our voyeuristic intrusion. This 
sense of our uninvited presence is reinforced by the table that physically bars our entry 
into her space, but any frisson of discomfort we feel is met by our visual delight at the 
illusion of the billowing curtain attached to a rod extending across the entire top span of 
the canvas. As explored in Chapter 1, this was a favorite illusionist trick among Dutch 
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painters and has been characterized as the most straightforward example of trompe l’oeil 
in Vermeer’s oeuvre. The curtain does not belong to the space of the room represented, 
but instead seems to hover in front of the painting’s surface.  In this respect, it joins the 
girl’s reflection in acknowledging our presence before the canvas; beyond that, it might 
mock our belief in the painting’s representational fiction by interrupting its seeming 
coherence. 
Vermeer has us caught between zones of representation, between a zone that bars 
our entry and exists for us as optical surface only and another that implies our entry into 
the space, our having pulled back the curtain to see. This desire to pull back the curtain to 
see the painting recalls the ancient author Pliny’s emblematic scenario of Zeuxis tricked 
by Parrhasius. Beyond its account of artistic rivalry, the psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan 
cites it as a story about the essence of visual desire.566 It is not just that Zeuxis mistakes 
the representation for the real, it is that he wants to see what is behind the represented 
curtain, what is behind the irreducible blank rectangle there presented; as such, it also 
stages the essential impetus of art historical desire. 
As something one expects to find hanging across the surface of a painting, the 
protective curtain falls prey to a kind of habitual viewing that no longer registers the 
thing as seen. It can be overlooked. Letter rack paintings, such as Peto’s but also dating to 
the 17th century, are similarly populated with objects of habitual use, which Norman 
Bryson describes as being typically overlooked. He writes, the “scissors and combs, 
books and papers, all the effects that weave the warmth and familiarity of a personal 
habitat” all “at once appear[ing] pathetic and lost…. They are simply junk, personal 
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waste.”567 By depicting banal objects of use, the letter rack paintings engage the hand 
even more than the eye; they speak to habits of straightening up more than to sumptuous 
visual pleasure or scrutiny. They pretend, Bryson continues, that their “objects have not 
been pre-arranged into a composition destined for the human eye: vision does not find the 
objects decked out and waiting, but stumbles onto them as though accidentally.”568   
Edgar Allan Poe famously revives the letter rack’s version of habitual looking 
when he hides a letter in plain sight in his 1844 short story “The Purloined Letter.”  A 
stolen letter – the contents of which remain unknown to the reader – is hidden somewhere 
in an apartment and unable to be found until Dupin, the shrewd detective, looks for it in 
an excessively obvious place: it has been turned inside out and placed as if a useless piece 
of paper in an old letter rack.  Poe reverses the logic of trompe l’oeil painting to deceive 
the minister, who can’t find the compromising letter, insinuating that he mistook the 
actual letter rack for a painted letter rack.569   
The upright and flat surface of the letter rack seems continuous with the wall 
surface on which the painting is displayed. Its remarkably shallow space is no deeper 
than the curled edge of a letter. It turns the representational logic of linear perspective 
inside out.  Instead of receding, the objects come forward into the space of the viewer. 
Bryson describes this intrusion into the space of the viewer as a shock; “instead of the 
objects’ obeying the subject’s sovereign gaze, they slip out…: they look back.”570 In his 
overzealous desire to disclose what lies hidden in the scene, Poe’s minister overlooks the 
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mode of the letter’s presentation. In contrast, Dupin’s desirous look scans the room in a 
way that allows the letter to look back, to make itself present, emerging from what the 
minister had assumed was mere representation.   
In William Harnett’s The Artist’s Letter Rack (Figure 3.17), at least five 
envelopes appear to be tucked into its pink straps. As discussed in Chapter 4, these 
envelopes are painted to be legible, addressed to particular recipients: “C.C. Peir[son] & 
Sons, 3908 [G]lory St, P[hi]ladelphia Pa,” or somewhat more generically, “To the lady of 
the house.” We might use the legibility of these envelopes to piece together a 
biographical narrative about its presumed owner, but to do so ignores the way the 
represented straps interrupt this legibility.571 To read the addresses depends upon ignoring 
the gaps in their presentation, by filling in the implied letters to arrive at an imaginary 
coherence of representation. 
Harnett confuses the activities of seeing and reading elsewhere in this painting, in 
a way that insists upon making visible its mode of presentation, rather than making 
legible its represented content. To the lower left of the represented letter rack is a 
newspaper clipping that refuses to be read no matter how hard one tries; it is painted to 
imitate the shapes and graphic frequencies of a typographic format, but without 
representing anything coherently alphabetic. Like these implied alphabetic letters, the 
paper letters in the letter rack are also only implied; we see only envelopes and have to 
imagine the letter hidden inside, encouraged by one at the upper right that peeks out 
suggestively from the torn edge of its envelope. If the newspaper clipping insists on the 
painted-ness of the image, the torn edge of the envelope or the curled edge of the clipping 
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re-engages our impulse to reach out and touch the representation to test the reality of its 
presentation. Michael Leja observes that suspicious viewers are most vulnerable to being 
deceived by an image (paradoxically) when they are tricked into letting down their guard. 
I think it is the newspaper lettering’s evident construction that might trick the viewer into 
lowering her guard; assured now of the painting as painting and of the limits of painting’s 
mimesis, her viewing is vulnerable to spectatorial interruption by the surprise or shock of 
something that seems to surpass representation.  
Caught between reading and seeing (and between believing and disbelieving), we 
are vulnerable to the letter rack’s signs of wear and tear which taunt us by suggesting 
points of entry or by prompting an instinctive desire to touch.  Leja suggests that this 
fantasy of entry into the painting goes beyond tactile gratification, “incit[ing] other 
abstract and unconscious fantasies … of forbidden or inaccessible spaces.”572  But this 
attraction is met by “an unconscious awareness that the alluring fantasies held out in the 
painting…are [only] illusions”; and this has a melancholy effect.573 This illusion of our 
entry is poignantly interrupted by the uppermost envelope, which turns away as if in 
melancholic resignation, refusing to be opened or read. 
Each of Bush’s envelopes, like Harnett’s melancholy envelope, is displayed face 
down, but unlike it, is usually unsealed. Like Harnett’s torn envelopes, Bush’s envelopes 
tempt the possibility of our entry by exciting our desire to touch. They do this sometimes 
through signs of wear and tear on the envelopes and often on the ground on which they 
are mounted, but not always; nonetheless, the paper envelopes exhibit a rich texture of 
warm roughness or cool crispness that invites our handling. Their display in frames, 
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leaning from a picture rail, might encourage us to think of them as objects rather than 
pictures, as Leo Steinberg famously suggested of the Flatbed Picture Plane.574 But 
beyond all this, it is the shadow cast by the flap of Bush’s envelope, which most 
powerfully invites our touch; the flap protrudes into our viewing space, suggesting even 
the possibility of our illicit entry into their contents.  
It is in attending to the shadow, however, that its illusion begins to unravel. If 
truly pressed onto a mount beneath the glass of a frame, the envelope would cast no 
shadow. Instead, the illusionary shadow makes the representation of this envelope as 
image, rather than its presentation as object suddenly visible. For these works are not 
framed envelopes, they are one-to-one scaled photographs of envelopes, framed in 
antique photographic printing frames, negative holders, or x-ray containers.   
The display of these envelopes, as if found objects pressed between a ground and 
a glass, calls to mind an effort of preservation or memorialization, like pressing a flower 
in a book. In this way, Bush’s photographs point back toward the one-time presence of 
the original object, now lost, but also preserved through representation. The frames that 
contain his photographs are salvaged from an antiquated apparatus that would have 
housed countless other plates of glass for the duration of their exposures. They would 
have contained other images now unknown and unknowable. The one-time presence that 
these frames promise is the unseen image, the now absent presence of the lost image. 
Bush’s particular mode of photography thematizes this experience of one-time presence; 
insofar as they tricked us, the envelopes were once there for us, once-present, and now 
present as image, as representation. This longing for presence via photography might be 
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understood as an effort to preserve analog photography’s index in the face of digital 
technology and its Photoshop-able malleability; Bush’s interest in photographs of letters 
engages both subject and medium in terms of outmodedness, inasmuch as each is now 
threatened by its virtual version.   
But to limit our understanding of Bush’s Envelopes to his pursuit of objective 
presence is to cut short the mode of trompe l’oeil. For the trick to work, the trompe l’oeil 
illusion must fail; otherwise, we don’t feel ourselves to be tricked and don’t recognize the 
artistic feat.  To this end, Bush requires that we recognize the shadow as impossibly 
present and the photograph as representation.  But I don’t think he does this for the trick 
alone, nor to simply have us replace our mistaken apprehension of the object’s presence 
with a newly assured recognition of the image’s mere representation. Rather, I think he 
wants us to see the way this vacillation between image and object, between present image 
and lost object has always structured photography.   
Like Harnett’s melancholy envelope, Bush’s photographs insist on the limits of 
our engagement with the envelope as image; even dismantling their frames will not allow 
our access. They remain, like the Dutch paintings of letters we have seen, available as 
surface only, unable to supply any insight into their contents. Inasmuch as Bush’s 
envelopes also re-imagine the blank rectangles or lack at the center of those paintings as a 
promising envelopment of a hidden message, they too figure the fundamental art 
historical fantasy of legibility and full disclosure. But insofar as they remain unyielding 
and empty surface, they insist on that fantasy’s interruption.  
Bush uses the mode of trompe l’oeil in the medium of photography to disclose 
that medium’s capacity to deceive, interrupting what he presumes to be its delivery of 
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truthful image content. In this way, his efforts resonate with those of postmodern 
theorists of photography who caution against being duped by photography’s seeming 
verisimilitude. Photography’s transparency is its “mythic value,” according to Abigail 
Solomon-Godeau; “phenomenologically, the photograph registers as pure image, and it is 
by virtue of this effect that we commonly ascribe to the photograph the mythic value of 
transparency.”575 That is, because viewers of photographs see through the materiality of 
the representation, they see only the image, the optical precision of which convinces them 
of its truth or documentary value and its freedom from authorial intervention. Such 
scholars, thus, intervene into what they understand to be a dominant attitude of credulity 
amongst viewers of photographs. They wish to challenge the perception of photography’s 
neutrality, asserting instead that its reality is “not just its material item, but also the 
discursive system of which the image bears its part.”576 Bush’s use of trompe l’oeil 
similarly intervenes to interrupt this fantasy of photography’s transparency by asserting 
the limitations and specificity of its materiality. 
Perhaps foremost among the scholars of the 1960s who are most suspicious of 
photography’s authority and truth claim is Roland Barthes. In their survey The Meaning 
of Photography (2005), Robin Kelsey and Blake Stimson name him as the herald of this 
new era of suspicion.577 Following Barthes’s lead, photography historians and theorists in 
the second half of the 20th century seek to unseat photography’s truth claim, which had 
seemed to be technologically guaranteed by its automatic registration of the referent. 
                                                
575 Abigail Solomon-Godeau, Photography at the Dock: Essays on Photographic History, Institutions, and 
Practices (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991) 180. 
576 John Tagg, The Burden of Representation: Essays on Photographies and Histories (Amherst, MA: 
University of Massachussetts Press, 1988) 4.  
577 Robin Kelsey and Blake Stimson, eds., The Meaning of Photography (Williamstown, MA: Sterling and 
Francine Clark Art Institute, 2008) xx, xxii. 
263 
 
While this automatic registration seemed to deliver its (image) content as directly and 
efficiently to its viewer as an envelope delivers a letter to its recipient, photography 
theorists articulated the many interventions impeding this delivery. As such, it is perhaps 
surprising that in the opening pages of Barthes’s last commentary on photography 
Camera Lucida, he should describe a photograph as a “transparent envelope.”578 Like a 
pointing finger, the photograph or envelope is a deictic gesture, directing one’s attention 
to what it contains or shows: “‘Look,’ ‘See,’ ‘Here it is’; it points a finger at certain vis-à-
vis, and cannot escape this pure deictic language.”579 The transparency of this gesture 
makes it “improbable,” for Barthes, “to speak of the Photograph” only “to speak of a 
photograph.”580 For the photograph like a “weightless, transparent envelope”—the 
medium itself—is not seen; it is the particular referent of a photograph that is seen. It is 
through this strange metaphor of the weightless, transparent envelope that Barthes 
describes the way we regard photography: that is, we do not see the photograph itself, 
rather we see its content, that which it represents, and we see it with an insistent presence. 
Inasmuch as the photograph is an envelope, it is a vessel of containment, and because this 
container is transparent, we see only that which it contains and delivers to us.  
A specific photograph, in effect, is never distinguished from its referent (from 
what it represents), or at least it is not immediately or generally distinguished 
from its referent (as is the case for every other image, encumbered—from the 
start, and because of its status—by the way in which the object is simulated): it is 
not impossible to perceive the photographic signifier (certain professionals do so), 
but it requires a secondary action of knowledge or of reflection. By nature, the 
Photograph…has something tautological about it: a pipe, here, is always and 
intractably a pipe.581 
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Barthes’s allusion here to René Magritte’s famous paintings The Treachery of 
Images (1929) (Figure 5.4) and The Two Mysteries (1966) (Figure 5.5), which include the 
line, “Ceci n’est pas une pipe,” seems an ironic nod to his previous insistence on the 
semiotic deconstruction of photography. Magritte’s text is meant to interrupt the 
conventions of signification that allow a viewer to say of a painting of a pipe, “That’s a 
pipe.” The painting thus addresses this linguistic tendency to overlook the painting’s 
status as such; the caption intervenes to disrupt this illusion of ordinary language. By 
declaring that this is not a pipe, Magritte draws our attention to the process of 
signification that has taken place. Whereas in earlier essays, Barthes discussed 
photography according to its surreptitious levels of signification—its denotations and 
connotations, for example—in Camera Lucida, he abandons this concern and instead 
declares a photograph to be transparent: ‘always and intractably a pipe.’582  
Insofar as the photograph is not distinguished from its referent (from that which it 
represents), Barthes’s transparent envelope (at least rhetorically) becomes a kind of 
trompe l’oeil envelope. For Barthes the photograph is indistinguishable from its referent 
(from what it represents); and in trompe l’oeil “the representation of a thing seems to be 
the thing itself.”583 This indistinguishability of a photograph and its referent is not 
encumbered by the way in which the object is simulated, for example, by its status as 
painting; but this is also the criterion for trompe l’oeil painting: the represented thing can 
seem to be the thing itself because its painted ‘status’ is disguised.  
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When Barthes writes that the photograph “is not immediately” distinguished from 
its referent, this draws it even closer to trompe l’oeil. For in trompe l’oeil the mistaking 
of the represented thing for the thing itself is only temporary; the deception must be 
interrupted so that its trick can be recognized. Trompe l’oeil allows us to experience what 
Jean-Paul Sartre calls the “illusion of immanence,” in which we mistakenly treat the 
image as a separate reality, as a thing. When we ‘fall for’ the trompe l’oeil illusion, we 
see the referent and think we perceive its reality. In the painting of a letter rack or in 
Bush’s photographs, we think we perceive actual envelopes; but we recognize that this 
perception was in error when we (actually) perceive the materiality of the 
representation—the flatness of the canvas or photographic print (sometimes this requires 
actually touching the object, to compensate for vision’s confusion of apprehension and 
perception). We had mistakenly treated the image of an envelope—the referent—as a 
separate reality, as a thing, when the separate reality or thing was actually a painting—
colored pigments organized on a canvas. We experienced, perhaps we even enjoyed the 
illusion of immanence when we posited its imaginary referent as a reality, experiencing 
an image as if it were a thing that could be perceived.  
Recognizing the trickery of trompe l’oeil—perceiving its material status as 
representation—requires a secondary action of reflection, which Sartre calls the 
“reflective consciousness.” “To determine the properties of an image as image I must turn 
to a new act of consciousness: I must reflect. Thus the image as image is describable only 
by an act of second degree in which attention is turned away from the [represented] 
object and directed to the manner in which the object is given.”584 In Camera Lucida 
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Barthes acknowledges this “secondary action of knowledge or reflection,” which makes it 
possible “to perceive the photographic signifier,” but he describes this as the domain of 
“certain professionals.”585 Better yet, for Barthes, to deal with the photographic signifier 
is to deal only with its studium. “To recognize the studium is necessarily to encounter the 
photographer’s intentions… It is rather as if I had to read the Photographer’s myths in the 
Photograph, fraternizing with them but not quite believing in them.”586 It is at the level of 
the studium that I recognize the photographic signifier, the role of the photographer, the 
photograph’s function. It is there where I negotiate photography’s messages—the 
messages Barthes previously described at length in his essay, “The Rhetoric of the 
Image” (1964), cautioning against photography’s ability to naturalize the symbolic 
messages it contains, “innocent[ing] the semantic artifice of connotation.”587 But in 
Camera Lucida, Barthes is not interested in “‘see[ing]’ the photographic signifier…. 
What did I care about the rules of composition of the photographic landscape, or, at the 
other end, about the Photograph as family rite? Each time I would read something about 
the Photograph, I would think of some photograph I loved, and this made me furious. 
Myself, I saw only the referent…”588 Barthes wants to see through the photograph, letting 
the referent adhere, even as he acknowledges that to do so is to ignore the “importunate 
voice (the voice of knowledge, of scientia)” and to instead become “a primitive, without 
culture,” to become, I want to say, a credulous spectator.589  
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But the limitation of the image, for Sartre, is that its object cannot be experienced 
as a perception. In L’Imaginaire (1940), the text to which Barthes dedicates Camera 
Lucida, Sartre writes that he wishes to recall the face of his friend Peter, who is not 
present. “I want the face of Peter to appear as a perception. I want ‘to make him present’ 
to me.”590 It is because he cannot bring Peter before him as a perception that Sartre seeks 
“recourse [in] a certain material which acts as an analogue, as an equivalent, of the 
perception.”591 This analogue allows for an illusion of that object’s immanence. Barthes 
begins the second part of Camera Lucida in search of an adequate analogue for his 
recently deceased mother. Whereas Sartre considered three kinds of analogue images for 
his friend Peter, Barthes limits his account to only one of these: the photograph. Sartre 
first tries to call Peter to mind; but while the mental image can arouse in him pleasant or 
sympathetic feelings, it lacks the clarity of Peter’s countenance. This clarity he finds in a 
photograph of Peter, but while it presents his external traits perfectly, “it does not give his 
expression.”592 His expression can instead be found, Sartre says, “rediscovered,” in a 
caricature, although this representation distorts his physical features. Whereas Sartre 
differentiates between these types of images and what they can deliver, Barthes makes 
room for all of these experiences in a particular photograph. This photograph, the Winter 
Garden photograph, allows him to “rediscover” his mother.593 It has the clarity of Sartre’s 
photograph and the expression of Sartre’s caricature; in it, he finds “the distinctness of 
her face, the naïve attitude of her hands, the place she had docilely taken without either 
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hiding or showing herself, and finally her expression…”594 It also arouses in him the 
pleasant and sympathetic feelings that Sartre used to describe the mental image: he saw 
her “kindness” and “gentleness,” giving him “a sentiment as certain as remembrance.”595  
But to describe it as an “analogue,” Barthes writes, is insufficient to his 
experience of this photograph. Perhaps other photographs of his mother, those 
“photographs, which phenomenology would call ‘ordinary’ objects, were merely 
analogical, provoking only her identity, not her truth; but the Winter Garden photograph 
was indeed essential, it achieved for me, utopically, the impossible science of the unique 
being.”596 This particular photograph allows Barthes to imagine that he has direct access 
to his absent mother, as if he could actually perceive her. For Sartre, however, this is 
merely an illusion; although he may wish to have Peter present as a perception, all that he 
can actually perceive is the materiality of the photographic object itself. This is his move 
from the imaginative consciousness to the reflective consciousness, a secondary action 
through which one sees not just the object of the image (the referent), but the image as an 
object (the signifier)—the manner in which the image is given. It is in the act of 
reflection, for Sartre, that one discovers “the essence of the image,” which has “a content 
of immediate certainty.”597 For Sartre this content was “the same for everyone.”598  
But although the photograph and caricature have a materiality that can be 
perceived in the act of reflection, the materiality of the mental image was less apparent. 
Sartre writes that its materiality “derives its meaning solely from the intention that 
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animates it.”599 Barthes revises this remnant of Sartre’s Cartesianism relative to 
photographs that have a punctum. It is not just his intention, which animates it. “Suddenly 
a specific photograph reaches me; it animates me, and I animate it. So that is how I must 
name the attraction which makes it exist: an animation.”600 The punctum breaks or 
punctuates the homogenous field that is the studium; it “rises from the scene, shoots out 
of it like an arrow, and pierces me.”601 I do not “seek it out” in contrast to the field of the 
studium, which “I invest…with my sovereign consciousness.”602 Just as I am attracted to 
it, it exerts attraction upon me; it advenes, comes upon me (“m’advient”).603 He writes, 
“It is what I add to the photograph and what is nonetheless already there.”604 Arguably, it 
is according to this duality, what I seek from the photograph versus what it wants from 
me, that Barthes sorts photography into the studium and the punctum. Barthes’s 
phenomenology makes room for an agency other than his own; the photograph can 
animate him by looking back at him in perhaps an unexpected way. 
It is Sartre’s subjectivism that Barthes takes up in Camera Lucida, as Ron Burnett 
says, “with a vengeance.”605 This is why he insists on the ways in which the photograph 
animates him. Sartre concedes no reality to the object of the image—Peter, Barthes’s 
mother—beyond that which I put there, that which I animate. For Sartre, “I know where 
I’m going and what I want to produce” as an image; “this is why no development of the 
image can take me by surprise, whether the scene I produce is a fictitious one, or one of 
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the past.”606 But it is specifically relative to an image that takes him by surprise, indeed 
an error of trompe l’oeil, that Sartre experiences the object of an image as a perception; in 
this case, it is the picture that acts upon him. When Sartre walks into an unfamiliar room 
and mistakes the figures in a large picture to be actual men, his experience “was not 
imaginary but perceptual. No doubt the synthesis was poorly made and the perception 
was false, but the false perception was nonetheless a perception.”607 The illusion is short 
in duration, perhaps a quarter of a second, and it disappears, but its cause remains: “the 
picture, made like a human being, acts on me as if it were a man, regardless of what the 
attitude I assumed towards it may be otherwise.”608 The “knitting of the brows, on the 
canvas, moved me directly”; “the repose of that figure moved me directly.”609 These 
elements are neutral, able to enter either an imaginary or perceptual synthesis, but they 
are expressive and this expressive value does not go away. “If I decide to hold on to the 
perception, if I look at the picture purely aesthetically, if I observe the color relationships, 
the form, the touch, if I study the purely technical processes of the painter, the expressive 
value will nevertheless not vanish; the figure in the painting begs me gently to look upon 
it as a man.”610 Barthes’s mother in the Winter Garden photograph has “the assertion of a 
gentleness.”611 This is “her expression” which begs him to look upon her as if through it 
she exists.  
Sartre describes looking at a portrait of someone who is dead, such as Charles 
VIII. When he looks at it, his “whole present attitude is full of this fact”—the fact that he 
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is dead. “Nevertheless,” he writes, invoking the structure of disavowal (‘I know, but all 
the same’),  
those sensuous and sensual lips, that narrow forehead, immediately arouse a 
certain affective impression which is directed at those lips as they are in the 
picture. Thus those lips perform a double function simultaneously: on the one 
hand, they refer to the real lips long since turned to dust, and derive their meaning 
only from this source; but, on the other hand, they act directly on my feelings, 
because they are a deception, because the colored spots on the picture appear to 
the eye as a forehead, as lips. Finally these two functions become grounded, and 
we have the imaginary state, that the dead Charles VIII is here before us. It is he 
we see, not the picture, and yet we declare him not to be there: we have reached 
him only ‘as an image,’ ‘by the mediation’ of the picture. Here we see that the 
relationship that consciousness posits in the imaginative attitude between the 
portrait and its original is nothing short of magical. Charles VIII is at one and the 
same time absent and also present… We do not think, in our non-reflective 
consciousness, that a painter made that portrait, etc. The first bond posited 
between image and model is a bond of emanation. The original has the 
ontological primacy. But it becomes incarnated, it enters into the image. This 
explains the attitude of primitives towards their portraits as well as certain 
practices of black magic…. This mode of thought has not disappeared. We have it 
in the structure of the image which is irrational, and, in which, as almost in 
everything else, we make rational constructions on prelogical foundations.612 
 
To imagine an object, for Sartre, is to intend a particular and certain knowledge of 
it; to imagine aims for (intends to grasp) the perceptual object—the object that I could 
see, hear, touch, if it was present, but which is necessarily absent in the image of it. He 
describes the way the imaginative consciousness differs from the reflective 
consciousness, “the imaginative consciousness I have of Peter is not a consciousness of 
the image of Peter. Peter is directly reached, my attention is not directed on an image, but 
on an object.”613 To imagine is to believe, in vain, that “the object really exists by means 
of our conduct towards it: we can pretend for a second, but we cannot destroy the 
immediate awareness of its nothingness.”614 
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Barthes wants to postpone this ‘awareness of its nothingness’ and to instead 
conduct himself in a way that allows photography’s object to really exist. To do so, he 
strays from the path of a formal logic, instead following “[his] desire or [his] grief,” to 
retain “an affective intentionality, a view of the object which was immediately steeped in 
desire, repulsion, nostalgia, euphoria.”615 For it was this ‘pathos’ that could not, for 
Barthes, be separated from the essence of the Photograph; it was “at first glance” this 
‘pathos’ of which photography consists.616 Barthes wants to extend the temporality of 
Sartre’s ‘second’—the second in which we can pretend that the object exists—because it 
is in this first glance, before the secondary move to reflective consciousness, that he can 
make his mother exist, once more. 
Barthes finds something of photography’s essence in what is available ‘at first 
glance.’ Like Zeuxis’s ‘first glance,’ this is the credulous glance. While this credulous 
glance is corrected in reflective consciousness, according to Sartre, or at the level of the 
studium, for Barthes, this correction is not necessarily for the better, as it brackets the 
intensity of emotion available ‘at first glance.’ Sartre identifies the imaginative element 
in the activity of reading as that which can “account for the intensity of our emotions.”617 
In the act of reading, he continues, “We take sides, we become indignant; and some even 
weep.”618 It is photography’s pathos, available ‘at first glance’ that prompts Barthes to let 
the referent adhere, to look past the manner in which something is given (and instead to 
recognize the fact of its given-ness). It is the intensity of his feeling, his ‘attraction,’ 
which helps Barthes see through the photograph, just as for Sartre, it helps the theater-
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goer see past the (now absent) presence of the curtain or the cardboard status of the forest 
stage set and helps the reader see past the signs of the words on the page.  
Sartre locates an affinity between the illusion of immanence and the operation of 
affect, both of which circumvent the reflective consciousness. Feeling has intentionality 
toward an object; “Hatred is hatred of someone, love is love of someone.”619 It envisions 
an object but this object appears differently than it would to reflective consciousness. If 
understood in reflective consciousness, feeling would be consciousness of the feeling, so 
that the feeling of hatred, for example, would be consciousness of hatred. But feeling is 
not reflective consciousness: “the feeling of hatred is not consciousness of hatred: it is the 
consciousness of Paul as hateful; love is not, primarily, consciousness of love: it is 
consciousness of the charms of the beloved.”620 My feeling seems to follow from an 
object. “I assume,” for example, “that in the absence of a certain person it is the feeling 
which was inspired in me by her beautiful hand that reappears.”621 But this feeling, for 
Sartre, has “a primary content which animates intentions of a very special type; in short, 
it is an affective consciousness of those hands.”622 
Insofar as affect or feeling rushes past the manner in which it is given—as hatred 
or love—to instead reach its (representative) object—Paul or those hands—it is like the 
desire of Zeuxis to see behind the curtain, which allowed him to rush past the painted 
manner in which it was given. But that which he wanted to see—the painting behind the 
curtain, which would have been the representative object of his desire—remains 
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unrevealed, without form. His desire remains without object: a vague or hazy something. 
This is the nature of desire: it is a blind effort to understand itself.  
Sartre describes desire as a “blind effort to possess on the level of representation 
what I already possess on the affective level.”623 My feeling, my love, gropes blindly in 
order to understand itself, which it does when it is met with a knowledge that causes its 
source to emerge. In Sartre’s examples, it was either Paul or those hands that emerged as 
representative realizations of my otherwise vague desire. Desire gropes blindly (past the 
manner in which it is given—thus rendering its signifier transparent) toward its object, 
which it “knows” only according to a representative substitute for it. It is here that 
consciousness is “entirely knowledge and entirely affectivity:” “affective-cognitive 
consciousness.”624 The feeling is an affective consciousness of “something fine, graceful, 
pure, with a nuance of strictly individual fineness and purity.” 625 And this something is 
absolutely unique for me and defiant of description. This affective consciousness is so 
determined to find its object that it fills in an imaginative knowledge thereof. In Sartre’s 
account: 
I am invaded by the knowledge that this something stands for ‘two hands.’ This 
assurance comes upon me suddenly: in relation to this affective object I find 
myself in the attitude of quasi-observation. Those hands are really there: the 
knowledge that penetrates them gives them to me as ‘the hands of such a person, 
white hands, etc.,’ and at the same time the feeling reproduces most poignantly 
what there is of the ineffable in the sensations of whiteness, of fineness, etc.; it 
gives that empty knowledge the opacity of which we spoke in the preceding 
chapter. I know that the object which is there, transcendent, confronting my 
consciousness stands for two white and delicate hands; at the same time I feel that 
whiteness and that delicacy, and particularly the nature of hands always so 
intimate, so personal. But, at the same time, I am aware that these hands have not 
as yet come into existence. What is before me is a substitute for these concrete 
hands, full but unable to exist by itself. When that substitute is present it delivers 
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the hands to me completely, but at the same time it lies in its nature to claim these 
hands which it posits, so that I am aware of envisioning them through it.626 
 
When Sartre describes the details that affectively structure the objects he recalls in 
affective consciousness—her beautiful hands—he describes them as “what is unique for 
me in those hands—and what cannot express itself in a knowledge, even imaginative—
namely, the tint of the skin at the finger tips, the shape of the fingernails, the small 
wrinkles around the phalanx, all this does, no doubt, appear to me. But these details do 
not present themselves in their representative aspect.”627 Instead he “become[s] aware of 
them as an undifferentiated mass which defies all description.”628 That is, in Barthes’s 
language, they ‘wound’ or ‘prick’ him in an un-nameable way, as does the punctum: 
‘something’ in a photograph “holds me, though I cannot say why, i.e., say where: is it the 
eyes, the skin, the position of the hands, the track shoes? The effect is certain but 
unlocatable, it does not find its sign, its name; it is sharp and yet lands in a vague zone of 
myself; it is acute yet muffled, it cries out in silence. Odd contradiction: a floating 
flash.”629    
When Barthes does name the punctum of particular photographs, it often happens 
to be something particular about the subject’s hands. In the Winter Garden photograph, 
he notices that his mother “was holding her one finger in the other hand, as children often 
do, in an awkward gesture.”630 He lists this “naïve attitude of her hands” among that 
which “transformed the photographic pose into that untenable paradox which she had 
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nonetheless maintained all her life: the assertion of a gentleness.”631 Of a 1926 portrait of 
Tristan Tzara by André Kertész (Figure 5.6) he writes, “What I notice, by that additional 
vision which is in a sense the gift, the grace of the punctum, is Tzara’s hand resting on the 
door frame: a large hand whose nails are anything but clean.”632 Of Duane Michals’ 
photograph of Andy Warhol (Figure 5.7), in which “Warhol hides his face behind both 
hands,” he writes, “I have no desire to comment intellectually on this game of hide-and-
seek (which belongs to the Studium); since for me, Warhol hides nothing; he offers his 
hands to read, quite openly; and the punctum is not the gesture but the slightly repellent 
substance of those spatulate nails, at once soft and hard-edged.”633 Describing the hands 
of his mother or of Tzara or of Warhol, Barthes ‘projects a certain tonality’ on them, 
suggesting the way these affective structures constitute for him their deepest reality—the 
punctum. 
Throughout his text Barthes animates the energy of the punctum by using the 
word, “advene” and its variant, “adventure,” thus, insisting on its meaning, to accede or 
to approach, to come forward, which is rooted in the Latin advenire, to come or to arrive 
at.634 It is a detail that allows the person in the photograph to have “a whole life external 
to her portrait,” allows her to “emerge,” to “continue living.”635 Notably Barthes 
illustrates the punctum in terms of its ability to “emerge” with an 1863 photograph of 
Queen Victoria on a horse (Figure 5.8). The arched format of the photograph, as well as 
its date of production and its maker’s notoriety as a stereographer, suggests that it was 
likely one of two constitutive images of a stereograph. Queen Victoria was among the 
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first to publicly praise the virtues of stereography at the Great Exhibition in 1851. By 
reproducing only one of the images, Barthes eliminates the potential for its stereoscopic 
effect, which, if viewed in the right context, would have allowed the figures to seem to 
emerge from the overexposed and hazy background. If reproduced as a stereograph, the 
image would have been literally doubled, but instead we remain blind to its doubled field.  
Barthes discusses this photograph of Queen Victoria in section 23 of Camera 
Lucida, the section titled, “Blind Field.” Here, he describes the punctum as a kind of 
doubled vision: “a ‘blind field’ constantly doubles our partial vision.”636 Millions of 
photographs lack this blind field: “everything which happens within the frame dies 
absolutely once this frame is passed beyond.”637 That is, for Barthes, in photographs that 
lack a punctum, its figures “do not emerge, do not leave; they are anesthetized and 
fastened down, like butterflies. Yet once there is a punctum, a blind field is created (is 
divined)…The punctum fantastically ‘brings out’ the Victorian nature (what else can one 
call it?) of the photograph, it endows this photograph with a blind field.”638 The 
euphemistic description, “Victorian nature,” emerges here according to Barthes’s 
purposes, not stereoscopically (although it would have done that too) but as a punctum. 
Barthes discovers this “Victorian nature” relative to the kilted groom, whose only 
function within the picture is to hold the horse’s bridle. He is there “to supervise the 
horse’s behavior: what if the horse suddenly began to rear? What would happen to the 
queen’s skirt, i.e. to her majesty?”639 This is what the punctum “‘brings out’…. What else 
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can one call it?,” he asks, almost facetiously.640 For what he describes, the suddenly 
exposed site underneath the queen’s skirt, conforms to the primal sight/site of disavowal 
in Sigmund Freud’s construction of the fetish, where the subject sees the mother’s absent 
penis (a blind field), resulting in a simultaneous belief and disbelief in this reality. In this 
particular case, the mother is also the symbolic father of England and thus continues to 
possess the phallus. The punctum is constructed much like the fetish, as an opportunity 
for credulity in the formation of the subject, one that protects the subject from the threat 
of castration, or perhaps the threat of the lost mother. The punctum-fetish compels 
Barthes’s belief in an object—the Winter Garden photograph—that then magically 
protects him from the loss of his mother by returning her to him, as well as from her 
hallucinatory return in the real. Its ‘blind field’ beneficently doubles his partial vision.  
Inasmuch the punctum is a “blind field” that “constantly doubles our partial 
vision,” it is as Kaja Silverman observes like Hans Holbein’s anamorphosis, “a kind of 
subtle beyond—as if the image launched desire beyond what it permits us to see.”641 It 
complicates the fantasy of the look’s mastery by suggesting the existence of a field that is 
not available to my look, is not given to be seen. Sartre believed his look to be his own, 
when as Barthes indicates, the object already dictates how it is seen. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, Lacan uses Holbein’s painting The Ambassadors (Figure 2.11) to demonstrate 
the eye’s relation to the given-to-be-seen. The painting’s use of conventional perspective 
allows me, the looking subject, to imagine that everything I see radiates out from my 
look. The painting encourages my “méconnaissance which is, for Lacan, the visual 
equivalent of the cogito—to equate our look with the gaze, and to impute to it a 
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mastering relation to the world.”642 But the painting also gives me something that is not 
available to my look; Holbein’s inclusion of a large anamorphic skull “prevents our look 
from effecting an imaginary mastery of its contents by dramatizing what might be called 
our ‘blind spot.’”643 
Viewing the skull requires that we position our bodies all the way to the right of 
the painting, indeed almost flush with its surface, as if entering the painting. “Rather than 
positing us as viewer, it puts us in the ‘picture.’”644 The anamorphic skull inverts the 
situation of looking, transforming my look at the object into my becoming the object of 
the gaze; the skull marks my emplacement within the field of vision, rather than my 
imagined mastery over it. It “‘makes visible for us here something that is simply the 
subject as annihilated—annihilated in the form that is, strictly speaking, the imaged 
embodiment of the minus-phi of castration, which…centres the whole organization of 
desires through the framework of the fundamental drives.’”645 
The second vantage point—the anamorphic one—calls into question the rules of 
the first—the perspectival one. It negates the ‘dominant fiction’ of the first vantage point. 
Insofar as the perspectival vantage point has ‘passed as reality,’ it was the screen of the 
given-to-be-seen. Its fiction dominates as long as it is affirmed by the larger society not 
only through conscious belief, but also through certain desires and identifications. Both 
vantage points require the viewer to occupy a particular location in space relative to the 
image. Silverman asks “under what conditions we might occupy a different viewing 
position with respect to the screen?” She wants “to define the conditions under which we 
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might step away from the geometral point, and see something other than the given-to-be-
seen. The category through which I propose to do so is memory,” she writes.646 
Silverman turns to Freud’s topographical model of the preconscious and 
unconscious to explore the potentiality of memory as that which allows the step away 
from the dominant fiction of the perspectival vantage point. She aligns that vantage point 
with Freud’s preconscious, insofar as both accommodate the subject’s ‘ability’ to classify 
and evaluate. A red chair, to use Silverman’s example, is thus a ‘chair’ or ‘red object’ or 
possibly even, ‘cheap’ or ‘high design.’ But I may also have unconscious memories of a 
particular red chair, and those may cathect my associations with this chair in “a dense, 
libidinally resonant signifying network.”647 What I see and deem important may be 
congruent with the values of a dominant fiction, but that is not necessarily the case; in 
this way, it begins to be possible to imagine stepping away from dictates of the cultural 
screen. My unconscious memories inform and re-direct my look at the behest of 
unconscious desire. But Silverman reminds us that desire’s object cannot be named 
directly; instead that which for me is libidinally cathected by my memories and my desire 
is already a substitute. “Repression dictates that the desired object can only be recovered 
or ‘remembered’ in the guise of a substitute.”648 It is relative to this capacity to 
substitute—to displace or to introduce alterity—rather than in its imperative to return to 
the primordial object of desire that Silverman locates the potentially productive capacity 
of the look. “It is a look which has developed such an appetite for alterity that it is 
capable of seizing upon even the most fleeting metaphoric or metonymic connection so 
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as to facilitate transfer of psychic value from one term to another, otherwise radically 
divergent, term.”649  
It is here that Silverman finds Barthes’s Camera Lucida to be a powerful 
demonstration of “both this appetite for visual alterity, and the resistance which such a 
remembering eye can exercise when confronted with the given-to-be-seen.”650 It might 
help to roughly map that which Barthes calls the studium onto the screen of the given-to-
be-seen, insofar as it is that “which I perceive quite familiarly as a consequence of my 
knowledge, my culture.”651 “What I feel about these photographs derives from an 
average affect, almost from certain training…. it is culturally (this connotation is present 
in studium) that I participate in the figures, the faces, the gestures, the settings, the 
actions.”652 In contrast, it is the punctum that allows us to step away from these dictates to 
see the photograph differently. The punctum ”breaks” the studium; it is a desiring look 
that “takes the spectator outside of its frame.”653 This confirms for Silverman Barthes’s 
interest in “the eye’s transformative potentiality—its capacity for looking from a position 
which is not assigned in advance, and for affirming certain ostensibly marginal elements 
within the screen at the expense of those that are culturally valorized” which he, like she, 
locates in memory. She observes that the punctum is unpredicatable, its form always 
shifting; “even though it is anchored in the unconscious to so conventional and insistent 
an object of desire as the mother, its itinerary cannot be charted in advance.”654 In this 
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way, Barthes demonstrates the imperative of displacement that rules the look. But insofar 
as the remembering look returns to the ego, to Barthes, to ‘me,’ Barthes’s look deploys 
memory in order to make a representational element his own. It is in this way that 
Barthes’s example stops short, for Silverman, of the kind of productive look that she 
advocates.  
Relative to the Kertész photograph, for example, Barthes discovers in a particular 
detail—the texture of the road—his own memory of roads like this that he himself 
traveled as a child. He uses a photographic version of a memory that belongs to Kertész 
to instead remember his own past experience. According to Silverman, “When Barthes 
apprehends a photograph in the way he celebrates, his own past is victorious over the 
photograph’s assertion of a ‘this has been.’ The figures depicted in the photograph serve 
only to activate his own memories, and so are stripped of all historical specificity. 
Barthes’s recollections might thus be said to ‘devour’ the images of the other.”655 
This is exactly opposite the kind of productive look that Silverman finds in Chris 
Marker’s film Sans Soleil (1982). The narrative structure of the film “‘remembers’ and 
encourages the viewer ‘to remember’ what might best be characterized as ‘other people’s 
memories.’”656 An off-screen female narrator reads letters supposedly sent to her by a 
filmmaker named Sandor Krasna. When she speaks, she thus inhabits, rather than 
devours, the “I” of Krasna’s first person account. Krasna’s text, in turn, operates as a kind 
of heteropathic recollection, according to which the things he describes “‘belong’ to 
someone else’s or to another nation’s ‘past.’”657 Barthes’s remembering, according to 
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Silverman, stops short of this heteropathic memory, enabling him to remember only his 
own memory.  
But I want to say that this is not necessarily the case, especially relative to the 
touching details he observes in Koen Wessing’s photographs from Nicaragua (Figure 
5.9). Whereas the scene of “a torn-up pavement, a child’s corpse under a white sheet; 
parents and friends stand around it, desolate” is “a banal enough scene, unfortunately,” 
Barthes notes certain “interferences: the corpse’s one bare foot, the sheet carried by the 
weeping mother (why this sheet?), a woman in the background, probably a friend, 
holding a handkerchief to her nose.”658 His short and parenthetical inquiry, “why this 
sheet?,” does something to heteropathically imagine according to another’s point of view, 
thus displacing what unconsciously touches him onto another. Of another related 
photograph by Wessing, not reproduced in Camera Lucida, Barthes describes the limits 
of his knowledge in front of a photograph of three sandanistas whose faces are covered 
by rags: “(stench? secrecy? I have no idea, knowing nothing of the realities of guerilla 
warfare); one of them holds a gun that rests on his thigh (I can see his nails); but his other 
hand is stretched out, open, as if he were explaining and demonstrating something.”659 In 
this photograph of a war scenario to which he cannot personally relate, he remains 
touched nonetheless by insistent details—hands and nails, and we, as readers, see these 
particular details return in and throughout Camera Lucida, rediscovered in other 
photographs. Here, however, he does not dwell on them; instead they are dropped, one 
might say, forgotten. That is, until he “‘recollects’ them” in relation to other 
photographs—notably those of Tzara or of Warhol, which he does not reproduce.  
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Insofar as unconscious desire seeks a substitute for its remembered object in the 
given-to-be-seen, Silverman recognizes this displacement as a possibility for effecting 
change. She writes, “As Sans Soleil makes explicit, memory implies more than anything 
else the possibility of effecting change at the level of representation.”660 It does this by 
showing a set of images, forgetting them, and then remembering them, but this time in 
relation to new images (substitutes). Silverman describes the “recombination of familiar 
elements with new ones” as formally dramatizing “the transformative process which 
results when the productively remembering eye transects the cultural screen.”661 It 
dramatizes the operation of memory: to repossess or rediscover a lost object of desire 
within the constraints of the given-to-be-seen. In Camera Lucida, like in Sans Soleil, the 
“nails” of one guerrilla warrior and the open hand of another are remembered (returned 
to), but in relation to other (substitute) images, in other photographs.  
Indeed, Barthes finds “the right degree of openness, the right density of 
abandonment” in the hand of Robert Mapplethorpe’s self-portrait (Figure 5.10).662 It is 
this degree of openness that strikes Barthes as a punctum, which takes him outside the 
frame, beyond that which the photograph permits us to see “toward the absolute 
excellence of a being, body and soul together.”663 I want to say that such recollections 
have less to do with Barthes’s own memory reserve than with a textual strategy, as 
perhaps a reward to an attentive reader. Or if not a reward, an activation of the reader: 
recognizing these reappearances “enlist[s] me in an act of ‘heteropathic recollection.’”664 
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Barthes’s first-person narrative throughout Camera Lucida requires me to inhabit his “I,” 
displacing me from my self and “introduc[ing] the ‘not me’ into my memory reserve.”665  
Mapplethorpe’s photograph, for Barthes, is erotic, and not pornographic, insofar 
as the body does not show itself, but rather gives itself. That is, Barthes feels that the 
hand has been “caught” in just the right way; he does not feel that the hand has been 
deliberately positioned in this way, but rather that “the photographer has found the right 
moment, the kairos of desire.”666 Said differently, in this photographed hand, Barthes 
doesn’t feel the intervention of the photographer, the ‘hand’ of an author. He can believe 
in the chance of this photograph, of its having been caught; he can believe like the 
Byzantines in “the image of Christ which impregnated St. Veronica’s napkin: that it was 
not made by the hand of man, acheiropoietos.”667  
 Another way in which Sans Soleil makes change possible at the level of 
representation, for Silverman, is by feeding the images through a synthesizer “to 
destabilize and to defamiliarize them.”668 The letter-writer, Krasna, explains according to 
his friend, Hayao Yameneko, that by changing the images, the synthesizer drains the 
images of reality. These images “‘are less deceptive…than those you see on television,’ 
since ‘at least they proclaim themselves to be what they are—images, not the portable 
and compact form of an already inaccessible reality.”669 Whereas Barthes certainly does 
not run the photographs he reproduces in Camera Lucida through a synthesizer, he does 
alter at least one of them via language. Most famously, as Margaret Olin observes, when 
Barthes recalls a James Van der Zee photograph (Figure 5.11) that he had earlier 
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described, he not only changes the location of the punctum, but he changes that which is 
in the photograph.670 Earlier in the text, Barthes describes that in the photograph which 
“prick[s] me” as “the belt worn low…and above all her strapped pumps (Mary Janes—
why does this dated fashion touch me?...).”671 But later in the text, he writes that 
sometimes the punctum is only revealed “after the fact, when the photograph is no longer 
in front of me and I think back on it.”672  
It is this “remembering eye” that Silverman celebrates in Camera Lucida for its 
capacity to displace: “Who could predict, for instance, that in the case of the Van der Zee 
photograph, Barthes’s remembering look would come to rest on the thin gold necklace 
around the neck of an African-American woman, and thereby assimilate that woman 
(through the intervening figure of his father’s sister) to what might be called the ‘mother 
complex’?”673 Barthes recollects a different punctum via memory—no longer the belt or 
shoes, but instead a necklace. But he also ‘misremembers’ the necklace, displacing the 
pearl necklace that actually appears in the Van der Zee photograph onto a “slender ribbon 
of braided gold” that he remembers having been worn by his father’s sister—a woman 
who, like Barthes himself, had “never married, lived with her mother as an old maid.”674 
He displaces his own lived experience onto the figure of his aunt, and writes, if not 
heteropathically perhaps empathically, “I had always been saddened whenever I thought 
of her dreary life.”675 Describing his realization that “the real punctum was the necklace 
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she was wearing,” he writes, “for (no doubt) it was this same necklace.”676 For Olin, the 
misidentification signals a split between Barthes the author and Barthes the narrator: the 
former understands the mistake, performs it as a textual strategy, the latter remains duped 
according to his naïveté and astonishment, parenthetically signaled as “(no doubt).” 
Barthes allows the punctum’s affect to survive even the possibility of nonexistence. 
That Olin seems to be first to observe this ‘mistake’ of the pearl necklace for a 
gold one indicates roughly twenty years of credulity among Barthes’s readers. Until 
prompted by Olin, we allowed his language to function transparently, as transparently as 
he describes the envelope that is the photograph. For me, this is not necessarily an 
accusation against inattentive reading; I am not advocating that we should have resisted 
letting ourselves be duped, that we should not have trusted our narrator’s memory, that 
instead we should have read Camera Lucida from a wholly skeptical stance. The text 
asks us to participate in his desiring looks, asks us to believe with him in photography’s 
relation to the referent, but it also performs the way the photograph or language 
necessarily fails to make its object exist. It asks us to maintain competing beliefs about 
photography. Instead of Yameneko’s synthesized images, which “‘are less deceptive’” 
because they proclaim their status as image rather than posturing as a “‘portable and 
compact form of an already inaccessible reality,’” Barthes allows both aspects of 
photography to stand.677 He does this in a way that splits himself in two: Barthes the 
narrator/credulous spectator lets photographs deceive us, according to the way they let us 
(and we want them to let us) access past reality; and Barthes the incredulous author 
                                                
676 Ibid. 
677 Sans Soleil voice-over qtd in Silverman 190. 
288 
 
points to its deception, to its status as image, drains it of reality—finds in it something 
that is not there. 
Krasna observes that Yamaneko’s “‘language touches me” because it “talks to 
that part of us which insists on drawing profiles on prison walls, a piece of chalk to 
follow the contours of what is not, or is no longer, or is not yet. The handwriting each of 
us will use to compose the list of things that quickens the heart, to offer or to erase.’”678 
Krasna allows Yamaneko’s language to ‘touch’ him, just as we allow Barthes’s language 
to touch us, to affect us with its affect. We allow it to pierce our incredulity, our skeptical 
stance, about the ‘status’ of an image’s ‘access to past reality’ because both Yamaneko 
and Barthes speak to that part of us that insists on drawing profiles on prison walls, that 
part of us that longs for something to remain of that which no longer does, that part of us 
that wants to make/let the index mean something—Sartre writes, “Consciousness has 
many…ways of surpassing the real in order to make a world of it.”679 
In Sans Soleil, Marker, like Barthes, turns toward “the marginal details of the 
cultures it depicts [instead of] those aspects which are more centrally featured at the site 
of the screen.”680  These details “become, quite simply, ‘things that quicken the heart.”681 
They touch us as Barthes’s punctum touches us, through a displacement that shifts the 
“libidinal value from the ‘large’ or ‘socially significant’ to what was regarded as ‘small’ 
and ‘socially insignificant.’”682 It is for Silverman insofar as these details are “insistently 
read through other people’s memories” apropos of Marker’s film (and not of Camera 
Lucida) that they enable a “psychic and a cultural displacement, an estrangement from 
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one’s self” toward an identification with an other.683 Marker (the director-author) shows 
us a detail, —“an outstretched stockinged foot on the ferry from Hokkaido to Tokyo”—
which a narrator (the letter writer, who is doubled by the female voice-over) insistently 
reads according to someone else’s memory. Barthes-the-author locates a detail of a Van 
der Zee photograph—a necklace—and synthesizes it via Barthes-the-narrator into 
something different—a gold necklace; Barthes-the-author thus deploys a textual strategy 
that remembers the necklace according to someone else’s memory—Barthes-the-
narrator’s faulty memory. As Olin begins to indicate, Barthes’s writing in Camera Lucida 
performs an estrangement from himself; he is split in two—credulous narrator and 
incredulous author.  
It is elsewhere in his writing that Barthes had already, and perhaps most 
famously, imagined and performed this estrangement from himself. In his 1967 essay, 
“The Death of the Author,” Barthes argues that the meaning of any text ought not to be 
sought in or from information about the author, but that instead its meaning belongs to an 
other—the reader. Notably Barthes begins this essay with an observation of a split 
between an (incredulous) author and a (credulous) narrator—a split that cannot be 
resolved. He asks who it is in Balzac’s Sarrasine that mistakes a castrato disguised as a 
woman for “woman herself.”684 He asks who is speaking; does Balzac write this in his 
own or through another’s voice? Is it Balzac’s hero (the narrator) who is credulous, “bent 
on remaining ignorant of the castrato hidden beneath the woman,” or is it Balzac (the 
author) commenting on the philosophical, psychological, or literary status of women?685  
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Barthes describes the way that Marcel Proust refuses our confusion of author and 
narrator; for in Proust, it is the author who writes, the narrator has not yet written. The 
narrator is not “he who has seen and felt nor even he who is writing, but he who is going 
to write.”686 Barthes writes at the beginning of the second part of Camera Lucida, “what I 
wanted—as Valéry wanted after his mother’s death—was ‘to write a little compilation of 
her, just for myself (perhaps I shall write it one day, so that, printed, her memory will last 
at least the time of my own notoriety).”687 Barthes the narrator, like Proust’s narrator, 
speaks as if he does not coincide with Barthes or Proust the author; he is the one who 
‘perhaps’ ‘is going to write’ ‘one day.’ Indeed Barthes further displaces this authorial 
intention onto Valéry; he speaks through Valéry’s words, doubling and thus negating the 
singularity of their authorship.688   
The author’s I designates a performance, it does not represent a person. 
“Linguistically, the author is never more than the instance writing, just as I is nothing 
other than the instance saying I: language knows a ‘subject,’ not a ‘person,’ and this 
subject, empty outside of the very enunciation which defines it, suffices to make 
language ‘hold together,’ suffices that is to say, to exhaust it.”689 Barthes empties the I of 
the author, clearing the way instead for the reader. Because “no one, no ‘person,’ says” 
“the Balzac sentence:” “its source, its voice, is not the true place of the writing, which is 
reading.”690 In Greek tragedy, the text is riddled with double meanings that the characters 
understand “unilaterally (this perpetual misunderstanding is exactly the ‘tragic’).”691 It is 
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the attentive reader-listener who “understands each word in its duplicity.”692 It is the 
reader who can hold together multiple and conflicting beliefs, allowing all of these 
meanings to constitute the text. In Camera Lucida, Barthes’s first-person strategy asks 
me to identify with the narrator’s “I,” and I am given details that I read as if according to 
his memory—so insistently that I misremember along with him the gold necklace that 
was never there. 
Barthes sees, but his seeing is not limited to his own consciousness; “‘I see,” he 
writes, through another’s sight—“by means of [a] ‘thinking eye,’” “that additional vision 
which is in a sense the gift, the grace of the punctum.”693 The photograph(er) leads a 
blind Barthes, much like the boy in Kertész’s photograph leads the blind violinist, giving 
(not showing) him the punctum of the dirt road (Figure 5.12). If this boy, this 
photograph(er), is “Orpheus, he must not turn back to look at what he is leading—what 
he is giving to me.”694 He paves the way, gives me a field, for my own discovery. The 
punctum, my punctum, is likely not seen by the photographer; it was merely there for him 
to photograph: “he could not not photograph the partial object at the same time as the 
total object (how could Kertész have ‘separated’ the dirt road from the violinist walking 
on it?)”695 Its presence there was inevitable, but its discovery is my delight. Discovering 
it then turns me into “a primitive, a child—or a maniac,” perhaps even into one of the 
“idiot children” in the Lewis Hine photograph he is describing when he writes, “I dismiss 
all knowledge, all culture, I refuse to inherit anything from another eye than my own” 
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(Figure 5.13).696 Barthes sees something by way of another’s sight, which becomes all his 
own. Through the gift of the punctum, Barthes, like the taller of Hines’ photographed 
children, sees what the other child, whose eyes are closed, does not. And at the same 
time, that which Barthes sees exists only for him, as if he saw it with his eyes closed.  
Barthes shuts his eyes to the photograph, “withdraw[ing] it from its usual blah-
blah: ‘Technique,’ ‘Reality,’ ‘Reportage,’ ‘Art,’ etc.: to say nothing, to shut my eyes, to 
allow the detail to rise of its own accord into affective consciousness.”697 Sartre describes 
the way that “some people,” at the orchestra, “shut their eyes to hear it, detaching 
themselves from the visual and dated event of this particular interpretation: they give 
themselves up to pure sounds.”698 They do this because what they seek to hear—a 
melody or a particular piece of music—is not located “here, between these walls, at the 
tip of a violin bow. Nor is it ‘in the past’ as if I thought: this is the work that matured in 
the mind of Beethoven on such a date. It is completely beyond the real.”699 He continues, 
“The performance of the symphony is its analogue…the real sounds must be 
apprehended as analogues. It therefore occurs as a perpetual elsewhere, a perpetual 
absence.”700 Inasmuch as it exists outside of real time and space, for Sartre, the melody or 
image is outside of existence. “I do not hear it actually, I listen to it in the imaginary…. 
There is in fact no passing from one world to the other, but only a passing from the 
imaginative attitude to that of reality.”701 The punctum allows Barthes to pass into the 
imaginative attitude relative to photography, away from the banal reality of its studium. 
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By not reproducing the photographs of hands by Kertész or by Michals, or the 
Winter Garden photograph, Barthes renders us as blind as Kertész’s blind violinist; we 
have only Barthes—the (naïve) boy—to lead us, to look on our behalf. But he describes 
his own looking, as if a kind of blind looking, that is, as if groping for or touching the 
referent; it is the “texture” of the dirt road in the photograph that gives Barthes “the 
certainty of being in Central Europe.”702 This texture, however, is an imaginary touch. It 
is an illusion that will not survive the reality test, wherein he reaches out his hand to 
touch the photographed road. Insofar as the photograph allows Barthes to imagine that he 
can feel the texture of the road—that he can perceive and not just imagine it—the 
photograph annihilates itself as medium, as in between, becoming instead the thing itself: 
“I recognize, with my whole body, the straggling villages I passed through on my long-
ago travels in Hungary and Rumania.”703  
His desire gropes as blindly as Kertész’s man down the road, led by the 
photograph, the materiality of which he disavows, to see through its eyes, just as the blind 
man sees through the boy’s eyes, as if they were his own. Barthes begins Part 2 of 
Camera Lucida on a blind search through photographs of his mother. He “had no hope of 
‘finding’ her, …expected nothing from these photographs…,” when suddenly one 
photograph among the piles, the Winter Garden photograph, emerges.704 Something in it 
‘advenes,’ or accedes, approaches, comes forward as if rising off the page to shoot out at 
me, to pierce or to wound me. And this he discovers in a photograph for which he 
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imagines the photographer’s instruction to his subject to have been: “‘Step forward a 
little so we can see you.”705 
When Barthes uses advenir to describe the energy of the punctum, he also uses it 
for its other meaning: to be superadded to, to become part of something (though 
inessential). For Silverman (and Freud), that which is added is unconscious memory and 
its libidinally resonant associations; the addition was thus a displacement, allowing us to 
step away from the culturally-dictated given-to-be-seen (of the studium). For Sartre, there 
is nothing in the picture other than what I add. Whereas in memory (in my affective 
consciousness), my mental image can remain ambiguous—“something fine, graceful, 
pure, with a nuance of strictly individual fineness and purity,” if instead I desire 
something, it must take on a specific affective form.706 “Desire must superadd itself” to 
affective consciousness, thus positing its object in an equivalent or substitute—“those 
hands,” in Sartre’s example.707 And it is to this affective equivalent that desire is then 
directed. It is through displacement, then, that desire operates; but it moves in a double 
direction—back toward an ambiguous mental image and forward toward a displaced 
substitute.708  
According to Sartre, desire is a “blind effort to possess on the level of 
representation what I already possess on the affective level.”709 Desire is a blind effort to 
find a representative, a substitute; desire is a blind effort to displace. In Kertész’s 
photograph, Sartrean desire is metaphorized as the blind gypsy, which I (as the boy) re-
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direct away from its (his) well-worn movement in affective consciousness (the tracks in 
the dirt road extending behind the baby toward the violinist) toward a representational 
substitute (off to the left of the image). Likewise, desire prompts the gypsy to represent 
an ambiguous feeling as a tune played on his violin.  
Barthes-the-author’s performance of the first-person constitutes an effort to see 
through the eyes of Barthes-the-narrator, who wants to believe that the past can return to 
him in the form of a photograph, who wants to believe that he can make his mother exist 
again through it and through his narration thereof. While we might assume that it is the 
boy who leads Kertész’s blind gypsy, there is reciprocity in this leadership. Each leads 
the other, and each is led by the other. For their relationship to be successful, each must 
see the world through the other’s eyes, in a kind of heteropathic seeing. If the boy forgets 
that the gypsy cannot see, he will dangerously assume that the man is aware of objects 
obstructing his path; and if the gypsy does not trust the eyes of the boy, he will have no 
path through the world. Kertész’s photograph illustrates a heteropathic relationship in the 
scenario of vision. 
And the punctum of Kertész’s photograph gives Barthes this heteropathic 
opportunity. But inasmuch as he sees through Kertész’s eyes and recognizes something 
that is all his own, he may, as Silverman suggests, devour the other. Even as the punctum 
allows him to rediscover something that is all his own, until then, he did not have it; it 
belonged to the other within him. It lay dormant in his unconscious, forgotten and 
inaccessible to his conscious mind until rediscovered by way of an other. His 
unconscious displacement of a memory from his childhood returns to him by way of 
another’s sight. Barthes then writes an account of this opportunity for rediscovery, for 
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remembering by way of an other, that is insistently first-person, so that as the reader I 
must inhabit another’s “I,” Barthes’s “I.” Barthes’s text, Camera Lucida, engenders my 
own heteropathic recollection of another person’s (his) memories. Insofar as “The Death 
of the Author” insists that a text, a piece of writing, belongs to the reader, Camera Lucida 
then belongs to us (at least as much as it feels insistently like his own). Reading Barthes’s 
memories in the first person, then allows us to step into the mode of the ‘productive look’ 
that Silverman describes for Chris Marker’s Sans Soleil. In Sans Soleil the off-screen 
narrator reads letters penned by a fictional author, remembering vicariously through his 
memories. This is Camera Lucida’s gift to us as readers. 
By restoring a capacity for heteropathic recollection to Camera Lucida against the 
grain of Silverman, I do not wish to be ungenerous to her scholarship. Instead, just as 
Barthes has given over his text to his reader—both Silverman and myself, in this 
instance—so she gives her text to me. My reading against hers is always already a marker 
of this. Moreover, I agree with and find generative the majority of her argument. 
For Silverman the Holbein painting “shows that the same image can look very 
different depending upon the vantage-point from which it is observed.”710 The competing 
systems of intelligibility in the Holbein painting for Lacan—one perspectival, one 
anamorphic—are also present in certain photographs for Barthes—one is the studium, the 
other is the punctum. The winter garden photograph looks very different from Barthes’s 
vantage point than from our own. He writes  
(I cannot reproduce the Winter Garden Photograph. It exists only for me. For you, 
it would be nothing but an indifferent picture, one of the thousand manifestations 
of the ‘ordinary’; it cannot in any way constitute the visible object of science; it 
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cannot establish an objectivity, in the positive sense of the term; at most it would 
interest your studium: period, clothes, photogeny; but in it, for you, no wound.)711 
   
He won’t reproduce it for us, it will not become a transparent envelope; it remains sealed, 
kept from our look. A page before, he writes of his mother and of him, “we supposed, 
without saying anything of the kind to each other, that... the suspension of images must 
be the very space of love, its music.”712 He suspends this particular image from our look, 
but makes it—and hence his mother—exist for us through and as text.713 He shares it with 
us in another medium, in this way “synthesizing” it as much as Yameneko’s images in 
Sans Soleil, to “destabilize and to defamiliarize” it, as if through language he can more 
easily prevent turning her into an ordinary object of everyday reality (for us). Barthes’s 
text itself—Camera Lucida—has competing systems of intelligibility—his (as author), 
his (as narrator), and mine (as reader). While at times, the text looks to be wholly 
inhabited by the author (it is his), at others it looks to be mine (I inhabit his “I”).  
The text Camera Lucida like the tool, a camera lucida, allows us to hold multiple 
vantage points simultaneously. The camera lucida was a 19th-century invention (1809) 
consisting of “a three-sided glass prism suspended before the eye of the draftsman, such 
that a subject and the piece of paper beneath the prism meld together onto the back of the 
draftsman’s retina. Thus, the image produced by a camera lucida is seen only by the 
draftsman and by no one else, except in the form of a tracing. Here, then,” as Geoffrey 
Batchen surmises, “was an apt metaphor for Barthes’s own text.”714 The camera lucida 
comes in between the world and the unique mental image that exists on my retina. It 
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allows me to plot this collision between world and mental image according to points on a 
page; Barthes similarly charts the existence of the photographed subject according to 
“sensitive points; precisely, these marks, these wounds are so many points.”715 In Olin’s 
estimation, Barthes privileges the relationship between the photograph and its beholder 
over the relationship between the photograph and its object. But I think both remain at 
stake for him.  
It is according to the punctum’s principle of adventure that Barthes understands 
existence relative to photography. Whereas the punctum had an “attraction that makes it 
exist: an animation,” the studium did not.716 Quoting Sartre, Barthes describes the way 
that he can look at the banality or studium of newspaper photographs “without assuming 
a posture of existence. Though the persons whose photograph I see are certainly present 
in the photograph, they are so without existential posture, like the Knight and Death 
present in Durer’s engraving, but without my positing them.”717 In L’Imaginaire Sartre 
had written, citing Husserl:  
when I look at the photos in a magazine they ‘mean nothing to me,’ that is, I may 
look at them without any thought that they exist. In that case the persons whose 
photographs I see are reached through these photographs, but without existential 
position, exactly like Death and the Knight, who are reached through Durer’s 
engraving, but without my placing them. We can also find cases in which the 
photograph leaves me so unaffected that I do not even form an image. The 
photograph forms but a vague object and the persons depicted in it are well 
constituted as persons, but simply so because of their resemblance to human 
beings, without any particular intentionality. They float between the banks of 
perception, between sign and image, without ever bordering on either of them.718 
 
This is the fate from which Barthes saves the Winter Garden photograph by not 
reproducing it for us. He cannot allow this photograph, which “gave me a sentiment as 
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certain as remembrance,” to become just any photograph, a photograph that might mean 
nothing.719 “No more than I would reduce my family to the Family, would I reduce my 
mother to the Mother…. When I confronted the Winter Garden Photograph I gave myself 
up to the Image, to the Image-Repertoire. Thus I could understand my generality; but 
having understood it, invincibly I escaped from it. In the Mother, there was a radiant, 
irreducible core: my mother.”720 He opts to believe in that which another’s photograph 
gives him to be seen, and this causes him to rediscover photography: “that every 
photograph is somehow co-natural with its referent, I was rediscovering, overwhelmed by 
the truth of the image.”721 He continues, “Henceforth I would have to consent to combine 
two voices: the voice of banality (to say what everyone sees and knows) and the voice of 
singularity (to replenish such banality with all the élan of an emotion which belonged 
only to myself).”722 
 Barthes discovers the emphatically undecidable nature of photography and 
represents it through two voices. The Winter Garden Photograph compels Barthes to 
believe in photography, understanding that his conviction in the existence of this 
photograph and its referent exists only for him (by way of another’s having been there to 
photograph it). For the rest of us, this photograph is merely banal, interesting only our 
studium; it speaks only to ‘what everyone sees and knows,’ which is its status as a 
photograph made by a photographer at a certain time and place for a particular purpose. 
The photograph, he comes to recognize, “always carries its referent with itself…they are 
glued together…. The photograph belongs to that class of laminated objects whose two 
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leaves cannot be separated without destroying them both: the windowpane and the 
landscape.”723  
Whereas his previous essays on photography sought to unveil the medium’s 
surreptitious delivery of ideology, this essay reevaluates the seeming transparency of its 
operation. Were we ever so credulous to photographic advertisements, which delivered 
their dominant fictions to us without our knowing better? Or did photography always 
operate in a way that ‘everyone [already] sees and knows?’ He returns to photography as 
the site of credulous spectatorship not to expose it as such, but to explore its own 
mythology. He suggests that the credulous first glance about which he and myriad 
postmodern critics spilled so much ink might always already have been joined by the 
incredulous second glance of the reflective consciousness. The first glance—as if through 
a transparent windowpane—and the second glance—at gelatin exposed or paint 
organized to depict that scene—are laminated together. In Camera Lucida Barthes 
articulates our understanding of this duality as our natural attitude relative to 
photography. Although its envelope may be transparent, we still recognize the status of 
its delivery mechanism. Rather than continuing to conjure a primitive and credulous 
spectator in need of a postmodern reminder that photographs are not transparent 
windows, and instead are made objects discursively deployed, in Camera Lucida Barthes 
suggests that such credulity is actually quite rare, and that moreover, it is a gift. 
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